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ABSTRACT 
 
Social media has become prevalent through platforms like Facebook, Twitter and 
LinkedIn and has essentially changed the way people communicate. At first, social 
media networks were used for private purposes; however, businesses have started 
using social media as a way to improve and advertise their products online. Therefore, 
social media presents many benefits such as lower costs for advertising and 
convenience for customers to view and share products online. However, the advent of 
social media in the business environment also creates challenges within the workplace 
that can have a negative effect on the employer–employee relationship. This is 
especially significant when social media is used inappropriately within and beyond the 
workplace. Therefore, the aim of this research is to address the legal challenges created 
by social media in the workplace, and whether employers have a contractual right to 
control and/or manage employees using social media beyond the workplace. 
 
The use of social media in the workplace complicates the employment relationship 
because of the various legal issues it creates. Therefore, the aim of this thesis is to 
highlight these legal issues within the workplace environment and how the use of 
social media affects the employment relationship when used within and beyond the 
workplace. Hence, this thesis will determine the meaning of a ‘workplace’ and how 
this may present legal issues relating to the use of social media outside of working 
hours. This discussion is coupled with the duties within an employment contract and 
whether social media has any impact on these duties within the employment 
relationship when determining the use of social media outside of working hours. 
Moreover, this thesis will examine the key legal issues arising out of the use of social 
media in the workplace, which include privacy and defamation as well as 
cyberbullying. These are key issues in relation to the ubiquitous nature of social media 
in the workplace. 
 
Focusing on these legal issues, this thesis will address the means by which employers 
can control and monitor the use of social media by employees within and outside the 
workplace through existing workplace surveillance legislation and workplace policies. 
However, the implementation of social media workplace policies to regulate off-duty 
vii 
 
conduct of employees may create some concern in relation to a breach of privacy. 
Therefore, this thesis considers the impact of privacy principles within workplace 
surveillance and to what extent an employer can regulate the use of social media by an 
employee beyond the workplace. 
 
This thesis concludes with key recommendations on the possible control and 
monitoring of social media within and beyond the workplace. The concluding remarks 
find that by introducing the integration of employment contracts and social media 
workplace policies, together with the implied duties under the contract, it is acceptable 
for employers to manage social media beyond the workplace.  Secondly, this thesis 
found that educating and training employees on the possible risks social media in the 
workplace can have and keeping the workplace policies up to date, may reduce the 
legal challenges of social media beyond the workplace. Lastly, this thesis proposed 
that existing workplace surveillance legislation be amended to include specific control 
and monitoring of social media within and beyond the workplace. 
 
1 
 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND TO THE 
RESEARCH PROBLEM 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
Social media is a global phenomenon and one of the most exciting technological 
developments in modern times. In 2016, it was estimated that 2.34 billion people are 
active on social media worldwide and that this will increase with time.1 As the name 
suggests, social media is about people connecting with each other within an online 
platform as a social means of communication. Further, as noted by Elefant, social 
media is ‘a catch phrase that describes technology that facilitates interactive 
information, user-created content and collaboration’.2 However, it is not only a social 
platform used by individuals for personal and social purposes. It is also now used 
extensively by businesses and corporations to advertise, promote and conduct 
business.3 Therefore, social media has become well entrenched in the workplace 
environment. Whether for personal or business purposes, there is no doubt that social 
media has many advantages. However, the use of social media in the workplace also 
has its legal challenges and can have a negative impact on the employer–employee 
relationship when it is misused, whether intentionally or unintentionally.  
 
The primary purpose of this research is therefore to examine the use of social media 
beyond the workplace and the implications for the employer–employee relationship. 
This thesis will therefore focus on the extent to which employers can monitor, control 
and manage employee’s use of social media, not only within working hours, but also 
beyond the workplace. A key question addressed is: ‘To what extent and on what legal 
basis can an employer regulate or monitor the use of social media by an employee 
within and outside the workplace?’. In addressing this question, this thesis argues for 
                                                          
1Statista, Number of Social Media Users Worldwide From 2010 to 2020 (2016) 
 <https://www.statista.com/statistics/278414/number-of-worldwide-social-network-users/>.  
2Carolyn Elefant, ‘The Power of Social Media: Legal Issues & Best Practices for Utilities Engaging 
Social Media’ (2011) 32 Energy Law Journal 1, 4. 
3Jessica Ireton, ‘Social Media: What Control Do Employers Have Over Employee Social Media 
Activity in the Workplace?’ (2014) 14 Houston Business and Tax Law Journal 144, 145. 
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the effective and purposeful use of social media policies, one of the most important 
workplace policies, as an essential tool for managing the use of social media in the 
workplace. By way of introduction to the thesis, this chapter sets out the background 
to the research problem, the research questions and research aims. It explains in brief 
the research methodology and framework, and provides an outline of the thesis 
structure. 
 
1.2 BACKGROUND TO THE PROBLEM 
During the past decade, the social media phenomenon has grown significantly with  
people  using social media such as Facebook, LinkedIn and Twitter regularly and on a 
daily basis.4 Increasingly, social media has also come to play a major role in the 
workplace as a means of communication and conducting business.5 As Holland states 
‘social media was originally designed for friends to keep in touch but it has morphed 
into one of the most powerful communication tools, both inside and outside the 
workplace’.6 To this end, social media has fundamentally changed how the workplace 
operates and how employers and employees interact with each other. McDonald and 
Thompson for instance note that ‘social media has become a pervasive feature of the 
contemporary employment relationship, fundamentally altering the reach, speed and 
permanency of work-related conduct and expectations’.7 Moreover, while social media 
has many benefits, there are legal risks and challenges associated with its use in the 
workplace.  This is further observed by Siow who remarks that the ‘trend of cases 
coming before the Fair Work Commission indicates that employers (and the law) are 
increasingly grappling with the impact of social media in their workplace’.8 A number 
of these cases, which are discussed in this thesis, also indicate that employers need to 
                                                          
4Emily Langer, ‘What’s Trending? Social Media and its Effects on Organizational Communication’ 
(2014) 17 UW-L Journal of Undergraduate Research 1. 
5Michael Silverman, Elmira Bakhshalian and Laura Hillman, ‘Social Media and Employee Voice: The 
Current Landscape’ (CIPD Research Report, March 2013) 8 – 9 
<https://www.cipd.co.uk/Images/social-media-and-employee-voice_2013-current-landscape-
sop_tcm18-10327.pdf>. 
6 Peter Holland, ‘Is Social Media the New Employee Voice?’ Business Insights (online), 28 January 
2016 <https://business.monash.edu/business-insights/is-social-media-the-new-employee-voice>. 
7Paula McDonald and Paul Thompson, ‘Social Media(tion) and the Reshaping of Public/Private 
Boundaries in Employment Relations’ (2016) 18 International Journal of Management Reviews 69, 69. 
8Veronica Siow, ‘The Impact of Social Media in the Workplace: An Employer's Perspective’ (2013) 
32(4) Communications Law Bulletin 12, 12. 
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be ‘proactive and address social media use by employees through an effective social 
media policy’.9  
 
Therefore, the primary aim of this research is to examine the use of social media in the 
workplace and beyond and the key legal issues confronting employers and employees. 
Central to this is the management and control of social media in the workplace and 
beyond through effective social media policies. Hence, a core aspect of this thesis is 
in the first instance to provide some background context on the nature of social media, 
the meaning of a workplace and its relevance for the employer–employee relationship 
given the fact that social media is accessed any time and any place and is ubiquitous 
in the workplace. Understanding the definition of ‘workplace’ is particularly relevant 
when considering the management and control of social media outside the traditional 
workplace environment. As technology and social media can be used anywhere, any 
place and any time, the traditional divide between private and public spheres of life 
and the workplace have become increasingly blurred. The divide is apparent in the 
changing nature of the term ‘workplace’ and whether the employment relationship 
continues outside the usual ‘cubicle or office’.10 Therefore, with the constant change 
in technology, as well as the broader scope of what a ‘workplace’ entails, it is fair to 
state that a ‘workplace’ can be any place and employees do not have to be bound to a 
physical space such as an office. Even an employee’s home can classify as a 
‘workplace’ when dealing with technology provided by the employer. This aspect is 
addressed in Chapter 2. 
 
A further discussion to the above-mentioned aspect in Chapter 2 relates to the use of 
social media and its impact on the employment contract.  The implied terms and duties 
of employers and employees in an employment contract play a significant role when 
social media is used within the workplace and beyond.  These implied terms and duties 
will need to address the changing nature of the employment relationship in regard to 
social media and its uses. These duties will further consider whether the control and 
monitoring of social media outside the workplace is limited to an employer’s duty 
towards his or her business and other employees. 
                                                          
9HLS Legal, Social Media is a Workplace Phenomenon (2017) 
<http://hlslegal.com.au/news/article/social-media-is-a-workplace-phenomenon>.  
10Ibid. 
4 
 
 
Notwithstanding the many advantages of social media, its use in the workplace does 
raise various legal issues. This thesis will therefore address only three key issues, 
namely the use of social media in relation to privacy, defamation and cyberbullying. 
These legal issues will be examined in the context of the employer–employee 
relationship and the implications for the management and control of social media in 
the workplace and beyond. These key issues are dealt with in Chapter 3.  
 
The first social media issue concerning the employment relationship relates to privacy. 
Social media is a platform designed to share ideas and information and with this 
privacy issues can be identified. Specifically, in the context of employment law, 
privacy and social media present certain legal changes with respect to the employer–
employee relationship. However, there are limited avenues for privacy protection 
especially in relation to the conduct of individuals in a private capacity. The Privacy 
Act 1988 (Cth) as amended provides some protection on the use and disclosure of 
personal information of an individual.11 However, privacy legislation affords limited 
protection in terms of social media in the workplace and Australian courts have not 
yet accepted any form of unjustified invasion of privacy of an individual.12 In regard 
to privacy and the workplace, both employers and employees have an interest in 
protecting their privacy.  Therefore, when social media plays a role in accessing 
information it can affect the employer–employee relationship, especially when private 
information is accessed outside the workplace. Therefore, this part of the thesis will 
examine the accessing of private information via social media pre-, during and post-
employment and whether confidential information can play a role in the management 
and control of social media by an employer.  
 
The second legal issue concerns the use of social media by employers or employees, 
but especially the use of social media by employees, that may give rise to claims for 
defamation. As noted, social media is global, easily accessible and instant. It can 
therefore influence the reputation of individuals and businesses in a negative or a 
                                                          
11See also Robert Slattery and Marilyn Krawitz, ‘Mark Zuckerberg, the Cookie Monster – Australian 
Privacy Law and Internet Cookies’ (2014) 16(1) Flinders Law Journal 1. 
12See, eg, Grosse v Purvis [2003] QDC 151; Sally Fitzgerald v Dianna Smith T/A Escape Hair Design 
[2010] FWA 7358 (24 September 2010). 
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positive way.13 Although social media has many advantages and can be used in many 
positive ways, on the flip side it can also harm employees and employers, whether 
intentionally or unintentionally. When using social media, the way of communication 
is electronic and therefore published material will be available to the public. At times, 
‘the public outpouring of malice by means of social media is an antisocial phenomenon 
of these times’.14 Therefore, the use of social media in the workplace to harm an 
employer’s business reputation or a co-worker’s reputation may be action by an 
employee subject to dismissal. 
 
The challenge with defamation and social media in the workplace environment is to 
identify the defamatory published information and who posted the information. This 
has significant drawbacks for a business’s reputation, which can result in an employee 
being dismissed because of their behaviour on the social media site. This is 
demonstrated in the recent case Malcolm Pearson v Linfox Australia Pty Ltd,15 where 
the employee’s employment was terminated owing to comments the employee had 
posted on social media about his employer. As a result, the termination was seen as 
fair because the employer had implemented a form of social media policy against the 
use of social media in the workplace, which was ultimately breached by the employee. 
On the flip side, an employer needs to be careful when dismissing employees because 
of the information published on social media. This is because an employee may have 
a defence of truth or opinion for the published material. These defences are put in place 
to protect the employee from being dismissed because of the published information on 
social media.  
 
The last issue relates to the effect of cyberbullying.16 Cyberbullying in the workplace 
is a critical legal issue, especially when social media is used as a means to perform an 
act of bullying on a co-worker or employer.17 A workplace-related cyberbullying 
                                                          
13Deborah Lupton, ‘Feeling Better Connected: Academics’ Use of Social Media’ (Canberra: News & 
Media Research Centre, University of Canberra, June 2014) 26 <http://www.canberra.edu.au/about-
uc/faculties/arts-design/attachments2/pdf/n-and-mrc/Feeling-Better-Connected-report-final.pdf>.  
14Patrick George (ed) et al, Social Media and the Law (LexisNexis Australia, 2014) 137. See also 
Duxton Stewart, Social Media and the Law (Routledge, 2013) 23-50. 
15[2014] FWC 446. See also Glen Stutsel v Linfox Australia Pty Ltd [2011] FWA 8444 (19 December 
2011). 
16One example is the case of Cairns v Modi [2012] EWHC 756 (QB) that led to the first social media 
case involving defamation. 
17John Weber, Should Companies Monitor Their Employees' Social Media? The Wall Street Journal, 
22 October 2014 <http://www.wsj.com/articles/should-companies-monitor-their-employees-social-
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matter was illustrated in the case of a young female, Brodie Panlock, who took her 
own life when co-workers continued bullying her in and outside the workplace.18 
Therefore, the communication and conduct between co-workers is not confined to the 
workplace and therefore issues such as cyberbullying can occur, which present a threat 
to workplace safety. It may be difficult to categorise and control cyberbullying that 
occurs outside of working hours, but the law recognises the need for employers to 
manage conduct beyond the workplace.19 
 
Therefore, having examined these key legal issues, the thesis moves on in Chapter 4 
to address the final research aim concerning the right of the employer to monitor and 
control employees’ use of social media within and beyond the workplace, and the 
importance of social media policies in protecting the employer–employee 
relationship.20 A central, and somewhat controversial, aspect of monitoring and 
controlling technology and social media in the workplace is the use of surveillance 
technologies. This part of the thesis will therefore discuss the legislative framework of 
workplace surveillance and its place in monitoring social media with a view to 
managing the employer–employee relationship while simultaneously recognising the 
role of social media in the workplace. The second part of Chapter 4 then discusses the 
importance of developing and implementing social media workplace policies that will 
facilitate the effective management and control of the use of social media within and 
outside the workplace where relevant and permissible in order to ensure harmonious 
workplace relations. 
 
                                                          
media-1399648685>; See also Richard O'Connor v Outdoor Creations [2011] FWA 3081 (24 May 
2011). 
18 Department of Justice and Regulation, Government of Victoria, Bullying-Brodie’s Law (25 November 
2014) <http://www.justice.vic.gov.au/home/safer+communities/crime+prevention/bullying+-
+brodies+law>. See also Geoff Wilkinson, ‘Brodie's Law Means Workplace and Cyber Bullies Face 10 
Years in Jail’, The Herald Sun (online), 5 April 2011 <http://www.heraldsun.com.au/news/workplace-
and-cyber-bullies-face-up-to-10-years-jail-under-anti-harassment-brodie-panlock-laws/story-e6frf7jo-
1226033612374>.  
19Bettina West, Mary Foster, Avner Levin, Jocelyn Edmison and Daniela Robibero, ‘Cyberbullying at 
Work: In Search of Effective Guidance’ (2014) 3 Laws 598, 601. See also Sue Lannin, ‘Cyberbullying: 
Government Crackdown to Target Social Media Sites’, ABC News (online), 3 December 2014 
 <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-12-03/government-plans-cyberbullying-crackdown/5935560>.  
20Employees have a general duty of disclosure and duty of care toward their employers. Equally, 
employers have a duty to provide work, act reasonably as well as a duty of care towards their employees. 
Chris Schlag, ‘The NLRB’s Social Media Guidelines a Lose-Lose: Why the NLRB’s Stance on Social 
Media Fails to Fully Address Employer’s Concerns and Dilutes Employee Protections’ (2010 – 2013) 
Cornell HR Review 2. 
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1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Against this background to the research problem, the following questions will be 
addressed: 
 
(1) What is social media? 
(2) What constitutes a ‘workplace’? 
(3) What legal challenges arise for employers and employees when using social 
media within and beyond the workplace? 
(4) To what extent can employers control and manage the conduct of employees in 
relation to technology and social media within and outside the workplace and 
working hours? 
(5) What role does workplace surveillance play in managing and controlling the use 
of social media in and beyond the workplace? 
(6) How can employment contracts and social media workplace policies be adapted 
and implemented in order to monitor conduct within and outside the workplace? 
 
1.4 RESEARCH AIMS 
In order to address the research questions, the research aims are to: 
 
(1) Explain what social media is. 
(2) Discuss the meaning of ‘workplace’. 
(3) Examine the duties within the employment contract in relation to the use of 
social media. 
(4) Discuss the relevant legal challenges faced by employers in the misuse of social 
media by an employee outside the workplace. 
(5) Analyse the employment laws in Australia that are in place to monitor social 
media in the workplace. 
(6) Examine the use of workplace surveillance, employment contracts and social 
media workplace policies as tools to control and monitor the use social media 
within and outside the workplace. 
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1.5 RESEARCH CONTEXT 
This research problem is examined within the framework of employment law. 
Therefore, general employment law principles and guidelines will be used to consider 
the research questions and aims of this thesis relating to social media in the workplace 
and the implications for the employer–employee relationship. Employment law deals 
with the fundamental principles of law that regulate the relationship between an 
employer and employee within and beyond the workplace. As explained by Edward 
and Robinson, employment law ‘is defined more broadly as the negotiated 
relationships between employers and employees’.21 Likewise, the International Labour 
Organisation (‘ILO’) identifies an employment relationship within employment law as 
‘the legal link between employers and employees. It exists when a person performs 
work or services under certain conditions in return for remuneration’.22 Therefore, this 
thesis will draw on constructive principles of employment law to examine the use of 
social media in the workplace and the employer–employee relationship.  
 
This research examines the common law employment relationship between an 
employer and employee and how this relationship has changed with the introduction 
of social media in the workplace. The common law duties, in particular of good faith, 
duty of care and mutual trust and confidence, between the employer and employee are 
also fundamental to the existence of the employment relationship.23  In this regard, the 
use of social media will indicate how these duties can be negatively impacted when 
either the employer or employee misuse social media in the workplace.  
 
In addition to the common law, the thesis will draw on statutory law. In this regard, 
the field of employment law in Australia is complex owing to the myriad of legislation 
that exits and the complex and often confusing relationship between Commonwealth 
(federal) and State and Territory legislation. Although in terms of the constitutional 
                                                          
21Kyle Edwards and Sarah Robinson, Labour and Employment Law: A Career Guide (Bernard Koteen 
Office of Public Interest Advising Harvard Law School, 2012), 4 
<http://hls.harvard.edu/content/uploads/2008/06/laboremployment2012.pdf> 
22International Labour Organisation, Employment Relationship (2016) 
<http://www.ilo.org/ifpdial/areas-of-work/labour-
law/WCMS_CON_TXT_IFPDIAL_EMPREL_EN/lang--en/index.htm>.  
23 Although the law of equity may also apply to employment law matters (see e.g. Chapter 3 in relation 
to a breach of confidentiality), this thesis focuses primarily on common law contractual duties as well 
as legislation applicable to the employment contract, as being the most relevant for the purpose of the 
issues raised concerning social media. 
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division of powers between the Commonwealth and the States, industrial relations has 
been a residual power of the States, over the years the Commonwealth has entered the 
field of employment law and industrial relations through the use of various 
constitutional heads of power such as the corporations power to pass the Fair Work 
Act 2009 (Cth), as one example.24 This thesis does not aim to cover the breadth of 
Commonwealth, State and Territory employment laws, but refers to key statutes where 
relevant and appropriate. Moreover, within the context of examining social media in 
the workplace in relation to privacy, defamation and workplace surveillance, this thesis 
will also include discussion on the relevant legislation.      
 
1.6 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This research is literature based using various case law, legislation, scholarly books 
and journal articles in various fields of law, but particularly employment law.25 The 
research methodology for this thesis is explained by McCrudden as the ‘primacy of 
critical reasoning based around authoritative texts’.26 Furthermore, this thesis engages 
with legal principles and a combination of rules and procedures that link with a 
particular area of law, specifically employment law, and the challenges faced within 
this area. Particularly, this thesis will draw on a range of primary and secondary 
sources in order to analyse the historical and current law relating to the legal issues 
addressed in this thesis and the limitations it presents.27 
 
1.7 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
Chapter 1 provides the introduction to this research where the problem to the statement 
as well as the background to the problem has been discussed. This chapter also presents 
                                                          
24 For a discussion on the federal nature of the Australian legal system and the division of powers in 
relation to employment law see Andrew Stewart, Stewart’s Guide to Employment Law (The Federation 
Press, 5th ed, 2015). 
25See, eg, Paul Chynoweth, ‘Legal Research’ in Andrew Knight and Les Ruddock (eds), Advanced 
Research Methods in the Built Environment (Wiley-Blackwell, 2008); Dennis Pearce, Enid Campbell 
and Don Harding, ‘Australian Law Schools: A Discipline Assessment for the Commonwealth Tertiary 
Education Commission 1987’ in Terry Hutchinson, Researching and Writing in Law (Reuters Thomson, 
3rd ed, 2010); Mark Van Hoecke (ed), Methodologies of Legal Research Which Kind of Method for 
What Kind of Discipline? (Hart Publishing, 2011).  
26Christopher McCrudden, ‘Legal Research and the Social Sciences’ (2006) 122 Law Quarterly Review 
632, 648. 
27See, eg, Susan Bartie, ‘The Lingering Core of Legal Scholarship’ (2010) 30 (3) Legal Studies 345; 
Terry Hutchinson, ‘The Transnational Lawyer: GATS, Globalisation and the Effects on Legal 
Education’ (2006) Australian and New Zealand Journal of Legal Education 93. 
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the research questions and aims in order to address the necessary legal issues arising 
from the use of social media in the workplace  
 
Chapter 2 provides an overview of the nature and development of social media as an 
introduction to social media in the workplace. The chapter then focuses on the meaning 
of workplace, the employer–employee relationship, and in particular the express and 
implied duties of an employer and employee in an employment contract and how the 
terms of a contract may form the basis of the management and control of social media 
within and beyond the workplace.  
 
Chapter 3 examines legal challenges and consequences regarding the use of social 
media in the workplace and how this can affect the employer–employee relationship. 
The three issues that are dealt with are privacy, defamation and cyberbullying. This 
chapter will firstly deal with privacy and confidentiality concerns pre-, during and 
post-employment. Secondly, it will look at scenarios where defamation cases have 
been decided within the framework of social media being misused in the workplace. 
Lastly it will examine the law on bullying in the workplace and how social media 
extends to cyberbullying, which can have serious consequences for employees. 
 
Chapter 4 considers how employers may monitor and control the use of social media 
by employees within the workplace and whether employers have the right to monitor 
employees outside the workplace by using different workplace surveillance devices. 
Workplace surveillance will also be considered against privacy principles and whether 
workplace surveillance policies will add to the protection of employee’s privacy within 
and beyond the workplace. Furthermore, this chapter will discuss the role of social 
media policies and consider the incorporation of social media policies in the 
employment contract. This chapter will therefore examine current workplace policies 
that monitor such conduct and will also consider improvements in social media 
workplace policies when considering control of employees outside of the workplace. 
 
Chapter 5 provides a summary of the thesis and sets out the conclusions, key findings 
and recommendations.  
 
11 
 
1.8 CONCLUSION 
This chapter dealt with the problem to this research and the legal issues the use of 
social media in the workplace creates. The following chapter will examine the 
development and use of social media in the workplace and how the meaning of a 
‘workplace’ may affect the use of social media outside of working hours. Furthermore, 
Chapter 2 will consider the meaning of the employer–employee relationship and how 
social media affects the employment contract beyond the traditional employment 
relationship. It will further deal with the terms of an employment contract and how 
these terms will be incorporated alongside a social media policy in relation to 
misconduct of an employee outside the workplace. 
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CHAPTER 2 
SOCIAL MEDIA AND THE WORKPLACE 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Social media has been in use since the 1970s and has developed exponentially through 
the use of different platforms.1 Following the invention of blogging in the 1990s, social 
media exploded into popularity with platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, 
YouTube, Yelp and numerous other forms.2 Although social media has, as the name 
suggests, emerged as a means of connecting people in social situations, for example, 
Facebook, it has increasingly become an indispensable tool for business and an integral 
part of the workplace.  
 
The development of technology and the use of social media in the workplace have 
provided businesses with the opportunity to promote their services and communicate 
with their clients as well as their employees using a wide range of non-traditional forms 
of communication that have a far greater reach.3 The following was acknowledged by 
Business Review Australia: ‘As social media continues to evolve and change, 
businesses are now adapting and embracing these changes with open arms. Companies 
are no longer relying solely on flashy ad campaigns or well-constructed press releases 
to communicate with customers. The rules have changed. Businesses must decide if 
                                                          
1Carli Garsow, Social Media has had a Monumental Effect on our Lives (2014) 
<http://digmagonline.com/2010/opinion/social-media-has-had-a-monumental-effect-on-our-lives/>.  
Different types of social media platforms that have been created since 197 include America Online 
(AOL), Friendster, MySpace, Facebook, Linkedin, Twitter and many more. These social media sites 
grew in popularity not only in private use but also within businesses. For example, in 2011 a survey 
showed that 65 million tweets were sent each day by private users and businesses and it grew to a total 
of 500 million tweets a day: Raymmar Tirado, A History of Social Media and the Future of Politics 
Raymmar (30 April 2014) <http://raymmar.com/history-social-media-future-politics/>.  
2Phillipa Collin, Kitty Rahilly, Ingrid Richardson and Amanda Third, The Benefits of Social Networking 
Services: A Literature Review (Cooperative Research Centre for Young People, Technology and 
Wellbeing, 2011)  
<http://www.uws.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0003/476337/The-Benefits-of-Social-Networking-
Services.pdf>.  
3Stephen Allred, Employment Law: A Guide for North Carolina Public Employers (The Institute of 
Government Press, 1999) 5. 
13 
 
they want to reveal their human side and forge new relationships with customers, or 
stay stagnant and “old school”’.4 
 
However, social media can present both challenges and opportunities for employers 
and employees when making use of social media in the workplace. As stated in 
Chapter 1, one of the main aims of this thesis is to examine the use and control of 
social media in the workplace generally from a legal perspective. Moreover, this thesis 
focuses specifically on the control and management of employees by employer’s 
outside of the traditional workplace and working hours. This control and management 
will extend to the monitoring of the use of social media by an employee whether on an 
employer-sponsored device or personal device.5  
 
The aim of this chapter is therefore to first provide an introductory overview of the 
development and nature of social media followed by the advancement of social media 
in the workplace. In terms of the workplace environment, this chapter will also 
examine social media in regard to the employer–employment relationship as essential 
background context for the discussions to follow in Chapter 3 on specific legal issues 
arising in the workplace and in Chapter 4 dealing with the monitoring and control of 
employees especially outside the workplace.   
 
2.2 DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIAL MEDIA  
In order to determine how social media and different social media platforms impact on 
the work environment, it is useful to first consider what social media entails and how 
it has developed. This part will consider the terms ‘social media’ and ‘social 
networking’ as related but distinct terms.  
 
In respect to social media, Clarke refers to social media as a ‘collective term for a 
range of services that support users in exchanging content and pointers to content, but 
in ways that are advantageous to the service-provider’.6 Furthermore, it also refers to 
                                                          
4Robert Spence, Social Media for Business just got Interesting (7 May 2013) Business Review Australia  
<http://www.businessreviewaustralia.com/marketing/774/Social-Media-for-Business-Just-Got-
Interesting>. 
5Little v Credit Corp Group Ltd t/a as Credit Corp Group [2013] FWC 9642 (10 December 2013), [67]. 
6Roger Clarke, ‘Privacy and Social Media: An Analytical Framework’ (2015) 23 Journal of Law, 
Information and Science 169, 169. 
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‘websites and applications that enable users to create and share content or to participate 
in social networking’.7  
 
Similarly, Davis refers to social media as ‘forms of electronic communication through 
which users create online communities to share information, ideas, personal messages, 
and other content (such as videos)’.8 Social media can include blogs, microblogs, 
social networks, media sharing and virtual worlds and this can all be accessed through 
personal devices such as mobile phones, iPads and computers.9 
 
Social networking, on the other hand, is the use of online social media to connect with 
people. It can be defined as ‘the exchange of information or services among 
individuals, groups, or institutions; specifically: the cultivation of productive 
relationships for employment or business’.10 Furthermore, Power notes that social 
networking ‘is a term used to describe web-based media that is used for social 
interaction’.11 Therefore, although social media and social networking are often used 
interchangeably, they are distinguishable with social media largely referring to a range 
of online applications or platforms, and social networking the purposeful and 
deliberate act of using these media to establish networks of people and communication. 
Thus, a business who has decided to use social media as a communication platform 
may use various platforms such as Facebook, Twitter or Instagram in order to interact 
and communicate with their customers and the wider business community12 and to 
form networks of relationships. Therefore, social media and social networking are not 
restricted to personal use but have also come to be used as powerful communication 
and marketing tools for businesses.  
                                                          
7Patrick George (ed) et al, Social Media and the Law (LexisNexis Australia, 2014) 2. See also Griffiths 
v Rose [2011] FCA 30. 
8Sarah Davis, ‘Social Media Activity & the Workplace: Updating the Status of Social Media’ (2013) 
39 Ohio Northern University Law Review 359, 360. See also Timothy Arnold-Moore, ‘Legal Pitfalls in 
Cyberspace: Defamation on Computer Networks’ (1994) 5(2) Journal of Law and Information Science 
165, 166. 
9Dorothy Bollinger, ‘Social Media and Employment Law: A Practitioner’s Primer’ (2011) 20 Temple 
Political & Civil Rights Law Review 323, 323-324. 
10Merriam-Webster Dictionary, ‘Social Networking’  
<http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/social%20network>. See also Karen McIntyre, ‘The 
Evolution of Social Media from 1969 to 2013: A Change in Competition and a Trend Toward 
Complementary, Niche Sites’ (2014) 3(2) Journal of Social Media in Society 5. 
11Charles Power, Social Media and the Law: Managing the Legal Risks for your Business (Portner Press, 
2015) 4. 
12Fauzia Burke, ‘Social Media v Social Networking’, The Huffington Post (online), 2 December 2009 
<http://www.huffingtonpost.com/fauzia-burke/social-media-vs-social-ne_b_4017305.html>.  
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Social networking however is not an entirely new construct. It began prior to social 
media using telephones instead of computers. A telephone network called ‘phone 
phreaking’ began in the 1950s, which entailed a process of hacking phones 
electronically to introduce items called ‘blogs and podcasts’.13 14   
 
In the course of the 1960s, the first form of email was invented, which made it possible 
for persons to communicate with each other via the computer.15 This led to the first 
use of websites and applications that introduced the communication system called 
Bulletin Board System in 1978, which was seen as an electronic message centre and 
an older version of the World Wide Web.16 During 1997, sites such as AOL and 
Sixdegrees.com were launched and provided platforms for people to connect and 
friend each other.17 This was seen as the first online communication platform that 
moved away from personal face-to-face communication. These platforms made it 
possible for individuals as well as businesses to communicate on new networking 
platforms.  
 
With the subsequent development in technology, modern social media platforms were 
created to connect people all over the world. These platforms include Friendster, which 
was launched in 2002 and made headlines with the ‘circle of friends’ technique by 
which ‘friends’ are added to the virtual network of friends,18 and Myspace, which was 
launched in 2003. MySpace was one of the favourite platforms at that time, until 
Facebook was created in 2004 that captured the limelight.19 Facebook was created by 
Mark Zuckerberg, who studied at Harvard University, with the intention of connecting 
                                                          
13Brett Borders, A Brief History of Social Media (2009) 
<http://socialmediarockstar.com/history-of-social-media>. For a detailed discussion on social 
networking prior to the 1960s see Vladimir Rimskii, ‘The Influence of the Internet on Active Social 
Involvement and the Formation 
And Development of Identities’ (2011) 52(1) Russian Social Science Review 79-101. 
14See also Mike Stelzner, Social Media vs. Social Networking: What’s the difference? (2009) 
<http://www.examiner.com/networking-innational/social-media-vs-social-networking-what-s-the-
difference>.  
15Karen McIntyre, ‘The Evolution of Social Media from 1969 to 2013: A Change in Competition and a 
Trend Toward Complementary, Niche Sites’ (2014) 3(2) Journal of Social Media in Society 5. 
16BBS, <http://www.bbscorner.com/>. See also Danah Boyd and Nicole Ellison, ‘Social Network Sites: 
Definition, History, and Scholarship’ (2008) 13 Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication 210-
230. 
17Digital Trends, The History of Social Networking (14 May 2016) 
 <http://www.digitaltrends.com/features/the-history-of-social-networking/>.  
18Ibid. 
19The latest social media platforms include SlideShare, Periscope, Vines and Snapchat. 
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the university students with each other.20 It is reported that within 24 hours some 1200 
students had already created a profile.21 The Facebook phenomenon rapidly extended 
to other universities and educational institutions and beyond. Within two years, 
Facebook had gained international popularity22 and is the leading social media 
platform to date,23 closely followed by YouTube and Twitter.  
 
Another successful social media platform is LinkedIn, which was launched in 2003 
and took a more professional approach to connect people in a business context and to 
advertise businesses and employment opportunities.24 LinkedIn makes it possible for 
professionals to create their professional profiles and upload their curriculum vitae and 
professional experience in order to connect with other professionals online.25 Finally, 
Twitter was launched in 2006 and enables anyone who accesses it to write short 
comments or statements of 140 characters called ‘tweets’.26 Twitter is also one of the 
most popular social media sites for both personal and business use today and common 
usage in the workplace.27  
 
As different social media platforms have developed, they have moved beyond the 
personal and social to now being widely used for professional and business purposes. 
However, the use of social media in the business environment or workplace creates 
both opportunities and downfalls which needs to be addressed. 
 
                                                          
20Sarah Phillips, ‘A Brief History of Facebook’, The Guardian (online), 25 July 2007  
<https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2007/jul/25/media.newmedia>.  
21Ibid. See also Ben Mezrich, ‘Friends and Foes: The Creation of Facebook’ (2009) 392 The Economist 
69. 
22Ibid. There was also a movie called ‘The Social Network’ on how Facebook was created within the 
University atmosphere < http://www.imdb.com/title/tt1285016/>. 
23Cooper Smith, ‘Facebook is Leading the Way in Social Commerce’, Business Insider Australia 
(online), 15 July 2015 <http://www.businessinsider.com.au/social-commerce-2015-report-2015-
7?r=US&IR=T>.  
24Ibid. See also LinkedIn, About LinkedIn (2014) <http://press.linkedin.com/about>. 
25Ewan Watt, What is LinkedIn? (2015) <http://www.roi.com.au/blog/social-media/what-is-linkedin/>.  
26Jane Douglas, ‘All of a Twitter?’ (2012) 26 Online Currents 305. See also Nicholas Carlson, ‘The 
Real History of Twitter’, Business Insider Australia, April 2011 
<http://www.businessinsider.com.au/how-twitter-was-founded-2011-4>.  
27See in general George Carter, ‘Trending on Twitter: How Twitter Can Help #lawlibrarians’ (2013) 17 
AALL Spectrum 7, 7; Phillip Gragg and Christine Sellers, ‘Twitter’ (2010) 102(2) Law Library Journal 
325, 325; Aviva Cuyler, ‘Social Networking: Leveraging Twitter, LinkedIn and Facebook’ (2011) 22(3) 
Connecticut Lawyer 26-29. 
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2.2.1 Advantages and Disadvantages of Social Media in the Workplace 
As noted, social media has become an integral part of business and the workplace and 
while there may be many advantages to using social media, there are also 
disadvantages that may affect the business and the employer–employee relationship.28  
 
2.2.1.1 Advantages 
According to Watson, businesses make use of social media in order to promote their 
products and services and to take advantage of the benefits social media present to 
businesses.29 Firstly, most of the social networking sites are free and Weinberg notes 
that this is a cost-effective way for businesses to advertise and communicate with 
customers.30 Secondly, the use of social media in business indicates that specific 
customers can be targeted. Furthermore, Hill, Provost and Volinsky observe that the 
use of social media is more productive in advertising products or services than through 
traditional word of mouth advertising because of the speed and efficiency with which 
information can be conveyed to vast numbers of people across the globe.31  
 
The use of social media in business can also be used to enhance customer service, 
which increases the prospects of customers reviewing products and services of the 
business.32 According to Power, ‘social media allows your customers to contact you 
in real-time, giving you an opportunity to add value by providing immediate customer 
service and support’.33  
 
From this discussion, it is evident that value is being added to businesses by using 
social media as it is transparent in the online information provided to customers and 
                                                          
28See in general Christiena van der Bank and Marjone van der Bank, ‘The Impact of Social Media: 
Advantages or Disadvantages’ (2015) 4(2) African Journal of Hospitality, Tourism and Leisure 1. 
29Richard Watson, Leyland Pitt, Pierre Berthon and George Zinkhan, ‘U-Commerce: Expanding the 
Universe of Marketing’ (2002) 30(4) Journal of Academy of Marketing Science 333, 334. 
30Tamar Weinberg, The New Community Rules: Marketing on the Social Web (O’Reilly Media, 2009) 
524-525. 
31Shawndra Hill, Foster Provost and Chris Volinsky, ‘Network-Based Marketing: Identifying Likely 
Adopters via Consumer Networks’ (2006) 21(2) Journal of Statistical Science 256, 257-258. 
32Australian Business, Pros and Cons of Social Media (5 July 2016) 
<http://www.business.gov.au/business-topics/business-planning/social-media/Pages/pros-and-cons-of-
social-media.aspx>.  
33Charles Power, Social Media & The Law (Portner Press, 2014) 5. 
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suppliers of the business.34 However, the use of social media, as discussed, can lead to 
difficulties and does have its disadvantages that could negatively impact on a business. 
As noted by Del Bosque, social media provides businesses with many benefits; 
however, they have to grapple with the ‘real drawbacks’ and legal pitfalls of social 
media in the workplace, discussed in Chapter 3.35  
 
2.2.1.2 Disadvantages 
Agreeing with Gommans, there are a number of disadvantages when using social 
media in the workplace.36 Businesses need to frequently monitor the use of social 
media sites for potential damaging remarks and comments made by customers or 
employees that could harm the reputation of the business or employer.37 Moreover, 
where employees are given permission to use social media in the workplace, they can 
share photos, videos and opinions on these sites, which could lead to defamation if 
inappropriately used.38 Hence, inappropriate use of social media by employees could 
negatively impact on the reputation of the business and ultimately on the employment 
relationship as well as the relationship with current and future customers. Likewise, 
Hennig-Thurau observes that harmful posts which are defamatory should be regularly 
monitored by employers, which once again, as mentioned, leads to social media being 
an investment in time, which not all employers have.39 Given the serious legal issues 
this raises, defamation is discussed Chapter 3 along with privacy.  
 
The use of social media in a business to widely convey information about the business 
and its people can inadvertently or deliberately raise thorny issues concerning privacy 
and confidentiality. Whether it is a breach of privacy between employer and employee 
or information of the customer, businesses need to take control and manage the use of 
                                                          
34See, eg, Cathy Hart, Neil Doherty and Fiona Ellis Chadwick, ‘Retailer Adoption of the Internet – 
Implications for Retail Marketing’ (2000) 34(8) European Journal of Marketing 654. 
35Darcy Del Bosque, ‘Will You be My Friend? Social Networking in the Workplace’ (2013) 114 New 
Library World 428, 436. 
36Marcel Gommans, Krish Krishnan and Katrin Scheffold, ‘From Brand Loyalty to E-Loyalty: A 
Conceptual Framework’ (2001) 3(1) Journal of Economic and Social Research 43, 49-50. 
37See, eg, Darren Barefoot and Julie Szabo, Friends with Benefits: A Social Media Marketing Handbook 
(No Starch Press, 2010).  
38Gommans et al, above n 36. 
39Thorsten Hennig-Thurau, Kevin Gwinner, Gianfranco Walsh and Dwayne Gremler, ‘Electronic 
Word-of-Mouth via Consumer-Opinion Platforms: What Motivates Consumers to Articulate 
Themselves on the Internet?’ (2004) 18(1) Journal of Interactive Marketing 35, 50. 
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personal information of employees and their customers.40 Just as social media 
networking companies such as Facebook and Twitter have their own policies dealing 
with the use of personal information, businesses using social media as a 
communication and marketing tool also need to also have social media policies in 
place in order to protect the business from unwanted behaviour.41 The development 
and implementation of social media polices is dealt with in Chapter 4.  
 
Factors such as cost-effectiveness, social communication and customer-specific 
activities indicate the advantage social media plays in the workplace and for a business 
in general. On the other hand, barriers such as time-management and the need to 
regularly monitor the use of social media by employees through social media policies 
and dealing with legal pitfalls can be seen as a disadvantage to the employer or 
business. Nonetheless, social media is here to stay and thus it is not a question of 
avoiding social media or banishing it from the workplace, but when embracing the use 
of social media in the workplace it is necessary to be cognisant of the potential impact 
on the employer–employee relations and the potential legal pitfalls. Therefore, 
although much is written on social media and how social media can be used by 
businesses to promote and develop their business, the focus of this thesis in on social 
media and the employment relationship and the legal basis for managing and 
controlling the use of social media within and beyond the workplace in order to 
effectively manage legal issues, in particular those associated with privacy, defamation 
and cyberbullying as three of the most challenging and emerging issues.   
 
In this thesis, it is argued that the use and misuse, whether intentionally or 
unintentionally, of social media in the workplace can have a significant impact on the 
employer–employee relationship. The aim of this chapter is to examine how the use of 
social media impacts on this relationship and the associated duties within the 
employment relationship within and beyond the workplace. According to a report 
published in 2012, around 75 per cent of employees access their social media accounts 
on a daily basis during working hours.42 This is a significantly high number and 
                                                          
40Melissa Steinman and Mikhia Hawkins, ‘When Marketing Through Social Media, Legal Risks Can 
Go Viral’ (2010) 22(8) Intellectual Property & Technology Law Journal 1, 5. 
41Ibid. See also Simeon Edosomwan et al, ‘The History of Social Media and its Impact on Business’ 
(2011) 16(3) Journal of Applied Management and Entrepreneurship 1. 
42Spencer Hamer, ‘Creating an Effective Workplace Social Media Policy’ (2013) 10 HR Focus 1. 
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indicates that businesses should be prepared when social media consequences arise 
either within working hours or outside. 
 
With the myriad of different social media platforms accessible at anytime and 
anywhere, in order to understand how social media affects the workplace and impacts 
on the employer–employee relationship it is appropriate to discuss the definition of a 
workplace and how social media can affect the workplace environment.  
 
2.3 SOCIAL MEDIA IN THE WORKPLACE 
As noted social media has become entrenched and widely used in the workplace 
through social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter and LinkedIn. The rapid 
increase of social media in the workplace is largely as a result of it being cost-effective 
and easy to access.43 One of the primary reasons for the successful growth and use of 
social media is that it can be accessed from anywhere in the world, using devices such 
as iPads, laptops, iPhones and even now the new Apple watches.44 This has benefits 
as noted above but also has implications within the workplace context. Social media 
is not bound by place or time, and has no barriers. To this end, social media has further 
blurred the lines between private and public spaces and has cut across traditional 
workplace boundaries.45 Therefore, although social media platforms are used for 
personal and social purposes, they are also used both formally and informally in the 
workplace for work-related purposes, blurring the lines between the personal and 
professional, and the home and work. This gives rise to legal issues concerning the 
appropriate use of social media in the workplace, and the extent to which employers 
monitor and control social media use beyond the workplace given the borderless 
environment, which is the main focus of the thesis. However, before examining the 
legal issues in Chapter 3 and monitoring and control of social media through 
workplace policies in Chapter 4, this section examines the nature and meaning of the 
workplace.  
                                                          
43Corey Dennis, ‘Legal Implications of Employee Social Media Use’ (2011) Massachusetts Law Review 
380, 380. 
44See Nick Vernon, The Apple Watch – Time for Employers to think about Social Media in the 
Workplace (27 March 2015) ShooSmiths <http://www.shoosmiths.co.uk/client-resources/legal-
updates/the-apple-watch-employers-social-media-in-workplace-9521.aspx>.  
45See in general Daniel Ornstein, ‘Social Media Usage in the Workplace around the World – Developing 
Law and Practices’ (2012) 13(2) Business Law International 195. 
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This section will firstly consider the definition of a workplace and whether this 
definition extends to employers monitoring conduct of their employees beyond the 
workplace. This is followed by a discussion on the employer and employee 
relationship and the nexus between social media use and duties arising from this 
relationship and the employment contract. The inappropriate use of social media by an 
employee, even outside the workplace, may lead to a breach of the employment 
contract that could affect the employment relationship. This discussion will then 
provide the legal basis for the management, control and monitoring of social media in 
the workplace, but also how this may extend to controlling employee conduct outside 
the workplace. 
 
2.3.1 The Meaning of ‘Workplace’ 
A primary question addressed in this thesis is the extent to which an employer can 
monitor and control the use of social media within and outside the workplace. In order 
to answer this primary question, the following section will consider the legal definition 
of a ‘workplace’ and the implications for control and monitoring of social media 
platforms beyond the traditional notions of a workplace.  
 
Workplace is not generally defined in employment legislation; however, the Work 
Health and Safety Act 2011 (Cth)46 is one important piece of legislation that does 
provide a definition of ‘workplace’:47  
 
(1) A workplace is a place where work is carried out for a business or 
undertaking and includes any place where a worker goes, or is likely to be, 
while at work. 
(2) In this section, place includes: 
(a) a vehicle, vessel, aircraft or other mobile structure; and 
(b) any waters and any installation on land, on the bed of any waters or 
floating on any waters. 
 
                                                          
46See also Patricia Monemvasitis, The New Fair Work Act Definition of Workplace Bullying (28 May 
2014) Carroll & O’Dea Lawyers <http://www.codea.com.au/Publication-1653-not-for-profit-may-
2014-newsletter.aspx?utm_source=Mondaq&utm_medium=syndication&utm_campaign=View-
Original>.  
47Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (Cth) s 8.  
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From this definition, it is clear that a ‘workplace’ can be anywhere the employee 
carries out work and can include an office, motor vehicle and even at their own home. 
The expansive definition of workplace is illustrated in the Fair Work Commission 
(‘FWC’) decision in Sharon Bowker & Others v DP World Melbourne Limited T/A DP 
World; Maritime Union of Australia,48 in which it was held that ‘the phrase “at work” 
describes an activity or state of affairs under which an individual is substantively 
connected to their employment or engagement. Being “at work” is plainly broader than 
being at a purely physical “workplace”’. It further held that ‘that use of social media 
affecting work colleagues, in or outside the workplace, is conduct which is exposed to 
employer direction and over which employers are expected to have policies and 
exercise control’.49 The FWC therefore recognises that in certain circumstances 
employers can exercise control over employees who use social media within and 
beyond the workplace.  However, the question arises to what extent should this control 
be exercised outside of the workplace through policies and employment contracts?  As  
in Chapter 4 of the thesis, the control and monitoring of employees and the use of 
social media through policies is an important and relevant management strategy that 
can help reduce litigation 
 
Taking into account the above mentioned definition of ‘workplace’, it makes 
accommodation for activities outside of the traditional workplace where the activity is 
one that is carried out within ‘the course of employment’ and for which the employer 
can be held liable. 50 This is relevant for the purpose of this thesis where employees 
engage in conduct that involves the use, and inappropriate use, of social media that 
occurs ‘in the course of employment’ whether within the traditional workplace or 
outside the workplace, even if ostensibly outside working hours. 
 
The extended construction of the workplace definition and the term ‘in the course of 
employment’ can be illustrated with reference to Ziebarth v Simon Blackwood 
(Workers’ Compensation Regulator), in which the Queensland Industrial Relations 
                                                          
48[2014] FWCFB 9227 (19 December 2014), [40]. In this case, the Fair Work Commission had to 
consider the phrase ‘at work’ within the meaning of bullying. 
49Ibid [42]. Also, refer to the Explanatory Memorandum to the Work Health and Safety Bill 2011, which 
explains the phrase ‘while the workers are at work.’ 
50See also Comcare v PVYW (2013) 250 CLR 246 for an in-depth discussion on what is seen as ‘in 
connection with employment.’ 
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Commission successfully granted a fleet services manager at a transport company 
compensation for an injury sustained at his home.51 This was an appeal from the 
Workers’ Compensation Regulator to the Queensland Industrial Relations 
Commission for an injury sustained by Robert Ziebarth, the appellant. On 21 March 
2013, around 10pm, the appellant had been in his shower at home when he slipped and 
injured his back while trying to answer a call from his employer.52 The appellant’s 
employer, Blenners Transport, told the appellant that he was on-call that evening and 
he had to answer his phone in case there was a major breakdown with one of the 
transport vehicles. Therefore, the appellant felt obligated to answer his phone 
accordingly.53 The issue in this case was whether the injury arose in the course of 
employment and therefore a ‘workplace’. The Commission considered whether the 
injury arose in the course of employment through the following two tests: ‘What was 
the activity being engaged in at the time of the injury?’ and ‘Did the employer induce 
or encourage the employee to engage in that activity?’.54 
 
The above discussion on the definitions of ‘workplace’ and ‘in the course of 
employment’, clearly makes provision for scenarios where social media is used in a 
similar fashion.  In the event an employee is inappropriately using social media beyond 
the workplace, but where there is still a connection with his or her employment, it is 
possible for the employer to take reasonable steps in managing this behaviour.  This is 
subject to the contract between the employer and employee and the necessary actions 
that may be taken when social media is inappropriately used by an employee beyond 
the workplace. 
 
On the other hand, the challenge for employers is whether they have the right to control 
and manage an employee’s use of social media outside of working hours when they 
are not in the course of employment.  However, the appropriate incorporation of social 
media policies may assist in this regard.  Therefore, the application of social media 
policies and employment contracts when dealing with inappropriate social media use 
by employees outside of working hours, will be further detailed in Chapter 4. 
                                                          
51Ziebarth v Simon Blackwood (Workers' Compensation Regulator) [2015] QIRC 121. 
52Ibid [3]. 
53Ibid [8]. 
54Ibid [31]. See also Campbell v Australian Leisure & Hospitality Group Pty Ltd & Anor [2015] ICQ 
16 [20]. 
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After considering these two questions, the Commission held that the injury was 
sustained in the course of employment, therefore considering this scenario within a 
‘workplace’ and stated that:55  
 
I am satisfied on the evidence before the commission that the [worker] has established 
a causal relationship between his employment and his [back injury]. The proximity of 
time between the fall in the bathroom and the onset of the pain, in the absence of any 
competing causal incident leads me to conclude, on the balance of probabilities, that the 
[worker’s] employment was a significant contributing factor to his injury. 
 
Therefore, the injury was sustained in the workplace because firstly, the employment 
contract stated that the employee should be available at all times; secondly, he was in 
possession of a work phone, which was required by the employee to carry out the tasks 
in the course of employment; and lastly, the employee was induced to engage in this 
activity.56 
 
In light of the above mentioned, an employee’s workspace can range from being in the 
office to working outside or on the road and this provides for the definition of 
‘workplace’ to be very flexible and broad and not necessarily confined to a physical 
office space.57 With the development of technology and taking into account social 
media in the workplace, it allows employees and employers to work outside of the 
normal working hours and to attend meetings via video or conference calls, emails and 
various online portals.58 It is clear from the discussion of ‘workplace’ that the 
employment of an employee is not limited to working hours at an office and therefore 
social media can impact on the employer–employee relationship during and after 
working hours. Moreover, the wide meaning of workplace has implications for 
monitoring and controlling the use of social media beyond the workplace, even though 
it is not necessarily at the office. The monitoring of the employee’s use of social media 
within and outside of the workplace will be discussed in Chapter 4, which considers 
                                                          
55Ibid [47]. See also Goodman Fielder v WorkCover Queensland (2004) 175 QGIG 871, 872. 
56Kate Denning, Back Injury Answering Work Mobile Arose ‘in the course of employment’ (July 2015) 
Denning Insurance Law <http://denninginsurancelaw.com.au/tag/workers-compensation-regulator/>.  
57See James Harter, ‘Should Employers Ban Email after Work Hours?’ Harvard Business Review 
(August 2014) <https://hbr.org/2014/08/should-employers-ban-email-after-work-hours/>.  
58Ibid. 
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in greater detail the control and management of social media outside the workplace 
through workplace policies. 
 
The boundaries between private and work-related use of social media is blurred and 
the challenges it presents in the workplace can affect the workplace environment. 
Hence, what is considered as conduct at work and conduct outside of work bring about 
the question of whether an employee’s conduct outside of work can still be considered 
the ‘workplace’ and therefore part of their employment.59 This was the question 
addressed by the Industrial Relations Commission in Ziebarth v Simon Blackwood 
(Workers’ Compensation Regulator).60 However, with social media being ubiquitous 
at times, it can affect the employer–employee relationship. It is therefore appropriate 
to discuss the employee–employer relationship in order to understand how social 
media can affect this relationship and what employers can do to manage the use of 
social media platforms in the workplace and beyond.  
 
2.4 THE EMPLOYER–EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP 
The development of technology, in particular social media, has changed how people 
interact with each other privately and within businesses.61 In the workplace setting, as 
mentioned, employers are using social media that can be valuable to a business.62 As 
a result, social media can be beneficial to businesses with regards to marketing and 
public relations, but the inappropriate use of social media can also be detrimental to 
the employer–employee relationship and hence the need for effective management and 
control within the workplace.63 In order to provide the legal context and framework 
                                                          
59In May 2015 a reporter for SBS was dismissed for his rude and unreasonable comments made on 
social media. The case is now being challenged – Markus Mannheim, ‘Ex-SBS Journalist Scott 
McIntyre Free to Challenge Anzac Day Twitter Sacking’, The Canberra Times (online), 1 January 2015 
 <http://www.canberratimes.com.au/national/public-service/scott-mcintyre-free-to-challenge-anzac-
day-twitter-sacking-after-tribunal-criticises-sbs-20151001-gjzhyu.html>.  
60[2015] QIRC 121. 
61See also Gray Plant Mooty, A Legal Guide to the Use of Social Media in the Workplace (2013) 
<http://www.gpmlaw.com/portalresource/A_Legal_Guide_to_the_Use_of_SOCIAL_MEDIA_IN_TH
E_WORKPLACE.pdf>.  
62See in general the International Labour Organisation, Country Studies on the Social Impact of 
Globalization: Final Report (Working Party on the Social Dimensions of the Liberalization of 
International Trade, Doc GB.276/WP/SDL/1, 276th Session, Geneva, November 1999) 2 
<http://www.ilo.org/public/english/wcsdg/docs/synthesis.pdf>. 
63See Tracey High and Christina Anderson, Social Media and the Employer-Employee Relationship 
Sullivan & Cromwell 
<http://www.sullcrom.com/files/upload/Social_Media_and_the_Employer-
Employee_Relationship.pdf>; Patricia Abril, Avner Levin and Alissa del Rieggo, ‘Blurred Boundaries: 
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for examining the question of monitoring and controlling the use of social media 
within and outside the workplace, this section provides an overview of the legal nature 
and development of the employer–employee relationship. This discussion will further 
be highlighted with reference to relevant express and implied rights and duties in the 
traditional employment contract.  
 
Although this chapter focuses on the common law contract of employment as the 
primary basis for the employment relationship, and the rights and duties that form the 
legal basis for the management and control of employee conduct, the employment 
relationship is regulated by various statutory instruments that include employment 
legislation such as the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) and industrial awards and 
agreements.64 In this regard, the field of employment law is very extensive and some 
parts of the law beyond the scope of this thesis. However, reference is made to such 
instruments in the thesis where relevant, for instance, when dealing with the discipline 
and dismissal of employees for misuse of social media within the workplace and 
beyond.  
 
2.4.1 The Development of the Employment Relationship 
The employment relationship signifies a legal concept that according to the ILO refers 
to ‘the relationship between a person called an employee (frequently referred to as a 
worker) and an employer for whom the employee performs work under certain 
conditions in return for remuneration’.65 This description indicates that the employer–
employee relationship is not only based on legal rights and duties, but is also 
considered an economic relationship because of the employee trading their services 
and the employer paying the employee a salary for those services. This in turn will 
help the employer turn a profit, which makes it economical.66 Furthermore, the 
                                                          
Social Media Privacy and the Twenty-First-Century Employee’ (2012) 49(1) American Business Law 
Journal 63-124. 
64 For a discussion on industrial awards and agreements see Andrew Stewart, Stewart’s Guide to 
Employment Law (The Federation Press, 5th ed, 2015) and Rosemary Owens, Joellen Riley and Jill 
Murray, The Law of Work (Oxford, 2nd ed, 2011) 152. See also James J Macken et al, Law of 
Employment (Lawbook Co, 5th ed, 2002). 
65International Labour Office, ‘The Employment Relationship’ (Paper presented at International Labour 
Conference, 95th Session, 2006) 3 < http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/ilc/ilc95/pdf/rep-
v-1.pdf>. 
66See Carol Fox, William Howard and Marilyn Pittard, Industrial Relations in Australia: Development, 
Law and Operation (Longman, 1995) 3; Ronald Duska, Contemporary Reflections on Business Ethics 
(Springer, 2007) 175. 
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employer–employee relationship can also be seen as a social one. 67 The social 
dimension of the employment relationship is clearly evident in and at the very heart of 
social networking and how social media is used for personal and professional activities 
in the workplace.    
 
In terms of the legal nature of the employment, Blackstone, described it as ‘a 
contractual relationship that bound the parties to a continuing relationship’.68 This is a 
fundamental premise because the ‘starting point for the analysis of legal obligations 
arising in the context of working relations must always be the terms of any contractual 
arrangement’.69 In this case, express and implied contractual duties are imposed on an 
employment relationship in order to prohibit any inconsistency that can harm the trust 
between an employer and employee.70 The employer–employee relationship is 
therefore based on contractual law.71 In this regard, one of the aims of this thesis is to 
examine the duties of the employer and employee and how these duties in the 
employment relationship may be affected by the use of social media in the workplace. 
 
By way of a brief introductory comment, the following section will explore the 
historical development of the employment relationship, from which key concepts such 
as trust and obedience derive, and hence the employment contract.  
 
                                                          
67Marilyn Pittard and Richard Naughton, Australian Labour Law (LexisNexis, 2010) 4. It is stated that 
‘by terminating the contract of employment, the employer deprives individual workers of their major 
source of income. The dismissal may also deprive workers of membership of the most significant 
community in their life and jeopardise their status in society more generally’ – Hugh Collins, Justice in 
Dismissal: The Law of Termination of Employment (Clarendon Press, 1992) 1-2. 
68Clyde Summers, ‘The Contract of Employment and the Rights of Individual Employees: Fair 
Representation and Employment at Will’ (1984) 52(6) Fordham Law Review 1082, 1082. See also John 
Howe and Richard Mitchell, ‘The Evolution of the Contract of Employment in Australia: A Discussion’ 
(1999) 12 Australian Journal of Labour Law 113; Simon Deakin, ‘The Evolution of the Contract of 
Employment, 1900–1950’ in Noel Whiteside and Robert Salais (eds), Governance, Industry and Labour 
Markets in Britain and France (Routledge, 1998) 212. 
69Hugh Collins et al, Labour Law: Text and Materials (Hart Publishers, 2nd ed, 2005) 70. 
70See Mark Freedland, The Personal Employment Contract (Oxford University Press, 2003) 88-92. 
71Nicola Countouris, The Changing Law of the Employment Relationship: Comparative Analyses in the 
European Context (Ashgate, 2013) 20. An example of this is the case of Yewens v Noakes (1880) 6 
QBD 530, 532 where it was held that ‘a servant is a person subject to the command of his master as to 
the manner in which he shall do his work’. This common law definition of an employee also relates to 
the statutory employee definition that an employee is subject to the control of the employer. 
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2.4.1.1 The Master–Servant Relationship 
The employment relationship stems from the medieval era within the household itself, 
for example, the master, his wife and children and then his servants.72 This was known 
as the master–servant relationship, which meant that all the needs of the servant must 
be met by the master and whereby the servant will obey the master in everything.73 In 
Australia, the master–servant relationship was inherited from the United Kingdom.74 
Selznick notes that:75  
 
The old law of master and servant looked to the household as a model and saw in its 
just governance the foundation of orderly society. The household model made sense in 
an overwhelmingly agricultural economy where hired labour, largely permanent, 
supplemented the work of family members and all were subject to the authority and 
tutelage of the father manager. The workman lived as a member of the household and 
often remained for life with the same master. It was against this background that the law 
of master and servant developed.76  
 
Under English common law, there was a clear divide between master and servant.77 
The relationship was described by Bacon as ‘superiority and power which it creates on 
the one hand, and duty, subjection, and as it were, allegiance, on the other, in which 
masters had authority to enforce obedience to their orders, from those whose duty it is 
to obey them’.78 This suggests that duties such as obedience, fidelity, good faith and 
                                                          
72Rosemary Owens, Joellen Riley and Jill Murray, The Law of Work (Oxford, 2nd Ed, 2011) 152. See 
also James J Macken et al, Law of Employment (Lawbook Co, 5th Ed, 2002) 3; Richard Carlson, ‘Why 
the Law Still Can't Tell an Employee When It Sees One and How It Ought to Stop Trying’ (2001) 22(1) 
Berkeley Journal of Employment and Labour Law 295. 
73Warren Freedman, Internal Company Investigations and the Employment Relationship (Greenwood 
Publishing, 1994) 15. See also William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England: Of Master 
and Servant <http://lonang.com/library/reference/blackstone-commentaries-law-england/bla-114/>: 
‘The great relations in private life are that of master and servant, which is founded in convenience, 
whereby a man is directed to call in the assistance of others, where his own skill and labour will not be 
sufficient to answer the cares incumbent on him…The first sort of servants therefore, acknowledged by 
the laws of England, are menial servants; so called from being intro moenia, or domestics. The contract 
between them and their masters arises upon the hiring.’ 
74Ibid. See also John Howe and Richard Mitchell, ‘The Evolution of the Contract of Employment in 
Australia: A Discussion’ (1992) 12 Australian Journal of Labour Law 113. 
75Philip Selznick, Law, Society and Industrial Justice (Russell Sage Foundation, 1969) 122. 
76See also Mary Gardiner, ‘His Master’s Voice? Work Choices as a Return to Master and Servant 
Concepts’ (2009) 31 Sydney Law Review 53. 
77See in general Timothy Walker, Introduction to American Law (Little Brown & Co, 1837) 261; Byrne 
v Australian Airlines Ltd (1994) 120 ALR 274, 334; Evelyn Atkinson, ‘Out of the Household: Master-
Servant Relations and Employer Liability Law’ (2013) 25(2) Yale Journal Law and the Humanities 205. 
78Matthew Bacon, A New Abridgement of the Law (Luke White, 6th ed, 1793) 121. 
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cooperation were mainly based on the personal ‘subordination’ of employees instead 
of the employee and employer having equal status.79 McCallum further explains that 
‘under master–servant laws, servants were required to obey their masters at all 
times’.80 Therefore, the master’s control over the servants included discipline.81 As a 
result, the relationship changed from the employer being ‘in control’ to ‘the right to 
control’.82  
 
From the 17th century, the government started introducing the notion of equality into 
the employment relationship, which meant that some kind of agreement could be 
established between master and servant.83 Therefore, the current employment contract 
is based on ‘freedom to contract’.84 According to Sappideen et al, the law of master 
and servant in Australia adopted the English contract law system whereby contracts of 
service were slowly implemented between an employer and servant to professional 
employees.85 Therefore, the master–servant laws established the dominance of the 
‘master’ whereas employment contracts, under common law, provide lawful control 
by an employer within the workplace. Likewise, Fox notes that the modern 
employment contract ‘reserving full authority of direction and control to the 
employer’.86 However, the employment contract, under common law, developed to 
provide freedom to contract on a more equal basis between employer and employee.87 
With the change in common law from a master–servant status to one of contract 
between and employer and employee in Australia, the courts in Rose v Telstra 
                                                          
79Simon Deakin and Frank Wilkinson, The Law of the Labour Market (Oxford University Press, 2005) 
66. 
80Ronald McCallum, Employer Controls Over Private Life (University of New South Wales Press, 
2000) 30. 
81R v Keite (1697) 91 ER 989, 992. 
82Ken Phillips, ‘Beyond Loyalty: Alternatives to Employment’ (1997) Non-Agenda 393, 393. 
83Mary Gardiner, ‘His Master’s Voice? Work Choices as a Return to Master and Servant Concepts’ 
(2009) 31 Sydney Law Review 53, 63. See also Roger Meiners et al, The Legal Environment of Business 
(Cengage Learning, 2014) 388. 
84Patrick Atiyah, An Introduction to the Law of Contract (Oxford, 5th ed, 1995) 7. The court in 
Blackadder v Ramsay Butchering Services Pty Ltd (2005) 221 CLR 539, [32] stated that: ‘The 
satisfaction of employment, the feeling of self-worth that it can generate and the maintenance of the 
skills to which their exercise would contribute are part and parcel of the employment contract.’ 
85Caroly Sappideen, Paul O’Grady, Joellen Riley and Geoff Warburton, Macken’s Law of Employment 
(Thomson Reuters, 7th ed, 2011) 24-25. 
86Alan Fox, Beyond Contract: Work, Power and Trust Relations (Faber, London 1971) 188. 
87See, eg, Steven Anderman, ‘Termination of Employment: Whose Property Rights?’ in Catherine 
Barnard, Simon Deakin and Gillian Morris (eds), The Future of Labour Law (Hart Publishing, 2004) 
105. 
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Corporation Ltd88 and Byrne v Australian Airlines89 held that an employee is allowed 
a ‘private life’ and an employer is not in a position to disrupt an employee’s private 
life without the necessary basis for it.90 Therefore, the modern employment contract 
makes provision for express and implied terms in order to deal with situations where 
an employer has control over the actions of an employee. This is relevant to the key 
aim of this thesis of whether an employer is in a position to control and monitor the 
use of social media by an employee within and beyond the workplace without 
breaching the employee’s privacy.  Privacy, as mentioned in Chapter 1, is a significant 
issue when social media is used within the workplace and will be explored further in 
Chapter 3. 
 
In light of this discussion, the following section will examine the nature of the general 
employment contract and the various duties within the contract of employment. It will 
further consider whether an employer can discipline an employee for misconduct or 
breach of an express or implied term in the employment contract outside the workplace 
relating to the inappropriate use of social media when the courts have recognised that 
an employee is allowed a ‘private life’.91 The question is whether there are exceptions 
to when an employer has a reasonable interest in disciplining an employee for misusing 
social media platforms beyond the workplace and which has an effect on the 
employment relationship.92  
 
                                                          
88Rose v Telstra Corporation Limited  1444/98 N Print Q9292 [1998] AIRC 1592 (4 December 1998). 
89[1995] 185 CLR 410. 
90Ibid 436. See also Philip Selznick, Law, Society and Industrial Justice (Russell Sage Foundation, 
1969) in Marilyn Pittard and Richard Naughton, Australian Labour and Employment Law (LexisNexis, 
2015), 97: ‘In the classic view, the law of master and servant is a branch of the law of persons. Writing 
in the middle of the eighteenth century, Blackstone spoke of master and servant as one of the three most 
important relations of private life, together with marriage and parenthood. Even the late nineteenth 
century treatises include master and servant in the law of persons or, more narrowly, in the law of 
domestic relations…The law of master and servant was rooted in a society in which everyone was 
presumed to belong somewhere, and the great parameters of belonging were kinship, locality, religion, 
occupation and social class. In all spheres of life, including spiritual communion, subordination to 
legitimate authority was thought to be a natural, inevitable, and even welcome accompaniment of moral 
grace and practical virtue…Work was carried out in the house of the master or in a small shop nearby. 
The workman lived as a member of the household and often remained for life with the same master. It 
was against this background that the law of master and servant developed.’  
91See discussion below in Rose v Telstra Corporation Limited  1444/98 N Print Q9292 [1998] AIRC 
1592; (4 December 1998) and Byrne v Australian Airlines [1995] 185 CLR 410. 
92Breen Creighton and Andrew Stewart, Labour Law (The Federation Press, 2010) 409-12. 
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2.4.2 The Employment Contract 
The execution of work and service in an employment relationship is observed by van 
der Waarden as ‘involving a contractual relationship’ and ‘it involves some adjustment 
of contractual concepts that contemplate purely commercial purchases and sales’.93 
However, an employment contract does not only purport to a worker’s service but also 
forms part of the employee’s identity, according to Owens and Riley.94 Therefore, an 
employee’s wellbeing, self-worth and personal circumstances form part of the 
employment relationship and hence the employment contract.95 As a result, the change 
and development of the growth of technology and the entrenched use of social media 
in the workplace, which has blurred the boundaries between work and social/personal 
activities has presented new challenges for the employment relationship. It also has 
implications for how modern-day employment contracts should be drafted to 
accommodate issues such as privacy, defamation and cyberbullying.96  
 
In view of the above mentioned, Stewart remarks that there are two important roles 
within the employment relationship: ‘(i) it provides the basic contractual framework 
for determining the rights and duties that subsist between employer and employee, 
offering each party remedies in the event that the contract is breached; and (ii) the 
extent that the content of the contract is not filled in by the parties … it supplies its 
own “default” norms in the form of terms implied by law’.97 Therefore, owing to the 
modern employer–employee relationship, rights and obligations are contained within 
an employment contract, which clearly establishes the parties to the contract and their 
duties and obligations towards each other, either explicitly or implicitly. 98  
 
                                                          
93Natalie van der Waarden, Understanding Employment Law: Concepts and Cases (LexisNexis, 3rd ed, 
2014) 4. 
94Rosemary Owens and Joellen Riley, The Law of Work (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 2011) 17. 
95Ibid. 
96Giuseppe Casale (ed), The Employment Relationship: A Comparative Overview (Hart Publishing, 
2011) 2. 
97Andrew Stewart, ‘Discipline at the Workplace’ (1992) 5 Corporate and Business Law Journal 257, 
258. 
98See Michael Doherty, ‘When the Working Day is Through: The End of Work as Identity?’ (2009) 
23(1) Work, Employment and Society 84; Simon Deakin and Frank Wilkinson, The Law of the Labour 
Market – Industrialization, Employment and Legal Evolution (Oxford University Press, 2005); Otto 
Kahn-Freund, Labour and the Law (Stevens, 1977). 
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In this regard, Lord Diplock explained that:99  
 
The basic principle which the law of contract seeks to enforce is that a person who 
makes a promise to another ought to keep his promise. This basic principle is subject to 
an historical exception that English law does not give the promisee a remedy for the 
failure by a promisor to perform his promise unless either the promise was made in a 
particular form, e.g., under seal, or the promisee in return promises to do something for 
the promisor which he would not otherwise be obliged to do, i.e., gives consideration 
for the promise. 
 
Therefore, as a general contract law principle, the employment contract must fulfil 
certain elements of a normal contract.100 Firstly, the employer will make an offer and 
the employee will accept this offer. There is no statutory requirement that employment 
contracts need to be in writing and therefore the courts can sometimes conclude that 
an agreement exists between the parties.101 Secondly, an agreement will only be seen 
as a contract if there is an intention to enter into this contract, written or oral, by both 
parties.102 Lastly, there must be consideration for the agreement (in the form of a 
promise) whereby the employer will pay the wages of the employee if that employee 
performs their work accordingly.103 When both parties have all three requirements 
present, an employment contract will be formed between employer and employee. 
However, this is not the only factor to take into account when considering the 
relationship between the employer and employee.104 On the one hand, the employment 
contract needs to fulfil the above mentioned contractual elements. However, on the 
other hand, the employment contract should also include express and implied terms. 
These express and implied duties form part of the employment contract as determined 
by courts and the common law.  
                                                          
99Moschi v Lep Air Services Ltd [1973] AC 331, 346-347. See in general Joellen Riley, Employee 
Protection at Common Law (Federation Press, 2005) 49; Otto Khan-Freund, ‘Blackstone’s Neglected 
Child: The Contract of Employment’ (1977) 93 Law Quarterly Review 508. 
100 Brian Willey, Employment Law in Context. An Introduction for HR Professionals (Pearson, 2009) 
43. 
101This was the case in Walker v Salomon Smith Barney Securities (2003) FCA 1099. 
102Ornstein, above n 45, 153. See, eg, the case of Redeemer Baptist School v Glossop (2006) NSWSC 
1201 (16 November 2006) where there was no legal intention to enter into a contract. A fine line needs 
to be drawn between when an employee has a legal intention to enter into a contract and when not.  
103See, eg, Soaring v Harris (1996) 13 NSWCCR 92 where some work which is performed is done for 
non-monetary benefits. 
104Anthony Forsyth and Andrew Stewart (eds), Fair Work: The New Workplace Law and the Work 
Choices Legacy (The Federation Press, 2009). 
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The parties to a contract, who are legally bound by the contract, are the employer and 
employee. Therefore, in considering contractual obligations, liabilities and 
consequences for breaches, as well as the regulation of the employment relationship, 
it is relevant and necessary to identify the status of the parties. It is not the case that in 
every relationship or situation the person concerned will be an employee.  
 
2.4.2.1 Definition of Employer 
An employer can simply be defined as ‘a person who engages another to work under 
a contract of employment’.105 The ordinary meaning of employer can be explained as 
‘a person or company that pays people to work for them’.106 In terms of the Fair Work 
Act the statute does not define employer but in certain sections refers to the ‘ordinary 
meaning’ of employer (for example) and in other parts the statute refers more 
specifically to ‘national system employers’.  
 
The meaning of ‘national system employer’ is defined as:107 
 
(a) a constitutional corporation,108 so far as it employs, or usually employs, an 
individual; or  
(b) the Commonwealth, so far as it employs, or usually employs, an individual; 
or  
(c) a Commonwealth authority, so far as it employs, or usually employs, an 
individual; or  
(d) a person so far as the person, in connection with constitutional trade or 
commerce, employs, or usually employs, an individual as:  
(i) a flight crew officer; or  
(ii) a maritime employee; or  
                                                          
105Ray Finkelstein and David Hammer (General Editors), LexisNexis Concise Australian Legal 
Dictionary (LexisNexis, 2015) 219 
106 Oxford Dictionary, Employer 
<http://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/definition/english/employer>. 
107Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) s 14. 
108 Defined in s 51(xx) of the Australian Constitution as ‘foreign corporations, and trading or financial 
corporations formed within the limits of the Commonwealth’. For an explanation of a constitutional 
corporation see Sarah Joseph and Melissa Castan, Federal Constitutional Law. A Contemporary View 
(Lawbook Co, 4th ed, 2014). 
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(iii) a waterside worker; or  
(e) a body corporate incorporated in a Territory, so far as the body employs, or 
usually employs, an individual; or  
(f) a person who carries on an activity (whether of a commercial, 
governmental or other nature) in a Territory in Australia, so far as the 
person employs, or usually employs, an individual in connection with the 
activity carried on in the Territory. 
 
It is clear from this definition who will include a national system employer. However, 
if a person does not fall within the ambit of the above-mentioned definition, they will 
generally be considered a state system employer. For example, under the Industrial 
Relations Act 1979 (WA) an ‘employer’ is defined as:109 
 
(a) persons, firms, companies and corporations; and  
(b) the Crown and any Minister of the Crown, or any public authority, 
employing one or more employees and also includes a labour hire agency 
or group training organisation that arranges for an employee (being a 
person who is a party to a contract of service with the agency or 
organisation) to do work for another person, even though the employee is 
working for the other person under an arrangement between the agency or 
organisation and the other person. 
 
Hence, in addition to the ordinary meaning of employer in relation to contracts of 
employment, it is also necessary to consider any statutory meaning of employer for 
the purpose of applying federal or state legislation to a particular matter. To establish 
whether the employment contract includes a national system employer or state system 
employer is key in order to determine which legislation will apply to the employment 
contract.110 This has also been highlighted in Chapter 1. 
                                                          
109Industrial Relations Act 1979 (WA) s 7. See also definition of employer and employee in Industrial 
Relations Act 1999 (Qld) ss 5, 6; Industrial Relations Act 1996 (NSW) ss 4, 5; Fair Work Act 1994 (SA) 
s 4 and Industrial Relations Act 1984 (Tas) s 3. Note in the ACT, NT and Victoria the federal Fair Work 
Act applies. Independent industrial systems have not been established in the ACT and NT.  
110For a discussion on a national system employer see Andrew Stewart, Stewart’s Guide to Employment 
Law (Federation Press, 5th ed, 2015); Ian Neil and David Chin, The Modern Contract of Employment 
(Thomson Reuters, 2012); Carolyn Sappideen et al, Macken’s Law of Employment (Thomson Reuters, 
7th ed, 2011). 
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2.4.2.2 Definition of Employee 
As is the case of employer, an ordinary meaning of employee is ‘a person who 
performs work under the control of another in exchange for payment of services that 
he or she provides’.111 Central to this definition is the notion of control, the scope of 
which is found in common law principles, and express and implied terms of the 
contract. However, the basis of control of employees is also found in legislative 
instruments.  
 
The Fair Work Act includes the common law (ordinary) definition for an employee.112 
It further defines an employee as ‘an individual so far as he or she is employed, or 
usually employed, by a national system employer, except on a vocational 
placement’.113 From these definitions, a national system employee is only generally 
categorised and not specifically defined. If the employer is a national system employer, 
it is easier to determine whether an employee is a national system employee because 
it will generally refer to a contract of service that includes an employment contract 
between an employer and employee. 
 
In relation to a state system employee, the Industrial Relations Act 1979 (WA), for 
example, defines an ‘employee’ as:114 
 
(a) any person employed by an employer to do work for hire or reward including an 
apprentice; or  
(b) any person whose usual status is that of an employee; or  
(c) any person employed as a canvasser whose services are remunerated wholly or 
partly by commission or percentage reward; or  
(d) any person who is the lessee of any tools or other implements of production or of 
any vehicle used in the delivery of goods or who is the owner, whether wholly or 
partly, of any vehicle used in the transport of goods or passengers if he is in all 
other respects an employee,  
but does not include any person engaged in domestic service in a private home 
unless –  
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(e) more than 6 boarders or lodgers are therein received for pay or reward; or  
(f) the person so engaged is employed by an employer, who is not the owner or 
occupier of the private home, but who provides that owner or occupier with the 
services of the person so engaged. 
 
In regard to a state system employee, they are well defined within the legislation and 
provide specific protection to these specified employees.115 However, scenarios can 
arise where it is problematic to identify an employee who is not specifically protected 
under legislation. This causes concerns for the employment relationship as the 
employee may not be an actual employee but rather an independent contractor. This is 
an important aspect of the employment contract because an employer is only able to 
manage, control and monitor the conduct of an employee with whom the employer has 
an employment contract. In this case, for example, an employer will not be able to 
control and monitor the conduct of an independent contractor.116 Therefore, it is 
essential to distinguish between a ‘contract for service’ (a contractor relationship) and 
a ‘contract of service’ (the employment relationship), the latter being the focus of the 
thesis. 
 
2.4.2.3 Independent Contractors 
Apart from an employer and employee forming an employment contract, it is also 
beneficial to examine the relationship between an employer and independent 
contractor in order to see whether this relationship will extend to an employer 
controlling or monitoring the contractor. Furthermore, this will also indicate whether 
a contractor has the same express and implied terms in this particular contract 
compared to the traditional employment contract between an employer and employee. 
According to Marshall, there is a definite divide between a contract of service and a 
contract for service.117 Therefore, a contract of service refers to a traditional employer–
employee relationship where an employee is under the obligation to fulfil their duties 
as stated by the employer, whereas a contract for service is related to an independent 
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contractor performing specifically agreed tasks for a specified price.118 Similarly, 
Windeyer J referred to this distinction as ‘the difference between a person who serves 
his employer in … the employer’s business, and a person who carries on a trade or 
business of his own’.119 
 
In relation to distinguishing between a contract of service and contract for service, the 
courts have applied various common law tests to identify whether it is an employee or 
independent contractor working for the employer.120 The most important common law 
tests relevant for this thesis include the control test, in business/economic reality test 
and the multi-factor test.121 
 
Firstly, the control test deals with the nature and degree of control the employer has 
over the employee. In the case of Gould v Minister of National Insurance,122 this was 
expressed by the court and held that ‘the degree of control exercised by the person 
employing the artiste … means not only the amount of control but the nature of that 
control’.123 Likewise in Zuijs v Wirth Brothers Pty Ltd,124 the High Court observed that 
the control test is considered ‘lawful authority to command so far as there is scope for 
it’.125 Therefore, the test is in fact about the right of an employer to exercise control 
over an employee.126 
 
Secondly, the business/economic reality test relates to whether a worker is considered 
economically dependent on the employer or whether the worker has their own business 
making a profit.127 A good example of this test was applied in the case of Abdalla v 
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Viewdaze Pty Ltd128 where a travel agent claimed to be unfairly dismissed. The travel 
agent in this case worked his own hours and was under insignificant control of the 
company.129 The Australian Industrial Relations Commission held that the agent was 
an independent contractor because of the agent having his own business rather than 
representing the company.130 
 
Lastly, the multi-factor test plays a significant role in determining whether a worker is 
an employee or independent contractor. This was highlighted in the case of Performing 
Right Society v Mitchell and Booker (Palais de Danse) Ltd,131 where McCardie J held 
this test to be:132  
 
the final test, if there be a final test, and certainly the test to be generally applied, lies in 
the nature and degree of detailed control over the person alleging to be a servant. This 
circumstance is, of course, one only of several to be considered, but it is usually a vital 
importance. 
 
Therefore, various other factors will be considered, besides control, in order to 
establish whether a worker is an employee or independent contractor. Comparably, a 
notable example of how the multi-factor test was applied is the case of Hollis v Vabu 
Pty Ltd.133 The court in this case considered whether a bicycle courier who injured a 
pedestrian was found to be an employee. On appeal, the High Court found that the 
bicycle courier was an employee because he did not generate goodwill for himself and 
was obliged to work.134 Therefore the court did not only consider the control of the 
employer over the worker but a multitude of other factors. The significance of this test 
is to determine whether a worker is an employee or independent contractor without 
referring to only one indicium. Therefore, this test allows the courts to consider a 
number of indicia and factors in order to make a final decision based on the 
employment relationship.135 
                                                          
128(2003) 122 IR 215. 
129Ibid 216-217. 
130Ibid [28]. See also Market Investigations Ltd v Minister of Social Security (1969) 2 WLR 1. 
131[1924] 1 KB 762. 
132Ibid 767. 
133(2001) 207 CLR 21. 
134Hollis v Vabu Pty Ltd [2001] 207 CLR 21, 42 [48]. 
135See also Abdalla v Viewdaze Pty Ltd (2003) 122 IR 215 [34] for a list of indicators regarding the 
multi-factor test. 
39 
 
 
Apart from the common law tests, the Fair Work Ombudsman further provides the 
following indicators in considering whether a person is an employee or independent 
contractor:136 
 
(i) degree of control over work; 
(ii) expectation and hours of work; 
(iii) risk involved; 
(iv) superannuation payments;  
(v) method of payment; 
(vi) tax and leave entitlements. 
 
If these categories fall outside the scope of performance of an employee, the 
relationship will not likely be one of employer–employee and the contract for services 
will be dealt with under the Independent Contractors Act 2006 (Cth). However, 
Dawson J in Stevens v Brodribb Sawmilling Company Pty Ltd137 cautioned against 
these factors and stated that ‘any attempt to list the relevant matters, however 
incompletely, may mislead because they can be no more than a guide to the existence 
of the relationship of master and servant’.138 Therefore, employers need to carefully 
consider whether the person is an employee or independent contract, not only based 
on these factors. 
 
A further difference between contract of service and contract for service was made in 
the case of ACE Insurance Limited v Trifunovski.139 In this case, the predominant issue 
was whether five insurance sales agents were seen as employees of the insurance 
company they were associated with.140 The sales agents were rewarded by way of 
commission and the contract expressly excluded them as employees but not as 
independent contractors.141 The sales agents argued that they were entitled to pay for 
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untaken annual leave and therefore they were seen as employees.142 Buchanan J found 
that they were employees of the insurance company. According to Buchanan J:143 
 
The selling of insurance was an activity which was required to be carried out through 
the personal efforts of individual agents and only by them. They were the personal 
authorised representatives of Combined under relevant legislation regulating activities 
in the financial services sector. The requirement for personal service to discharge the 
obligations under the contract which each agent had made is a strong indicator in favour 
of a contract of employment. 
 
Furthermore, Lander J held that a contract of service includes a number of express and 
implied terms in a contract such as leave, income tax and superannuation payments 
whereas the contract for service do not include these implied terms and must be 
addressed expressly in the contract between employer and independent contractor.144 
Therefore, Lander J agreed with Buchanan J in that there were no other indicia to 
suggest that the sales agents were independent contractors.145 
 
A further example where the courts applied the test in whether a contract is formed 
with an employee or independent contractor was in the case of Fair Work Ombudsman 
v Quest South Perth Holdings Pty Ltd.146 The Full Federal Court applied s 357 of the 
Fair Work Act as well as a ‘multifactorial test’ in order to determine whether someone 
is considered an employee or independent contractor.147 Section 357 of the Fair Work 
Act states that:148 
 
(1) A person (the employer) that employs, or proposes to employ, an individual 
must not represent to the individual that the contract of employment under 
which the individual is, or would be, employed by the employer is a 
contract for services under which the individual performs, or would 
perform, work as an independent contractor.  
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(2) Subsection (1) does not apply if the employer proves that, when the 
representation was made, the employer:  
(a) did not know; and  
(b) was not reckless as to whether; the contract was a contract of 
employment rather than a contract for services. 
 
In this case, the court held that a representation was made by the employer according 
to s 357 of the Fair Work Act as well as the ‘multifactorial test’.149 Therefore, the 
worker was an employee and not an independent contractor and the court took into 
account an array of factors and indicia in determining this position. 
 
Taking the above-mentioned case law into account, it is reasonable to argue that there 
is a distinction between employees and independent contractors as a result of the 
numerous tests and parts of legislation applied. For the purposes of this thesis, the 
discussion will not extend to independent contractors and their conduct relating to 
social media outside the workplace. However, it is necessary to point out the difference 
between the two workers in order to keep the boundaries clear of when an employer is 
responsible for conduct of an employee on social media platforms beyond the 
workplace. 
 
In the absence of specific case law dealing with independent contractors and social 
media, the distinction and relevance between the employment relationship and 
contractor relationship in relation to the use and control of social media in the 
workplace can be explained in the following hypothetical scenario in which A is 
appointed by XYZ training company as an educational training facilitator. After 
facilitating in Bunbury, A was upset with the lack of interaction and enthusiasm from 
the current group. Emotional and upset, A decided to make her disappointment known 
by posting on social media ‘I can’t teach these stupid Bunbarians’. Not aware of any 
consequences, A is informed that members of the Bunbury training group are upset 
with the defamatory social media posts. The group will be taking steps to have the 
posts removed and claim damages from XYZ. As A is an employee of XYZ the 
Bunbury group will be able to hold XYZ vicariously liable and claim damages directly 
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from XYZ. If A was appointed as an independent contractor to facilitate the Bunbury 
training program and posted defamatory comments on social media about the group, 
A would have been held personally responsible for any claim for damages and a claim 
for vicarious liability will not succeed.150 Defamation and vicarious liability is 
discussed in Chapter 3.  
 
The discussion on independent contractors and control is also pertinent to the vexing 
issue of whether social media workplace polices do or should apply to independent 
contractors. For instance, a thorny question that does arise is whether a business can 
prohibit an independent contractor from communicating information about the 
business on social media. This is considered in Chapter 4. In terms of an employment 
relationship, such issues and control are subject to the terms of the employment 
contract.  
 
The following section discusses the employment contract duties, specifically express 
and implied duties in an employment contract, and will also include discussions on 
how the use of social media in the workplace affect the employment relationship. It 
will further consider how the decisions by courts dealt with implied terms, specifically 
within scenarios where the employment relationship has changed due to technological 
and legal adjustments. 
 
2.4.3 Employment Contract Duties 
The employment contract between employer and employee consists of different duties 
towards each other that can have an impact on their relationship in different 
situations.151 Kirby J described the relationship between an employer and employee, 
with reference to the contractual duties, as ‘one importing implied duties of loyalty, 
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honesty, confidentiality and mutual trust’.152 Therefore, the duties are based on the 
nature of the employment relationship.153 In relation to the employment contract, the 
duties and obligations that must be met by both the employer and employee are what 
make it an employment contract.154 These are referred to as express and implied duties.  
 
The importance of these duties, in particular implied duties, play a role where the 
workplace environment transforms because of the use of social media. It is therefore 
relevant to discuss these duties against the background of social media in the 
workplace.155 These duties need to be considered to see how far an employer’s duty 
stretches in order to monitor an employee’s conduct regarding the use of social media 
outside of the workplace.  
 
2.4.3.1 Express Terms 
As mentioned earlier, an employment relationship is based on ‘freedom to contract’ 
and therefore an employer and employee will often agree to express terms and 
conditions in an employment contract.156 As soon as these terms are incorporated into 
a document and signed, the terms are part of the contract and the parties are bound to 
the express terms.157 Express terms in an employment contract are less likely to create 
problems, unless ambiguous or poorly constructed, and in the case where there would 
be some uncertainty about a term, the validity will be determined by normal 
contractual principles.158 The court will determine the express terms according to the 
words used in the contract:159 
 
It is not the subjective beliefs or understandings of the parties about their rights and 
liabilities that govern their contractual relations. What matters is what each party by 
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words and conduct would have led a reasonable person in the position of the other party 
to believe. References to the common intention of the parties to a contract are to be 
understood as referring to what a reasonable person would understand by the language 
in which the parties have expressed their agreement. 
 
Express terms include, for example, type of employment, payment, hours of work, 
termination and jurisdiction.160 In this case, the employer and employee can expressly 
agree to terms regarding the use of social media in the workplace. Both parties need to 
agree and intend to have these terms in their contract in order to prevent any confusion. 
Furthermore, a workplace policy may expressly form part of an employment 
contract.161 For example, the case of Raynes v Arnotts Biscuits Pty Ltd162 dealt with 
policies forming part of an employment contract as the employee was made aware, 
prior to contract formation, of the workplace policy being a term in the employment 
contract.163 The significance of workplace policies forming part of employment 
contracts is that when an employer utilises social media in the workplace, both 
workplace policies and employment contracts may deal with the inappropriate use of 
social media expressly. This will then determine the outcome of the action required 
for the inappropriate use thereof. This will also be dealt with further in Chapter 4.  
 
In addition to express terms, the employment contract is subject to implied terms that 
is, terms ‘on which the parties have not actually agreed, but which are nonetheless 
taken to be part of their contract’.164 As implied terms are not explicitly stated in a 
contract they are more likely to give rise to difficulties in terms of application and 
interpretation, especially where employees are not familiar with such terms.  
 
2.4.3.2 Implied Terms 
According to Wightman, ‘a crucial aspect of the theory of the common law contract of 
employment is that it embodies autonomous individuals creating the terms of their 
contractual relationship free from coercion; the state merely acts as a passive agent 
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enforcing the free will and freedom of contract struck by two equals’.165 Therefore, the 
employment contract, as discussed above, changed from a hierarchy of status to one 
that is now based on contract.166 Therefore, many terms must be included in the 
employment contract through an express agreement, but sometimes it is difficult to 
define certain terms in a contract that must be covered implicitly.167 The court in 
Barker v Commonwealth Bank of Australia168 stated that ‘implied terms can be 
excluded by the express terms of the contract or it may be excluded because it would 
operate inconsistently with the express terms of the contract’.169 The application of 
implied terms remarked in this case will be discussed in greater detail under the duty 
of mutual trust and confidence below. 
 
For example, the duty to obey is an implied term of the employment contract as it is 
an obligation placed on an employee to obey their employer’s orders. Implied terms 
are viewed as a ‘gap-filling’ device and therefore the employment contract is ‘fleshed 
out by implied terms – terms that the parties would not have directly or explicitly put 
their minds to’.170 Likewise, Carrigan explains that: 
 
Implied terms have been part of the matrix of different social formations for a number 
of centuries. They are part of the ideology of law and play a seminal role in reinforcing 
hierarchical conceptions of employment law. Implied terms are not abstract collective 
entities existing in a legal vacuum. They will not change their function in the face of 
criticism alone. They are a concentrated expression of economic, social and legal 
power.171 
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Thus, where the use of social media by an employee in the workplace is expressly 
agreed to by the parties, the parties still have implied duties towards each other in 
relation to the use of social media in the workplace and how the consequences of the 
misuse thereof will affect the employment relationship and ultimately the employment 
contract. 
 
There are two categories of implied terms within an employment contract, namely172 
implication by law and implication of a term necessary.173 The second category applies 
to business efficacy and works alongside the expressed terms in a contract. This was 
expressed by Lord Simon in the case of BP Refinery (Westernport) Pty Ltd v President, 
Councillors and Ratepayers of the Shire of Hastings.174 He held that five requirements 
must be met with regard to the second category in any form of contract:  
 
(i) the term must be reasonable and equitable;  
(ii) the term must be necessary to give effect to business efficacy;  
(iii) the term must be so apparent that ‘it goes without saying’;  
(iv) the term must be clearly expressed; and  
(v) the term must not be in conflict with any express term in the contract.175  
 
The rigorous application of these requirements will be difficult. Nonetheless, the court 
in Byrne v Australian Airlines Ltd176 held that this must only apply to oral or semi-
written contracts and the test is now whether the ‘implication of the particular term is 
necessary for the reasonable or effective operation of a contract of that nature in the 
circumstances of the case’.177  
 
The first category, on the other hand, includes terms that should apply to the 
employment contract regardless of the intention of the employer or employee.178 Under 
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this category, a two-step process is required, namely that179 there must be a contractual 
relationship that is identifiable180 and the test of necessity must be satisfied.181 One 
example of a term implied by law is that an employee must obey all reasonable orders 
given by the employer.182 The difference between the two categories of implied terms 
will be important when considering terms in an employment contract that are essential 
to the employer–employee relationship. This is also relevant when considering the 
employment contract and social media workplace policies in Chapter 4.  
 
With the development of social media in the workplace, certain implied duties between 
employers and employees apply to conduct involving social media. These duties form 
the foundation of the employment contract and provide the basis on which an employer 
will be able to monitor and control the social media and consequences for 
inappropriate use, which may extend beyond the workplace.  
 
The following section will firstly look at the duties of employees followed by the duties 
of employers. It will provide a general discussion on each duty within the context of 
employment law and extend to the use of social media and the implications of 
inappropriate use on the employer–employee relationship. The discussion that follows 
does not seek to consider all rights and duties,183 but only those duties that are most 
relevant in terms of the use of social media in the workplace, the inappropriate use of 
social media and the potential consequences, which forms the background for the 
discussion on monitoring and control of social media through workplace policies in 
Chapter 4.  
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2.4.4 Employee Duties 
An employee has certain duties under the employment contract that they must adhere 
to. In the case of Coconut Pty Ltd v Worrell and Anor,184 the court summarised the 
implied duties of an employee as the duty to work; duty to obey all laws; duty to care 
and skill; duty of good faith and fidelity; and duty not to disclose confidential 
information.185  
 
These key duties will accordingly be explained and discussed with specific reference 
to breaches of these duties in relation to the inappropriate use of social media in or 
outside of the workplace.  
 
2.4.4.1 Duty to Obey 
One of the fundamental duties of an employee is the duty to obey orders from the 
employer186 and the failure to do so is highlighted in Laws v London Chronicle 
(Indicator Newspapers) Ltd:187 
 
It is, no doubt, therefore, generally true that wilful disobedience of an order will justify 
summary dismissal, since wilful disobedience of a lawful and reasonable order shows a 
disregard … of a condition essential to the contract of service, namely, the condition 
that the servant must obey the proper orders of the master, and that unless he does so 
the relationship is, so to speak, struck at fundamentally.  
 
Therefore, an employee must show obedience towards their employer in the tasks they 
fulfil.188 This harks back to the master–servant relationship and the notion of control. 
However, orders directed at an employee by the employer must be ‘lawful’ and 
‘reasonable’.189 In the case of R v Darling Island Stevedoring and Lighterage Co Ltd; 
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Ex part Halliday and Sullivan,190 the court had to determine whether a reasonable 
command and order was breached by an employee. The High Court held that:191 
 
If a command relates to the subject matter of the employment and involves no illegality, 
the obligation of the servant to obey it depends at common law upon its being 
reasonable, in other words, the lawful commands of an employer which an employee 
must obey are those which fall within the scope of the contract of service and are 
reasonable. 
 
Similarly, in the case of Pepper v Webb192 an employee was dismissed as a result of 
not acting on his employee duties. It was held by the court that the dismissal of the 
employee was fair because the employee ceased from acting on fair and reasonable 
duties as requested by his employer, and therefore he repudiated his employment 
contract.193 The employer also accepted this breach.194 
 
The duty to obey is also illustrated in the case of Adami v Maison De Luxe Ltd,195 in 
which the employer asked his manager to change the normal hours of the dancing club 
to include Saturdays. Mr Adami was worried about this as he had other part-time jobs 
on Saturdays, but decided to delegate the work to other staff members. The employer 
consequently dismissed Mr Adami. The High Court of Australia held that the employer 
dismissed Mr Adami on a fair and reasonable basis due to Mr Adami not performing 
or obeying the reasonable orders made by the employer.  
 
Furthermore, the court in Secretary of State for Employment v Associated Society of 
Locomotive Engineers and Firemen (No 2)196 had to consider whether the duty to obey 
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was lawful orders was within the orders given to the employees. The court noted 
that:197 
 
There are many breaches of our law when an act which would otherwise be lawful is 
rendered unlawful by the motive or object with which it is done. So here it is the wilful 
disruption which is the breach. It means that the work of each man goes for naught … 
wages are to be paid for services rendered, not for producing deliberate chaos. 
 
This indicates that employers remunerate employees to obey lawful and reasonable 
orders and if an employee disregards these orders, it may constitute a breach of the 
implied duty and hence a breach of the employment contract.198 The primary question 
is whether the duty to obey extends to employees being directed on the use of social 
media beyond working hours.  
 
In relation to the use of social media in the workplace, the duty to obey is a matter that 
needs consideration, especially when examining the employer’s right to control and 
manage an employee’s actions outside the workplace. As held by Adami v Maison de 
Luxe Ltd,199 employers have the right to issue lawful and reasonable orders to its 
employees. If an employee breaches this duty, it may lead to a reasonable dismissal by 
the employer.200 One of the aims of this thesis is to consider the control and 
management of employees through social media policies in connection with the 
employment contract. This will be further examined in Chapter 4; however, the 
relevance in this part of the chapter is that social media policies, which to some extent, 
form part of the employment contract, may include lawful and reasonable orders when 
there is use of social media in the workplace.  
 
An example of this was demonstrated in the case of Pearson v Linfox Australia Pty 
Ltd201 where the employee refused to undertake training of the use of social media in 
the workplace, which ultimately led to the employee’s dismissal. The court held that, 
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even though workplace policies are formed with the view to deal with actions by 
employees within the workplace, the social media policy and specific training on this 
extend to an employee’s behaviour beyond the workplace.202 The dismissal was 
therefore not considered unreasonable because of the employee not obeying the 
reasonable and lawful orders of the employer in relation to the use of social media in 
the workplace and beyond. 
 
2.4.4.2 Duty of Good Faith and Fidelity 
The duty of good faith and fidelity is indicative of the master–servant relationship and 
remains an important implied duty that requires an employee to be faithful and loyal 
towards their employer.203 The word ‘loyal’ can be defined as ‘faithful or steadfast in 
allegiance’.204 Under common law, an employee has a duty of good faith and fidelity 
towards their employer to show loyalty within this employment relationship and 
therefore it is not an equitable term.205 This duty is mostly evident with intellectual 
property rights, confidential information of a corporation206 and competing with an 
employee’s employer.207 Furthermore, this duty is vital in the employment contract 
because:208 
 
Conduct which in respect of important matters is incompatible with the fulfilment of an 
employee’s duty, or involves an opposition, or conflict between his interest and his duty 
to his employer, or impedes the faithful performance of his obligations, or is destructive 
of the necessary confidence between employer and employee, is a ground of dismissal. 
 
There exist two notions of loyalty when dealing with the duty of good faith and fidelity. 
The first refers to ‘fiduciary obligations’ and the second ‘employment obligations’.209 
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Generally, when fiduciary obligations exist, a fiduciary relationship normally exists 
and the courts will determine whether an employment contract gives rise to such a 
fiduciary relationship.210 If an employment contract is established as a fiduciary 
relationship, two elements of loyalty exist: a fiduciary’s interests must not conflict with 
the interests of their principal and a fiduciary must make no unauthorised profit in their 
position as fiduciary.211 As already mentioned, an employee also owes a duty of loyalty 
under common law to their employer. This is also known as the ‘duty of good faith 
and fidelity’.212  
 
The case of Dover-Ray v Real Insurance Pty Ltd213 is a prime example of the 
consequences for misusing social media and the impact on the employment 
relationship. In this case, an employee was dismissed for publishing disparaging 
material about the employer on a social media blog that was harmful to the employer’s 
reputation and, importantly, for refusing to remove the blog when instructed to do 
so.214 The Commission held that there was a valid reason for the dismissal pursuant to 
s 652(3)(a) of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) as ‘the blog, in effect, was an 
attack on the integrity of management’.215  The Commissioner did note that ‘it is not 
necessary for me to find whether or not Ms Dover-Ray’s conduct was a breach of her 
obligations as an employee not to conduct oneself in a manner calculated or likely to 
destroy or seriously damage the relationship of mutual trust and confidence between 
the employer and employee and to act with good faith towards her employer – that 
were implied terms of her contract of employment’.216 Arguably however such conduct 
falls within the scope of the implied duty to act in good faith, and it can seriously 
damage the employment relationship as was clearly evident in this case. A refusal to 
carry out a reasonable instruction may also amount to a breach of duty to obey, as 
discussed above.   
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The duty of good faith and fidelity indicates the importance of loyalty between an 
employer and employee and that serious consequences will arise from the 
inappropriate use of social media within and beyond the workplace.217 Therefore, this 
duty is well established within the employment contract and any breach thereof will 
undermine the confidence of the employer.218 This duty will also extend to how 
employers can control and monitor employee’s behaviour outside of the workplace 
through their employment contract and workplace policies on social media. Aside from 
an employee having a duty to obey and good faith, it is also required from an employee 
to have a duty of care towards their employer. 
 
2.4.4.3 Duty of Care 
Employees have a duty of care towards their employer to perform their work in a 
skilful manner. In general terms, the existence of a duty of care was considered by the 
court in Donoghue v Stevenson.219 In this case, Lord Atkin held that:220 
 
You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonably 
foresee would be likely to injure your neighbour. Who, then, in law is my neighbour? 
The answer seems to be – persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act 
that I ought reasonably to have them in contemplation as being so affected when I am 
directing my mind to the acts or omissions which are called in question. 
 
In an employment context, the reasonable duty of care will be applied in a similar 
fashion and an employee needs to be aware of their actions and whether it was 
foreseeable or not. This duty has also been marked as an ‘inherent requirement of the 
job’.221 This duty includes three steps. Firstly, the employee must possess the required 
skill for the job, which goes together with inherent requirements of the job.222 
Secondly, the employee must perform their job in an acceptable and skilful manner.223 
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Lastly, the employee must perform their job with the necessary care.224 This duty is 
essential to the employment relationship as the employee is required to comply with 
an employer’s policies within the workplace.225 This extends to activities beyond the 
workplace, which is categorised in connection with their employment and the 
inappropriate use of social media in the workplace and beyond. 
 
In relation to this duty, employees have a general duty to take reasonable care not to 
cause damage to their employer whether within working hours or beyond.226  
Therefore, employees need to take care when using social media as a means of 
communication in the workplace and beyond due to their general duty of care towards 
the employer.  In the case of Wilkinson-Reed v Launtoy,227 the employee was dismissed 
because of a message sent by the employee to her manager’s estranged wife.  The 
message contained derogatory comments about the manager.  The Commissioner held 
that the comments made on the estranged wife’s Facebook account was for private 
purposes only and therefore it would have remained confidential.228  The dismissal 
was found to be unlawful.  Even though this was the position held by the Commission, 
employees need to take care when posting online as inappropriate behaviour by an 
employee in this regard may be against their implied duty of care.  Furthermore, it may 
be against a social media workplace policy associated with the implied duties found 
within the employment contract. 
 
As a result of the limited Australian case law on the use of social media in the 
workplace and breach of duty of care, the following case is instructive for illustrating 
the duty of care in relation to the inappropriate use of social media.  The case of 
PhoneDog v Kravitz.229 involved a US company (PhoneDog) who provides online 
news and blogs to mobile device readers. In 2006, they employed Mr Kravitz as a 
blogger for their business. He was contracted to provide relevant information and news 
to PhoneDog’s clients through Twitter and other online platforms. For this, Mr Kravitz 
                                                          
224Ornstein, above n 45. 
225Department of Commerce, Government of Western Australia, Guidance Note. General Duty of Care 
in Western Australian Workplaces (2005)  
<https://www.commerce.wa.gov.au/sites/default/files/atoms/files/general_duty_of_care.pdf>.  
226Lister v The Romford Ice and Cold Storage Company Limited (1957) AC 555. 
227[2014] FWC 644 (24 January 2014). 
228Ibid [63]. 
229PhoneDog v Kravitz, No. 11-03474 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2011) 
< http://courtweb.pamd.uscourts.gov/courtwebsearch/cand/DduUX1LkLg.pdf>. 
55 
 
made use of the Twitter account ‘@PhoneDog_Noah’ and within his contract of 
service he gained more than 17 000 followers. Mr Kravitz’s employment ended in 
2010 and the dispute between him and his employer arose because he would not release 
the PhoneDog Twitter account back to his employer. Mr Kravitz changed the Twitter 
account name to ‘@noahkravitz’. Mr Kravitz gained employment at a competitor of 
PhoneDog and used this Twitter account name.  
 
PhoneDog argued that there is an economic relationship between them and their users, 
who follow them on these social media platforms and that Mr Kravitz disrupted the 
relationship causing PhoneDog to be economically harmed by his actions.230 The court 
concurred with these arguments.231 The most important argument advanced by 
PhoneDog, which is of relevance for this implied duty, was that Mr Kravitz owed them 
a duty of care and therefore he was negligent in changing the Twitter account and 
distributing news to the same Twitter followers from another account.232 Therefore, 
Mr Kravitz was found to have breached his duty of care towards his employer. 
 
The duty of care by an employee towards an employer when using social media is still 
relevant, even though it is outside the workplace. It has earlier been discussed that a 
‘workplace’ can be considered anywhere and therefore employees need to be aware 
that their private activities when accessing social media platforms may be subject to 
monitoring and control by the employer. The above mentioned implied duties by the 
employee are important to fulfil the employment contract between the parties. 
However, just as the employee duties are important within this scope, so are the 
employer duties in order to complete the employment contract and the way employers 
have duties towards their employees when assessing the use of social media in the 
workplace and beyond. 
 
2.4.5 Employer Duties 
At the same time as employees have implied duties towards their employer, so too 
does the employer have duties towards their employee. An employer’s duty towards 
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their employees is implied by operation of law.233 An employer’s duties include the 
duty to pay wages;234 duty to provide work;235 duty to act reasonably;236 duty of care; 
and duty of mutual trust and confidence. The focal point and heart of these duties lie 
with mutual trust and confidence. The main discussion will surround the duty to act 
reasonably, duty of care and the duty of mutual trust and confidence. This discussion 
will expand into whether employers have the duty to control and manage the actions 
of employees outside the workplace when they use social media in an inappropriate 
way towards the employer. 
 
2.4.5.1 Duty of Care 
At common law, employers owe a duty of care to their employees with regard to the 
employer–employee relationship as well as within health and safety.237 This is to 
ensure the safety of all employees within the workplace.238 Although this is of a 
tortious or negligent nature, it also falls within the contractual relationship between 
employer and employee.239 An employee’s safety is recognised through a ‘neighbour’ 
relationship between employer and employee.240 The court in Cotter v Huddart Parker 
Ltd241 further described the duty of care by an employer as follows: 
 
The special duties which are owed to an employee as contrasted with ordinary invitees 
arise by virtue of implications in the contract of employment. They comprise the duties 
to ensure, so far as it is possible to do so by the exercise of reasonable care, (1) that the 
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persons selected to work with him as his fellow employees are competent, (2) that the 
premises at which he is to work, and the appliances in use there, are safe, and (3) that 
the general system of working which is in use is also safe.242 
 
Similarly, the case of Pascoe v Coolum Resort243 dealt with the duty of care by an 
employer. In this case the employee was walking with co-workers down a paved 
pathway and at the end of it, she slipped and injured her knee.244 The court, in this 
regard, held that:245  
 
The degree of care necessary to discharge its obligation to take reasonable care for the 
respondent is, accordingly, of a higher order. In this regard, it is well established that, 
in the context of the employer's duty to its employees, the exercise of reasonable care 
for the employee's safety in the environment created for, and in the course of, the 
conduct of appellant's business operations includes recognition of the possibility of 
inadvertence or even careless lack of attention by its employees. 
 
Therefore, this duty is not only seen as personal but also non-delegable, which means 
that an employer has a duty of care, not only towards employees but also independent 
contractors.246 Furthermore, the case of Wright v Optus Administration Pty Limited247 
indicated that an employer always has a duty of care towards employees and their 
safety. In this case, a former employee attempted to murder a co-worker by pushing 
him off the roof where the training took place. The court in this case noted that Optus, 
as employer, had acted negligently in not keeping the workplace safe and calling the 
police immediately after becoming aware of this. In the context of social media, an 
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employer has a duty of care towards any employee who is not safe in the workplace. 
This is evident from the case in Cotter v Huddart Parker Ltd noted above.248  
 
The duty of care by an employer, for purposes of this thesis, will be aimed at keeping 
employees safe within the workplace when using social media and specifically focus 
on cyberbullying as an issue when employees misuse social media. A good example 
of inappropriate behaviour by employees towards one another is the case of Sharon 
Bowker & Ors v DP World Melbourne Ltd & Ors,249 which deals with bullying in the 
workplace. This case considered whether an employer has a duty of care towards 
employees whose safety is being threatened outside of the workplace on a social media 
network. In this case, the FWC stated that for an employer to take action and perform 
their duties there is no requirement for the bullying to take place within the 
workplace.250 Therefore, it can extend beyond the workplace and efficient control and 
monitoring is able to take place.  
 
This is one of the few cases reported that deals with cyberbullying in the workplace;251 
the issue of cyberbullying will further be explored in Chapter 3. The duty of an 
employer to keep their employees safe is key within the employment relationship. 
Because of the significance of this duty on the employment relationship, the 
termination of employment as a result of inappropriate behaviour by employees 
towards co-workers must be taken seriously by employers.  
 
2.4.5.2 Duty to Act Reasonably (‘In Good Faith’) 
Baroness Hale in the case of Crossley v Faithful & Gould Holdings Ltd252 held that: 
‘it seems to me that, rather than focus on the elusive concept of necessity, it is better 
to recognise that, to some extent at least, the existence and scope of standardised 
implied terms raise questions of reasonableness, fairness and the balancing of 
competing policy considerations’.253 Further, the court in Woods v WM Car Services254 
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stated that an employer should be good and considerate.255 However, some case law 
suggests that ‘good faith’ and ‘reasonableness’ are two co-existing duties within the 
employment contract.256 In Australia, there is no set definition for ‘good faith’, but 
Mason refers to it in three stages: an obligation on the parties to cooperate; complying 
with standards of conduct in an honest way; and being reasonable within complying 
with standards of conduct in an honest way.257  
 
In the case of Downe v Sydney West Area Health Service (No 2),258 the court held that 
‘the Health Department’s power cannot be exercised to undermine or destroy the basis 
of the employee’s contract of employment’259 and further submits that ‘the employee 
relies upon a breach of the implied duty not to engage in conduct calculated or likely 
to destroy or seriously damage the relationship of confidence and trust between 
employer and employee, which the employee says is implied into her contract of 
employment’.260 Therefore, traditionally this duty did not form part of the employment 
contract.261 
 
The interest with good faith comes in whether it should be seen as a subjective or 
objective standard of reasonableness, due to both being co-existing duties.262 
Farnsworth notes that ‘a requirement of fair dealing arguably incorporates an objective 
standard and may invite expert testimony as to the practices of a particular trade or 
profession’.263 In some cases, the courts have implied both ‘good faith’ and 
‘reasonableness’ together.264 Mason further suggests that ‘the obligation of good faith 
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includes compliance with standards of conduct which are reasonable having regard to 
the interests of the parties’.265  
 
In the case of Royal Botanic Gardens and Domain Trust v South Sydney City 
Council,266 the court suggested that the duty of ‘good faith’ will be implied in certain 
contracts. Nevertheless, the view on the existence of the duty of good faith and the 
duty to act reasonably has had conflicting views over the past few years. In the case of 
South Australia v McDonald,267 it was accepted that such a term should be implied ‘to 
restrain abuses of an employer’s power’. On the other hand, it has been suggested that 
this duty should be an implied term in all contracts.268 Currently, and in the case of 
Australian Licenced Aircraft Engineers Association v Qantas Airways Limited,269 the 
Commissioner held that the duty of good faith forms part of the employment contract, 
but is uncertain to what extent.270 
 
One example of where the court approached both ‘good faith’ and ‘reasonableness’ 
was in the case of Rogan-Gardiner v Woolworths.271 The employee was an accountant 
for Woolworths over a period of eight years and when restructuring took place 
Woolworths dismissed the employee while she was on maternity leave after she 
refused to be placed in another position. The court held that there is an implied duty 
of good faith within the employment contract but Woolworths did not breach this duty 
due to them informing the employee of other positions available.272 Furthermore, the 
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court held that Woolworths was reasonable in giving notice and reasonable 
remuneration to the employee.273 
 
In circumstances where social media comes into play within the employment 
relationship, the employer will have a duty to act reasonably and in good faith 
(honestly) towards the employee in regard to their actions on social media. The duty 
to act reasonably and in good faith on the grounds of inappropriate use of social media 
by employees is especially relevant in the termination of employment contracts as a 
result thereof.  Although the concept of dismissal is necessary, it is also essential for 
the employer to remember that when dismissing an employee regarding the 
inappropriate use of social media and any code of conduct within the workplace, it 
must be done reasonably and fair.274 The dismissal of an employee regarding the 
inappropriate use of social media beyond the workplace should also consider whether 
the employee understood their actions at the time the comments were posted in 
connection with employment. This was considered in the case of Linfox Australia Pty 
Ltd v Stutsel275 in which an employee was dismissed because of inappropriate and 
offensive comments being made to his employer on social media, but where it was 
held that the dismissal was unreasonable because the employer did not have a social 
media workplace policy and the comments were made within a private discussion. 
However, the dismissal may be subject to the employment contract as well as 
workplace policies making employees aware of their conduct when implemented 
within the workplace.276 
 
Apart from the duty to act reasonably and in good faith, this also flows into the duty 
of trust and confidence within the employment relationship.277 Therefore, this duty and 
the following duty are closely related in terms of duties of the employer.  
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media-employer-policy-v-freedom-of-speech#.VpbzwY9OLIU>.  
275[2012] FWAFB 7097 (3 October 2012). 
276Ibid [34]. 
277Malik v BCCI (1998) AC 20. 
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2.4.5.3 Duty of Mutual Trust and Confidence 
This duty can be described as a duty ‘not to abuse or destroy the relationship of trust 
between employer and employee’.278 Furthermore, the case of Thomson v Orica 
Australia Pty Ltd279 summarised this duty as ‘the implication of a term in a contract of 
employment that the employer will not, without reasonable cause, conduct itself in a 
manner likely to damage or destroy the relationship of confidence and trust between 
the parties as employer and employee’.280 This duty and obligation in the contract must 
therefore be performed in good faith.281 Neil and Chin state that:282  
 
Whether contracts of employment include an implied term requiring employers to treat 
their employees in a manner that preserves a relationship of mutual trust and confidence 
between them and, if so, the basis for implying such a term, and the consequences 
flowing from its breach, constitute the most significant controversies in the common 
low of employment in Australia.283  
 
Therefore, this is the most significant implied duty within the employment contract 
which needs careful consideration, especially when dealing with the use of social 
media within and beyond the workplace.  The significance of the duty of mutual trust 
and confidence was especially dealt with in Commonwealth Bank of Australia v 
Barker,284 which considered three important aspects:285 
 
(i) current decisions on whether there exist an implied duty of mutual trust and 
confidence; 
                                                          
278See in general Joellen Riley, ‘Before the High Court: “Mutual Trust and Confidence” on Trial: At 
Last’ (2014) 36 Sydney Law Review 151. 
279[2002] FCA 939. 
280Ibid [141]. 
281Pittard and Naughton, above n 67, 287-294. See also Malik and Mahmud v Bank of Credit and 
Commerce International SA (in liq) [1997] 3 WLR 95 where the court held that ‘an implied term to the 
effect that the employer would not, without reasonable and proper cause, conduct itself in a manner 
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(ii) no limit to providing damages after termination which relates to a breach 
within the employment contract; and 
(iii) strict treatment of employment policies by both employer and employee. 
 
Thus, one of the most debated terms in a contract, and whether it should be implied or 
not, is the duty of mutual trust and confidence between the employer and employee. 
In 2014, the High Court of Australia in Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Barker286 
decided whether a duty of mutual trust and confidence was a term implied by law in 
an employment contract.  
 
Mr Barker was employed by the Commonwealth Bank of Australia as an executive 
manager in the bank’s corporate banking section in Adelaide under a written contract 
of employment that permitted the bank to terminate the contract, without cause, by 
four weeks’ written notice. On 2 March 2009, at a meeting with a number of officers 
of the bank, Mr Barker was handed a letter which informed him that his current 
position was to be made redundant with effect from the close of business that day.287 
Mr Barker was told on 2 March 2009 that if he was not redeployed within the bank his 
employment would be terminated on 2 April 2009. That date was later extended to 9 
April 2009 on which date Mr Barker was informed that his employment was 
terminated by reason of redundancy with effect from the close of business on that 
day.288  
 
In 2010, Mr Barker brought proceedings against the bank for breach of his contract of 
employment. Mr Barker’s claimed that certain written policies of the bank that 
covered, inter alia, the issue of redundancy were incorporated into his contract of 
employment.289 He claimed that the bank breached these policies, by failing to inform 
him of a possible alternative position within the bank, and that he thereby lost that 
opportunity. The primary judge (Besanko J) found that the policies were not 
incorporated into and did not form part of Mr Barker’s contract of employment.290 
                                                          
286Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Barker (2014) 253 CLR 169. 
287Ibid [1]-[3]. 
288Ibid [4]-[5]. 
289Ibid [5]-[6]. 
290Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Barker (2012) 229 IR 249 - Besanko J held at [330] that: ‘The 
term only operates where a party does not have reasonable and proper cause for his or her conduct and 
the conduct is likely to destroy or seriously damage the relationship of confidence and trust between 
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However, his Honour went on to find that the bank had been almost totally inactive in 
complying with its policies during a reasonable period after notifying Mr Barker of his 
redundancy.291 He found that this was a serious breach of the implied term of mutual 
trust and confidence, which sounded in damages. His Honour awarded Mr Barker 
damages of $317 000 for loss of the opportunity to be redeployed to a suitable position 
within the bank. The bank then appealed against the order for damages made by the 
primary judge in favour of Mr Barker. 
 
Two issues arose on appeal. Firstly, whether the contract of employment contained the 
implied term and secondly whether, if it did, the bank’s breach of its own policies 
constituted a serious breach of the relationship of trust and confidence upon which the 
term is founded.292 The High Court dealt with the implied term as incorporated by law 
and not fact. In this sense, the necessity test is of particular importance. In the case of 
University of Western Australia v Gray,293 the Full Court observed that ‘giving 
practical content to the notion of “necessity” in a particular case may often involve 
considerations of “justice and policy” and the need to have regard to the consequences 
of implying, or not implying, the term, including the “social consequences” thereof’.294  
 
Although employment contracts have been modernised, the employer’s obligation is 
still to take an employee into their service and keep them in their service in order to 
continue the employer–employee relationship. Therefore, the employment contract is 
then seen as something more than just to perform work and pay for the work.295 The 
High Court further held that the implied terms in the employment contract is premised 
                                                          
employer and employee. Furthermore, in this case I am not deciding whether the term applies at the 
point of dismissal.’ 
291Ibid [335]. 
292Ibid [10]. 
293(2009) 179 FCR 346. 
294Byrne [377]. At [379], their Honours further held that ‘policy considerations may often be significant 
in negativing the making of an implication, or else in demonstrating that the issues raised by the 
proposed implication are of such a character or complexity as to make it inappropriate for a court, as 
distinct from a legislature, to impose the obligation in question.’ 
295Ibid [291]. The High Court also included Professor Freedland’s take on the employment contract as: 
‘the contract has a two-tiered structure. At the first level, there is an exchange of work and remuneration. 
At the second level, there is an exchange of mutual obligations for future performance. The second level 
– the promises to employ and be employed – provides the arrangement with its stability and with its 
continuity as a contract. The promises to employ and to be employed may be of short duration, or may 
be terminable at short notice; but they still form an integral and most important part of the structure of 
the contract. They are the mutual undertakings to maintain the employment relationship in being which 
are inherent in any contract of employment properly so called.’ 
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on two principles.296 Firstly, the employment contract involves a relationship and not 
merely a contractual exchange between parties. Therefore, an employer is under some 
obligation not to terminate the relationship unless provided for in the contract. 
Secondly, intention must be clear between the parties and therefore the relationship 
between the employer and employee is one of trust and confidence and this is well 
established.297  
 
The High Court came to the conclusion that trust and confidence is not an implied term 
in contracts of employment in Australia.298 The fact that the court rejected mutual trust 
and confidence as an implied term in the employment contract shows that employers 
will need to review their workplace policies and procedures more carefully, especially 
in the age of social media which impacts the employment relationship. 
 
In relation to the inappropriate use of social media by employees and the decision held 
by Barker regarding the duty of mutual trust and confidence within the employment 
relationship, is a relevant consideration for social media policies to be adopted.  It is 
unclear whether a social media policy would have contractual weight as some policies 
are expressly stated to have no contractual validity, whereas others expressly form part 
of the contract by forming part of the contract as an annexure or the letter of offer.299  
In this case, it is possible for a social media policy to form part of the employment 
contract, depending on the mutually enforceable commitments by both the employee 
and employer.  Therefore, even though there is no existing implied duty of mutual trust 
and confidence in employment contracts, the social media policy forming part of the 
employment contract may create mutual trust between parties in accepting the terms 
attached to the policy on the use of social media within and beyond the workplace.  
According to Barker, ‘an employer must not without reasonable or proper cause 
conduct itself in a manner likely to destroy or seriously damage the relationship of 
confidence and trust between the employer and employee’.300  Therefore, adopting the 
correct social media policies connected to the employment contract will increase trust 
                                                          
296Ibid [294]. 
297Ibid [294]-[295]. 
298Ibid [340]. 
299Cicciarelli v Qantas [2012] FCA 56. 
300Barker v Commonwealth of Australia [2012] FCA 942, [323]. 
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and confidence within the employment relationship, even though there is no such 
implied duty recognised under common law. 
 
Against this background, it is necessary to consider how social media policies will be 
incorporated into the employment contract in order to keep a balanced policy between 
employer and employee. An employer places trust in their employees in order for them 
to fulfil the tasks they are ordered to perform. If an employee breaches this trust, the 
employer needs to focus on implementing the correct workplace policies connected 
with the employment contract in order to restrict the employee from inappropriately 
using social media again. This is also considered within the control and monitoring of 
social media outside of the workplace, which will be discussed in Chapter 4. However, 
the termination of an employee’s contract is relevant to consider when there has been 
misuse of social media in and beyond the workplace. The way in which employees 
will be disciplined for their behaviour on social media platforms needs consideration 
because it could lead an employee being unfairly dismissed because of a lack in social 
media regulation in the workplace. 
 
2.4.6 Discipline of Employees using Social Media Within and Beyond the 
Workplace 
One of the objectives of the Fair Work Act is to create a structure for unfair dismissal 
procedures by employers who fear that they will lose their reputation as a result of the 
conduct of an employee.301 Therefore, the Fair Work Act provides a ‘fair go all round’ 
to both employees and employers.302 Furthermore, in the case of Re Loty and Holloway 
v Australian Workers’ Union,303 the court stressed that in order to be protected from 
an unfair dismissal, an individual needs to be a national system employee and covered 
by an award.304 
 
According to the Fair Work Act and the FWC, the following criteria will be used in 
order to assess whether an unfair dismissal has taken place:305 
 
                                                          
301Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) s 381(1)(a). 
302Ibid s 381(2). 
303[1971] AR (NSW) 95. 
304See Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) s 382(a), (b). 
305Ibid s 385. 
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(i) whether the person is an employee who has completed a period of 
employment with his or her employer of at least the minimum employment 
period;306 
(ii) whether the dismissal was harsh, unreasonable or unjust;307 
(iii) whether the employer is a small business;308 and 
(iv) whether there was a genuine redundancy.309 
 
Therefore, when an employer considers dismissing an employee over the inappropriate 
use of social media, whether within or outside the workplace, the above criteria need 
to be considered otherwise an employer’s dismissal of an employee will be unlawful 
and unreasonable in order.310 The following discussion will therefore examine 
scenarios of dismissal within the context of employees inappropriately using social 
media within and outside the workplace.  
 
In 2010, a number of employees employed with the New South Wales Department of 
Corrective Services posted comments on Facebook about the Commissioner and 
senior officers of the Corrective Department.311 Mr Ken Moroney was appointed by 
the Corrective Department to investigate the postings made on Facebook and to 
conduct disciplinary hearings with each of them to assess whether the comments made 
were an appropriate reason for dismissal.312 Mr Moroney concluded that the conduct 
by the employees was threatening to the business interests of the Corrective 
Department and made various orders ranging from warnings to dismissals.313 The 
FWC held that the dismissals of the employees were unfair and that they should be 
reinstated.314 However, the decision of the case centred on the unauthorised 
                                                          
306Ibid s 382(a). 
307Ibid s 386(1)(b). 
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Ray v Real Insurance Pty Ltd [2010] FWA 8544 (5 November 2010); O'Keefe v Williams Muir's Pty 
Ltd [2011] FWA 5311 (11 August 2011); Sally-Anne Fitzgerald v Dianna Smith T/A Escape Hair 
Design [2010] FWA 7358 (24 September 2010) and Ms Lee Mayberry v Kijani Investments Pty Ltd 
ATF The Dawe Investments Trust Subway Wallsend [2011] FWA 3496 (14 July 2011). 
311Public Service Association and Professional Officers Association Amalgamated Union of New South 
Wales v 
Director of Public Employment by his agent the Director General of the Department of Justice and 
Attorney General [2010] NSWIRComm 36, [1]. 
312Ibid [3]-[4].  
313Ibid [4]-[7]. 
314Ibid [76]. 
68 
 
appointment of Mr Moroney as investigator for the Corrective Department, which 
counted in the employee’s favour. 
 
Furthermore, the case of Paternella v Electroboard Solutions Pty Ltd315 dealt with a 
sponsored employee who was dismissed because of his inappropriate conduct towards 
fellow employees. After his dismissal, he sent threatening emails to the employer 
stating that he would post aggressive comments on Facebook, which could hurt the 
interest and reputation of the business.316 One of the threatening emails read as follows: 
‘Facebook makes it easy to contact people don’t forget that you idiots. When you s**t 
on people it will eventually come back and I am going to make it my focus to take a 
big American dump on you’.317 Commissioner Ashbury concluded by noting that:318 
 
Mr Paternella’s dismissal was unfair on the ground that it was harsh. The dismissal was 
harsh because Mr Paternella was not given any warning that his employment was in 
jeopardy, limiting his opportunity to mitigate the loss of his job, and consequently his 
right to remain in Australia. The lack of warning also made the dismissal harsh because 
Mr Paternella had a limited time in which he could obtain employment with an employer 
prepared to sponsor him so that he could remain in Australia. 
 
This indicates that employers should be careful in dismissing employees before going 
through the proper procedures. Even though the employee did respond with aggressive 
emails about social media posts, it did not hurt the reputation of the employer and 
therefore not a subject for dismissal. 
 
The case of Dover-Ray v Real Insurance319 involved an employee who used a social 
media site to accuse her employer of corruption after the employer discarded her 
sexual harassment claims by a colleague. The employer dismissed her because of the 
allegations made on the blog (social media site). The Commissioner held that the 
employee was fairly dismissed due to the grossly offending claims on social media.320 
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On the contrary, in the case of Dianna Smith v Fitzgerald,321 the Commissioner held 
that an employee’s posts on Facebook were not serious enough to warrant a dismissal 
because the comments did not specifically refer to the employer.322 If the conduct is 
such that it affects the workplace then the employer can make a determination on the 
basis of that.323  
 
Lastly, the case of Winfield v Racing Qld Ltd324 was heard in 2011 regarding the misuse 
of social media in the workplace. In this case, the court was provided with evidence of 
Winfield, who was a jockey and employee of Racing Qld Ltd, and who posted negative 
comments on her Facebook page. The FWC referred to these comments as ‘colourful 
in language and perhaps of a disdainful view of the personnel of Racing Queensland 
or one person in particular’.325 Winfield made these comments as the Licensing 
Committee in Queensland did not want to approve her application as a jockey because 
of her poor health.326 As a result of her comments on Facebook, Racing Qld Ltd used 
this to show her character and conduct as an employee. The FWC held that ‘if she were 
to provide evidence that she had worked hard, was physically fit, showed due and 
proper respect for her position and for persons who were trying to instruct her’ then 
her employer did not have a case of discipline against her.327 
 
In some cases, employers will regard the comments made by employees on a social 
media platform as misconduct that warrant a warning, whereas other cases used it as a 
primary point for dismissing the employee. As concluded above, implied terms are 
powerful within an employment contract and lay the foundations of rights and 
obligations between employer and employee.328 The cases discussed above once again 
confirm that when dealing with social media in the workplace, the employment 
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contract should be formed in a way benefiting both the employer and employee, even 
when monitoring the employee outside the workplace.  
 
Therefore, to know what terms should apply to such a contract, it is relevant to examine 
the content of an employment contract and whether terms (such as these discussed 
above) will form part of the employment contract explicitly or impliedly and further 
how it will impact on the use of social media within the employment relationship.  As 
a result of the numerous cases dealing with the misuse of social media in the 
workplace, it is essential for employers to consider the inclusion of social media 
workplace policies into an employment contract in order to educate the employee on 
the risks of breaching terms and duties when misusing social media beyond the 
workplace. 
 
2.5 CONCLUSION 
Social media, as explained in this chapter, is now widely used for personal and 
professional activities and is firmly entrenched in the workplace environment. 
However, as discussed, the use of social media in the workplace has implications for 
the management and control of the employer–employee relationship. The first part of 
this chapter therefore considered the general meaning of ‘social media’ and how it sets 
the scene within both a private and public setting. The use of social media has spread 
within businesses, which provides both advantages and disadvantages for the business. 
However, the greatest concern with the use of social media within businesses is the 
misuse of social media platforms within the workplace.  
 
This led to the second part of this chapter dealing with what a workplace is and what 
this means for the use and control of social media. Because of the broad definition of 
‘workplace’, there is no longer a bright line between public and private spaces. This 
indicates that the ‘workplace’ can be anywhere the employee is performing their 
duties. This brought up the issue of whether the conduct of employees inappropriately 
using social media outside working hours can be controlled and monitored by the 
employer. It was considered that due to the definition of ‘workplace’ extending to 
homes and other contexts, it is possible to regulate the behaviour of employees outside 
of working hours. This points towards employers having greater control over 
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employees, which could lead to implications for the employer–employee relationship. 
This part also considered the difference between an employee and independent 
contractor in regard to their conduct and the inappropriate use of social media outside 
the workplace. However, the focus of this thesis is on the employer and employee 
relationship and not an independent contractor. Nonetheless it was useful to identify 
the difference between an employee and an independent contractor, and when an 
employer will be responsible for the inappropriate use of social media within and 
outside the workplace. 
 
The last part of this chapter considered the employment contract and how the terms of 
the contract relate to the use and misuse of social media within and outside the 
workplace. This part considered the general relationship between employer and 
employee and the key rights and responsibilities of the parties within the employment 
contract. Each key duty was explained within the general scope of employment law 
principles, which preceded into a more detailed discussion of how social media 
impacts on these duties and the employment relationship.  
 
The duties in an employment contract are important in order to establish and regulate 
the relationship between employer and employee. Therefore, express and implied 
terms form an integral part of the employment contract; the absence of these terms 
articulating the duties and obligations of employer and employees would be 
detrimental to the existence of an employer–employee relationship. However, the 
introduction of social media in the workplace has brought with it numerous challenges 
in relation to breach of these duties and therefore dismissal of employees because of 
the inappropriate use of social media beyond the workplace. It is therefore vital for an 
employer and employee to act within their respective duties and responsibilities in 
order to prevent any issues with the inappropriate use of social media within and 
outside the workplace.  
 
The monitoring of social media by employers within and outside the workplace will 
be discussed further in Chapter 4 and will provide a discussion on how the implied 
terms in an employment contract can form part of the monitoring of social media inside 
and outside the ‘workplace’ within a social media workplace policy.  As pointed out 
in this part, the social media policy may be structured in a way that attaches to the 
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employment contract.  This will depend on the mutual acceptance of the employee and 
employer. 
 
The following chapter is concerned with and focuses on three key legal issues 
regarding the use of social media in the workplace and beyond – privacy, defamation 
and cyberbullying. These legal challenges will be considered within general law and 
extend to a specific discussion on social media and how the employment relationship 
is impacted beyond the workplace. 
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CHAPTER 3 
LEGAL ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH THE USE OF SOCIAL 
MEDIA IN THE WORKPLACE 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The use of social media in the workplace has significantly changed the workplace 
environment, which has implications for the employer and employee relationship, as 
discussed in Chapter 2. Also, as discussed in Chapter 1, the advent of social media in 
the workplace has been a significant asset for businesses to further their business 
interests in a digital space; however, with the use of social media in the workplace 
comes legal risks and challenges for both employers and employees. Therefore, one 
aim of this thesis is to highlight the legal challenges social media presents in the 
workplace environment and how it affects the employer–employee relationship, as 
discussed in Chapter 2. Although the benefits of social media are numerous, and the 
use of social media can be beneficial to any business, the inappropriate use in the 
workplace can give rise to various legal issues. This chapter examines the use of social 
media in relation to three key issues, namely privacy, defamation and cyberbullying, 
and how these issues may impact on the employer–employee relationship.  
 
These key legal issues can be summarised within the following hypothetical legal 
scenarios.  
 
Privacy 
Sarah is an executive chef at TopChef Culinary School teaching students how to 
prepare French culinary dishes. Sarah has been with TopChef Culinary School for the 
last ten years, but she wants to broaden her horizons at the newly established Revoir 
Restaurant in the city. Sarah has hinted on her Facebook account that she is interested 
in a position at Revoir restaurant knowing that it will stay private as she has changed 
her privacy settings for only her friends to see. She also applied a few days later for an 
executive chef position at Revoir restaurant. However, Charles, the Human Resource 
Manager at TopChef Culinary School, has seen this on her Facebook page as he is 
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friends with Sarah on Facebook. Charles is upset that she wants to leave and decides 
to send private and confidential information about Sarah to Revoir restaurant plus all 
the other restaurants and culinary schools in a 15-kilometre radius. When Revoir 
restaurant received this private and confidential information of Sarah, they 
immediately phoned Sarah and told her that they would not be interviewing her for 
this position because of the information they received of her prior misbehaviour in the 
kitchen. 
 
Defamation 
Lola is a teacher at Blue Mountain High School. She has been in education for nearly 
seven years and joined Blue Mountain High School seven months ago. Lola has found 
everyone inviting at her new High School except for one teacher, Harriet, who has 
been assisting the Principal of the school with administrative duties for the past four 
years. Harriet’s son is in Lola’s class and keeps disrupting Lola’s class by not paying 
attention and playing on his phone and iPad continuously throughout class. Lola told 
Harriet’s son that he needs to stop disrupting the class otherwise he will be sent to the 
Principal’s office. Harriet was made aware of this by her son after school. The same 
evening, while waiting for her takeaway, Lola saw on her Twitter page that Harriet 
tweeted ‘Lola is an incompetent teacher with no regard to her students and their 
activities. She should be fired for her level of incompetence and for placing Blue 
Mountain High School in a bad light’. Lola was surprised as she has no idea what 
Harriet is tweeting about but feels upset about these remarks on Twitter. 
 
Cyberbullying 
Tanya is a cashier at Billy Bob’s Hardware shop. She started working at the shop five 
months ago, and it is the only job she could find because of the bad economy. Dave 
and Annie are her co-workers and have been making her work unbearable for the last 
two months. Dave and Annie have been tormenting Tanya by leaving worms in her 
lunchbox and making her work their shifts. They have also posted on their individual 
Facebook and Instagram pages memes of Tanya posing as a drug addict. Dave and 
Tanya have even gone as far as to post on her private Facebook messenger that ‘if you 
try and convey any of this to the manager, we will give you a beating you’ll never 
forget’. She has since left Billy Bob’s Hardware shop and went into depression because 
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of her difficulty finding work. She has also left a Facebook post expressing her 
depression and what she endured. Tanya eventually took her own life. 
 
These scenarios illustrate the kinds of situations that can arise in relation to workplace 
matters regarding social media and how they may concern the employment 
relationship. Although hypothetical, they reflect the reality of social media and the 
workplace and such issues are evident in the cases discussed in this thesis. This chapter 
will address each of these key issues. 
 
The chapter does not purport to give a comprehensive analysis of each area of law, 
which is beyond the scope of the thesis, but rather to focus on key aspects and 
principles of the relevant law as it relates to social media in the workplace. The first 
part of this chapter will consider privacy laws in regard to the use of social media pre-
, during and post-employment, and the relevance of the doctrine for the employment 
relationship. The second part of the chapter will consider social media and defamation 
in the workplace, which may affect an employer’s business interests and reputation, 
but also that of the employee. Lastly, this chapter will focus on cyberbullying in the 
workplace; particularly, how this can affect employees within and crucially outside the 
workplace.  
 
3.2 PRIVACY AND SOCIAL MEDIA IN THE WORKPLACE 
The use of social media in the workplace gives rise to important legal considerations 
concerning privacy, largely because social media is borderless but also because of the 
relatively easy access to data and personal information of individuals gleaned from 
social media. According to O’Halloran, issues of privacy and inappropriate use of 
social media in the workplace is changing the workplace environment.1 The issues 
regarding privacy and social media in the workplace range from employees accessing 
their personal social media sites at work to employers recruiting employees through 
social media vetting.2 Moreover, when it comes to the question of privacy and the risks 
associated with the use of social media, there are also often misconceptions about the 
                                                          
1Paul O’Halloran, ‘The Rise of ‘E-misconduct’ in the Workplace’ (2012) Internet Law Bulletin 90, 90. 
2See Saby Ghoshray, ‘The Emerging Reality of Social Media: Erosion of Individual Privacy Through 
Cyber-vetting and Law’s Inability to Catch Up’ (2013) 12 John Marshall Review of Intellectual 
Property Law 551. See also Jeff Sovern, ‘Opting In, Opting Out, or No Options at All: The Fight for 
Control of Personal Information’ (1999) 74 Washington Law Review 1033, 1035. 
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extent to which social media is private, rights to privacy and the extent to which the 
law in fact protects privacy rights in terms of social media. 
 
Therefore, in terms of dealing with the use of social media in the workplace and the 
implications for monitoring and controlling employees’ use thereof, it is relevant to 
consider the meaning of privacy and the extent to which privacy rights are protected. 
This section therefore provides an overview of key principles of privacy law in 
Australia in relation to the use of social media in the workplace. 
 
3.2.1 Defining Privacy 
The definition of privacy has been, and continues to be, the subject of much debate 
and it is notable that the courts have not necessarily reached consensus on the meaning 
of privacy.3 As noted by Professor McCarthy, the concept of ‘privacy’ has ‘proven to 
be a powerful rhetorical battle cry in a plethora of unrelated contexts … Like the 
emotive word “freedom”, “privacy” means so many different things to so many 
different people that it has lost any precise legal connotation that it might once have 
had’.4 Therefore, privacy remains a debated and contentious matter in Australia.  The 
Australian Law Reform Commission (‘ALRC’) also states that ‘the very term 
“privacy” is one fraught with difficulty. The concept is an elusive one’.5 Nevertheless, 
for the ordinary literal interpretation of privacy, the Macquarie dictionary defines 
privacy as ‘the state of being private’ or ‘seclusion’.6 The ALRC’s definition of 
                                                          
3Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats (2001) 208 CLR 199. Gleeson CJ at [43] 
stressed the difficulty of defining privacy and states that ‘human dignity is the foundation of much what 
is protected where rights of privacy are acknowledged but otherwise noted the lack of precision of the 
concept of privacy.’ 
4See in this regard Australian Law Reform Commission, The Meaning of Privacy 
<http://www.alrc.gov.au/publications/1.%20Introduction%20to%20the%20Inquiry/meaning-privacy>.  
See also Thomas McCarthy, The Rights of Publicity and Privacy (Thomson Reuters, 2nd ed, 2005), 5.59. 
5Australian Law Reform Commission, Privacy, Report no 22 (1983), 19 < 
http://www.alrc.gov.au/report-22>. See also Ruth Gavison, ‘Privacy and the Limits of Law’ (1980) 89 
Yale Law Journal 421, 424; Alec Samuels, ‘Privacy: Statutorily Definable?’ (1996) 17 Statute Law 
Review 115. 
6Macquarie Dictionary, ‘Privacy’ (December 2016) 
<https://www.macquariedictionary.com.au/features/word/search/?word=privacy&search_word_type=
Dictionary>.  
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privacy has ‘stayed as close as possible … to the ordinary language concept’.7 The 
ALRC further defines privacy as:8  
 
A value which is important for individuals to live a dignified, fulfilling and autonomous 
life … [It] is an important element of the fundamental freedoms of individuals which 
underpin their ability to form and maintain meaningful and satisfying relationships with 
others; their freedom of movement and association; their ability to engage in the 
democratic process; their freedom to advance their own intellectual, cultural, artistic, 
financial and physical interests, without undue interference by others. 
 
Similarly, the Fair Work Ombudsman (‘FWO’) considers privacy as ‘being able to 
keep certain information to ourselves and to control what happens to our personal 
information. It also refers to being able to do things without interference by others’.9 
These definitions indicate the importance of privacy in an individual’s life and they 
reflect the common notion of autonomy, control over one’s personal information and 
non-interference by others. However, with advancements in technology, the 
exponential use of social media, the blurring of private and public spaces and the 
cyber-world dimensions, such notions of privacy are increasingly being challenged. 
Hence, the use of social media in the workplace raises particular concerns about 
privacy rights and the protection of privacy.  
 
3.2.2 Privacy Law in Australia 
Privacy, and hence the right to privacy, is a ‘meaningful and valuable concept’ as it 
preserves a person’s dignity and personal information.10 The right to privacy is 
recognised as a fundamental human right in international conventions,11 the essence 
                                                          
7Australian Law Reform Commission, above n 5, 20. When dealing with the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) it 
is interesting to note that the Act itself does not contain a specific definition of ‘privacy’. 
8Australian Law Reform Commission, Serious Invasions of Privacy in the Digital Era Issue Paper 43 
(October 2013), [24], 14 
<https://www.alrc.gov.au/sites/default/files/pdfs/publications/summary_report_whole_pdf_.pdf>.  
9Fair Work Ombudsman, Privacy (2016) <https://www.fairwork.gov.au/how-we-will-help/templates-
and-guides/best-practice-guides/workplace-privacy>.  
10Edward Bloustein, ‘Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser’ (1964) 39 
New York University Law Review 962; William Parent, ‘Privacy, Morality and the Law’ (1983) 12 
Philosophy and Public Affairs 269. 
11Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res 217A (III) UN GAOR, 3rd sess, 183rd plen mtg, UN 
Doc A/810 (10 December 1948) art 12. Similarly, Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights provides that ‘No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his 
privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation’: 
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of which is found in Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which 
states that ‘no one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, 
home or correspondence nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation’.12 The 
importance of international obligations is noted in the Hosking v Runting13 decision:14 
 
To ignore international obligations would be to exclude a vital source of relevant 
guidance. It is unreal to draw upon the decisions of Courts in other jurisdictions (as we 
commonly do) yet not draw upon the teachings of international law.  
 
Although a personal right to privacy is recognised in international conventions and 
national constitutions as a fundamental right, there is no right to privacy in the 
Australian Constitution.15 Moreover, as explained below, there is no general right to 
privacy under common law. Statutory law provides some protection to privacy in 
relation to the handling of personal information through the Commonwealth Privacy 
Act16 and state and territory legislation in some jurisdictions.17 Although 
constitutionally and at common law there is limited recognition and protection of 
privacy rights, privacy is nonetheless upheld as an important value. People 
unsurprisingly have an expectation of privacy and that their privacy will be respected 
in all aspects.  
 
In this regard, the High Court of Australia had to decide whether a right to privacy 
exists in the case of Victoria Park Racing and Recreation Grounds Co Ltd v Taylor.18 
In this case, a dispute occurred between a radio station and the owner of the Victoria 
                                                          
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights opened for signature 6 December 1966, GA Res 
2200A (XXI) (entered into force 23 March 1976).  
12Ibid. 
13[2005] 1 NZLR 1. 
14Ibid 6. 
15For a right to privacy in national constitutions see for example: Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa 1996 s 14; Constitution of the United States of America 14th Amendment. See also David 
Richards, ‘Constitutional Legitimacy and Constitutional Privacy’ (1986) 61 New York University Law 
Review 800; Kevin McAdam, ‘Privacy: A Common Law and Constitutional Crossroads’ (2011) 40 
Colorado Lawyer 55; Michelle van der Bank, ‘The Right to Privacy – South African and Comparative 
Perspectives’ (2012) 1(6) European Journal of Business and Social Sciences 77. 
16Privacy Act 1988 (Cth). 
17Information Privacy Act 2014 (ACT); Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 1998 
 (NSW); Information Act 2003 (NT); Information Privacy Act 2009 (Qld); Personal Information and 
Protection Act 2004 (Tas); Privacy and Data Protection Act 2014 (Vic); Freedom of Information Act 
1992 (WA). State laws apply to public sector agencies.  
18(1937) 58 CLR 479. 
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Park Racing club. The owner of a house, adjacent to the race park, erected a high 
platform in his front yard for the radio broadcasters to stream live racing updates of 
the races to their listeners.19 As a result, attendance at the park lessened.20 This case 
held that there is no general right to privacy in Australia and stated that ‘any person is 
entitled to look over the plaintiff's fence and to see what goes on in the plaintiff's land. 
If the plaintiff desires to prevent this, the plaintiff can erect a higher fence’.21 
Therefore, Latham CJ held that the defendants did not breach the law of privacy by 
simply looking over the fence into the racing grounds.22 The court accordingly held 
that ‘there are no legal principles which the court can apply to protect the plaintiff 
against the acts of the defendants of which it complains’.23  
 
Furthermore, in 2001, the High Court of Australia faced this question again in the case 
of Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd.24 The court, 
affirming the principle in Victoria Park, once again did not recognise a general right 
to privacy and further held that there is no cause of action for invasion of privacy. The 
court did however observe that ‘the requirement that disclosure or observation of 
information or conduct would be highly offensive to a reasonable person of ordinary 
sensibilities is in many circumstances a useful practical test of what is private’.25 
However, Gummow and Hayne JJ observed that ‘invasions of privacy … in many 
instances would be actionable at general law under recognised causes of action’.26 
Therefore, the court held open the possibility for the development of a cause of action 
for breach of privacy. 
 
In contrast, two lower court decisions were prepared to recognise a right to privacy in 
Australia and a cause of action for breach of privacy.27 In the cases of Grosse v Purvis28 
                                                          
19Ibid 480-481. 
20Ibid. 
21Ibid 494. 
22Ibid 494. 
23Ibid 527. 
24(2001) 185 ALR 1; (2001) 208 CLR 199.  
25Ibid [107]. 
26Ibid [123]. 
27Doe v Australian Broadcasting Corporation [2007] VCC 281; Grosse v Purvis [2003] QDC 151; Gee 
v Burger [2009] NSWSC 149. However, see, also, Giller v Procopets (2008) 24 VR 1 in which Judge 
Gillard noted that the law in Australia has not developed to the point where an action for a breach of 
privacy is recognised. 
28[2003] QDC 151. 
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and Doe v Australian Broadcasting Corporation,29 the courts have identified a kind of 
action for invasion of privacy. In the case of Grosse v Purvis, Skoien SJDC was open 
to recognising a tort of invasion of privacy. His Honour pointed out that the elements 
of an action for invasion of privacy included:30 
 
(i) willed act by the defendant; 
(ii) which intrudes upon the privacy or seclusion of the plaintiff; 
(iii) in a manner which would be considered highly offensive to a reasonable 
person of ordinary sensibilities; and 
(iv) which causes the plaintiff detriment in the form of mental, physiological or 
emotional harm or distress, or which prevents or hinders the plaintiff from 
doing an act which he or she is lawfully entitled to do. 
 
The court went further by awarding damages to the plaintiff, whereby Skoien SJDC 
recognised ‘a civil action for damages based on the actionable right of an individual 
person to privacy’.31   
 
The case of Doe v ABC dealt with a rape case within marriage. The ABC broadcast the 
story about ‘YZ’, including the name of ‘YZ’, the circumstances under which it 
happened and where it happened.32 The court held that there was a breach of privacy 
by the defendant through unjustified publication of information and held that ‘the 
unjustified publication of personal information was a breach’.33 The plaintiff in this 
case argued that there was a tort of invasion of privacy of information whereas the 
defendants argued that there is no tort of invasion of privacy recognised under 
Australian law.34 Hampel J considered the tort of invasion of privacy and held that the 
‘development of a tort of invasion of privacy is intertwined with the development of 
the cause of action for breach of confidence. What is seen to underpin both causes of 
action is the acceptance or recognition of the value of privacy as a right in itself 
deserving of protection’.35 Justice Hampel further held that the employees who 
                                                          
29[2007] VCC 281. 
30Grosse v Purvis, [444]. 
31Ibid [442]. 
32Doe v Australian Broadcasting, [1]-[5]. 
33Ibid [164]. 
34Ibid [146]-[147]. 
35Ibid [148]. 
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published the personal information, were not only liable under the Judicial 
Proceedings Reports Act 1958 (Vic), but also under an equitable breach of 
confidence.36 However, the court did not provide an exhaustive definition of privacy.37  
 
These lower court decisions, however, are not binding on other higher courts in other 
states and territories. The lower court decisions appear to support an action for breach 
of privacy, but this is yet to be determined by the High Court of Australia. 
 
Despite the lacuna in common law in terms of protecting breaches of privacy, Australia 
has passed national38 and state legislation concerning privacy.39 However, this is 
limited to dealing with personal information in certain circumstances. Consequently, 
in Australia an individual may complain to the Privacy Commission about a privacy 
issue but is not recognised as a right to privacy.40 Therefore, privacy law is a 
‘developing area’ and much more attention is required to the development thereof, 
especially with the advent of social media.41 This is expressed through the following 
statement:42 
 
When [Facebook] started, it was a private space for communication with a group of 
your choice. Soon, it transformed into a platform where much of your information is 
public by default. Today, it has become a platform where you have no choice but to 
make certain information public, and this public information may be shared by 
Facebook with its partner websites and used to target ads. 
 
The development of technology within the workplace has resulted in legal issues with 
privacy and is but only one area that requires consideration within privacy laws. The 
protection of employees and the access of private information by their employers turn 
around the key question of whether a cause of action for invasion of privacy will be 
recognised under Australian common law. The court in Maynes v Casey43 held that the 
                                                          
36Ibid [163]. 
37Ibid [162]. 
38Privacy Act 1988 (Cth). 
39Above n 17. 
40Patrick Fair, ‘Too Much Information’ (2014) Law Society Journal 20, 20. 
41Des Butler, ‘A Tort of Invasion of Privacy in Australia?’ (2005) 29 Melbourne University Law Review 
339, 362. 
42Roger Clarke, ‘Privacy and Social Media: An Analytical Framework’ (2015) 23 Journal of Law, 
Information and Science 169, 180. 
43[2011] NSWCA 156. 
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cases mentioned above44 ‘may well lay the basis for development of liability for 
unjustified intrusion on personal privacy, whether or not involving breach of 
confidence’.45 However, the ALRC considered that a statutory cause of action is 
possible when dealing with invasion of privacy and stated that ‘unauthorised use of 
personal information and intrusion on personal privacy’ will be ‘significantly affected 
by the digital era’.46 Similarly, in March 2016, the New South Wales Parliament 
Standing Committee considered a statutory cause of action for serious invasions of 
privacy, which includes the use of social media.47 
 
The NSW inquiry into a statutory cause of action for serious invasions of privacy was 
established because of concerns raised regarding personal information dissemination 
through social media platforms.48 The Committee considered several submissions 
regarding a statutory cause of action for invasion of privacy, noting that there were 
‘several gaps and inconsistencies in existing [common law] legal protection that may 
amount to an invasion of privacy’.49 However, because there is no right to privacy 
recognised under Australian law, the Committee referred to the Lenah Game Meats 
case, which recognise a breach of confidentiality and refer to it as ‘the main avenue of 
protecting privacy [in Australia]’.50 A discussion on breach of confidentiality through 
the use of social media will be discussed later in this chapter. 
 
The use of social media in the workplace provides numerous opportunities for 
businesses and individuals to connect and improve status, but the use of social media 
also raises concerns about privacy and how personal information of either an employee 
or employer will be handled and/or disclosed. For example, an employer may breach 
an employee’s privacy by disclosing personal information, via social media, of that 
employee to other staff members in the workplace. As there is limited recognition of 
privacy protection under common law, it is necessary to consider privacy legislation 
                                                          
44Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Games Meat (2001) 185 ALR 1; (2001) 208 CLR 199; 
Victoria Park Racing and Recreation Grounds Co Ltd v Taylor (1937) 58 CLR 479. 
45Maynes v Casey, [186]. 
46Australian Law Reform Commission, above n 5, [5]. 
47New South Wales Parliament Legislative Council Standing Committee on Law, Remedies for the 
Serious Invasion of Privacy in New South Wales, Report No 57 (3 March 2016)  
<www.parliament.nsw.gov.au>.  
48Ibid 13.  
49Ibid 41. 
50Ibid 42. 
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when dealing with the use of social media in the workplace and beyond. The discussion 
in relation to privacy is focused on the law relating to public sector employers and 
limited private sector entities.  However, the challenge is whether the law is subject to 
traditional private employers outside the constraints of privacy legislation when 
employers are looking to control and monitor social media of employees. 
 
3.2.2.1 Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) and Australian Privacy Principles 
The Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) regulates how personal information about individuals is 
handled by Commonwealth government agencies and some private sector entities.51 
Private sector entities that fall within the ambit of the Privacy Act are businesses that 
have an annual turnover of more than $3 million.52 A small business, that is a business 
with an annual turnover of $3 million or less, does not have to comply with the Act. 
However, there are several small businesses that will be subject to the Privacy Act, 
such as a credit reporting agency and a health service provider or a business that holds 
health information.53 For example, a private school with an annual turnover of $3 
million is subject to the Privacy Act. If the private school has a turnover of less than 
$3 million but holds health information about staff and students, it will also be obliged 
to comply with the Privacy Act. Moreover, of significance is that the Privacy Act does 
not regulate how private individuals handle the personal information of other 
individuals. This is particularly relevant when dealing with the use of social media by 
individuals in a private capacity.  
 
The objects of the Privacy Act are, inter alia, to ‘promote the protection of the privacy 
of individuals’, to provide the ‘basis for nationally consistent regulation of privacy and 
the handling of personal information’ and to promote ‘responsible and transparent 
handling of personal information by entities’.54 Therefore, the Privacy Act was enacted 
to protect the handling and collection of personal information on a national level. This 
                                                          
51 Agency includes a Minister, a government department, a body established under a Commonwealth 
enactment and a federal court: Privacy Act 1998 s 6. 
52 Privacy Act 1998 s 6D. For a further explanation and list see the Office of the Australian Information 
Commissioner, ‘How Do I know if My Small Business is Covered by the Privacy Act?’ 
<https://www.oaic.gov.au/agencies-and-organisations/faqs-for-agencies-orgs/businesses/small-
business>. 
53 Privacy Act 1998 s 6D4. Health information is defined in s 6 and includes an activity involved in 
assessing, maintaining or improving a person's physical or psychological health. 
54 Privacy Act 1998 (Cth) s 2A 
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is relevant to the handling of social media information of an employee by an employer 
and whether the law is suited to address the unlawful handling of personal information 
on a social media platform. 
 
Personal information is defined in s 6(1) of the Act as ‘information or opinion about 
an identified individual, or an individual who is reasonably identifiable, whether or not 
true and whether or not in material form’.55 However, the ALRC stated that despite 
defining what personal information is, it is also useful to understand what personal 
information does not include, and noted that:56 
 
As part of a wider inquiry into the Privacy Act, the issue of what is or is not de-
identification could be considered. This is an important threshold issue which 
determines whether or not information is protected. Developments in technology have 
made it increasingly difficult to determine whether information is de-identified or not. 
 
The ALRC held that it is difficult to specifically identify what is not included as 
personal information; however, it mentioned that ‘for the purposes of the Act it is 
necessary to decide whether information is about an identified or reasonably 
identifiable individual’ and ‘this includes making a distinction between information 
that may be “re-identifiable” or reasonably identifiable in a particular context – for 
example, where an agency or organisation holds information identified by a unique 
identifier and also holds the master list – but is not reasonably identifiable for the 
purposes of the Act in another context – for example, where an agency or organisation 
holds information identified by a unique identifier but does not hold and does not have 
access to the master list’.57  
 
Therefore, in order to address whether an employer may or may not collect and access 
personal information, the Australian Privacy Principles (‘APPs’) address transparency, 
disclosure and quality of personal information, which indicates how government 
                                                          
55Ibid s 6(1). See also Telstra Corporation Limited and Privacy Commissioner [2015] AATA 991. 
56Australian Law Reform Commission, For Your Information: Australian Privacy Law and Practice, 
Report no 108 (August 2008), [6.64] 
<https://www.alrc.gov.au/publications/6.%20The%20Privacy%20Act%3A%20Some%20Important%
20Definitions/what-not-%E2%80%98personal-information%E2%80%99>.  
57Ibid [6.83]. 
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agencies and selected private organisation should implement privacy policies and 
guidelines or review them and what personal information include.58  
 
A key feature of the Privacy Act is the application of the 13 APPs contained in 
Schedule 1 of the Act.59 The APPs apply to Commonwealth government and private 
sector agencies, and regulate how personal information is collected, stored, used, 
accessed, disclosed and changed. In relation to the APPs, only four of the APPs are 
directly applicable to the discussion of privacy and social media challenges in the 
workplace and beyond. The recently adopted APPs place the following obligations on 
certain employers60 when dealing with personal information and privacy:61 
 
(i) the employer may not collect personal information unless the information 
is necessary for one or more of its functions or activities;62 
(ii) the employer can collect personal information only by lawful and fair 
means and not in an unreasonably intrusive way;63 
(iii) the employer can collect personal information about an individual only 
from that individual if it is reasonable and practicable to do so;64 and 
(iv) the employer must provide the individual with access to the personal 
information held by it on request by the individual.65 
 
The Privacy Act as amended and the APPs apply to the handling of personal 
information that may be collected via social media platforms by public employers and 
private entities as discussed above. However, it is still limited and does not extend to 
                                                          
58John Reen, The New Australian Privacy Principles: Amendments to the Privacy Act 1988 (February 
2013) DibbsBarker 
<http://www.dibbsbarker.com/publication/The_new_Australian_Privacy_Principles__Amendments_t
o_the_Privacy_Act_1988.aspx>.  
59 The APPs came into effect in March 2014 following an amendment to the Privacy Act pursuant to 
the Privacy Amendment (Enhancing Privacy Protection) Act 2012 (Cth). These principles replaced the 
Information Privacy Principles that previously applied to Commonwealth government agencies and 
National Privacy Principles that applied to certain private sector organisations. 
60Entities not covered under the Privacy Act include small businesses with an annual turnover of $3 
million or less. 
61Patrick George (ed) et al, Social Media and the Law (LexisNexis, 2nd ed, 2016) 32. 
62APP 3.2. 
63APP 3.5. 
64APP 3.6. 
65APP 12.1. 
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private individuals acting in private business; but it is a step in the right direction on 
the impact social media has on privacy in the workplace.  
 
With regards to privacy in the workplace and technology, O’Rourke, Pyman and 
Teicher aptly note that:66  
 
Australia’s privacy protection regime is still embryonic: legislatures, regulators, and 
other bodies, while needing to implement measures in response to immediate threats 
from new technologies, also need to explore a more coherent and comprehensive long-
term approach to privacy. A precise definition of privacy remains elusive … particularly 
in the workplace.  
 
In terms the use of social media in the workplace, the APPs will find application in 
entities that are subject to the Privacy Act and hold personal information about 
employees that have been obtained through social media platforms. This will include 
small business that may be subject to the Privacy Act.67 Therefore, when employers 
receive personal information regarding their employees, it will be best practice to treat 
this information as private and confidential according to the APPs.68 This is considered 
below in the context of employment. 
 
Although the Privacy Act does not give a person the right to privacy, the Privacy Act 
as amended, and the incorporation of the APPs do provide some protection in relation 
to the collection, use and access of personal information of an employee. However, 
this protection is limited, as mentioned, to Commonwealth departments and agencies, 
and to small businesses with a turnover that exceeds $3 million. This can create 
                                                          
66Anne O’Rourke, Amanda Pyman and Julian Teicher, ‘The Right to Privacy and the Conceptualisation 
of the Person in the Workplace: A Comparative Examination of EU, US and Australian Approaches’ 
(2007) 23 International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations 161, 193. 
67Fair Work Ombudsman, Best Practice Guide: Workplace Privacy (2014) <www.fairwork.gov.au>. 
According to Privacy Act 1998 (Cth) s 7B(3), private employers are exempted, in regards to accessing 
personal information, if the personal information is directly related to a current or former employment 
relationship and therefore does not benefit employers with regard to prospective candidates. 
68Personal information can also be seen as ‘Information that identifies you or could identify you. There 
are some obvious examples of personal information, such as your name or address. Personal information 
can also include medical records, bank account details, photos, videos, and even information about what 
you like, your opinions and where you work - basically, any information where you are reasonably 
identifiable’ – Alastair MacGibbon and Nigel Phair, Privacy and the Internet (2012) Centre for Internet 
Safety 
<http://www.canberra.edu.au/cis/storage/Australian%20Attitutdes%20Towards%20Privacy%20Onlin
e.pdf>.  
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problems for employees in entities and business that fall outside the scope of the 
Privacy Act, whose personal information is accessed through social media by an 
organisation. This is of particular concern given that accessing personal information 
of employees, including prospective employees, through social media has become 
common practice (discussed below in relation to vetting) and privacy laws have slowly 
started to recognise the threats social media causes in regards to privacy.69 The breach 
of privacy through social media platforms plays a significant role within the 
employment relationship and how the collection of personal information may impact 
the workplace in general. In Chapter 2 it was argued that social media impacts on the 
employment contract and how the employer and employee are affected by the implied 
terms within the employment contract on the use of social media. This is key to how 
privacy applies to the employment relationship and what is expected from the 
employer and employee in relation to the collection and use of personal information. 
 
As noted, a significant limitation of the Privacy Act is that it does not apply to 
individuals acting in a personal capacity and how individuals collect and share 
personal information on social media. If personal information is publicly available on 
social media, then anyone can access it. The individual may have little control over 
how that information may then be used and distributed. An individual using social 
media in a personal capacity will therefore not be able to rely on the Privacy Act to 
protect their rights relating to their personal information. They will need to rely on 
other areas of law, such as defamation law. Although individual employees using 
social media in a personal capacity or using personal information gleaned from social 
media are not covered by the Privacy Act, within the workplace context the misuse of 
social media to distribute personal information about employers or employees may 
constitute misconduct and may be a breach of the employment contract or a workplace 
policy, which can give rise to dismissal (see Chapter 2 and Chapter 4). 
 
                                                          
69See, eg, Chika Anyanwu, ‘Challenges to Privacy Law in the Age of Social Media: An Australian 
Perspective’ (2013) 40 Australian Journal of Communication 121; Diane Gan and Lily Jenkins, ‘Social 
Networking Privacy: Who’s Stalking You?’ (2015) 7 Future Internet 67. 
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3.2.3 Privacy, Social Media and Employment 
When dealing with privacy issues regarding social media in the workplace, it is useful 
to discuss social media and privacy in relation to the employer–employee relationship 
in three parts, namely pre-, during and post-employment. 
 
3.2.3.1 Privacy Concerns Pre-Employment 
With the increase in businesses using social media sites to improve their business70 as 
well as the increase in individuals (prospective employees) using their personal social 
media sites, it is easy to see how privacy can become an issue. This is because 
nowadays information about employees and prospective employees is mostly obtained 
from the internet and social media sites.71 Therefore, as discussed above, employers 
need to be cautious when obtaining information about employees or prospective 
employees. This is well captured by the FWO expressing the importance of employers 
collecting personal information without invading the right to privacy.72 The FWO 
explains that ‘employers will need to think about the way in which they collect, use 
and disclose information they obtain from employees’.73 
 
Social media vetting or so-called ‘online vetting’ is now increasingly used by 
employers when considering hiring a prospective candidate for a position.74 ‘Vetting’ 
can be defined as ‘a thorough and diligent review of a prospective person or project 
prior to a hiring or investment decision’.75 This is usually done by screening the 
candidate’s social media accounts in order to get a look at who the person is. The 
screening can be done through social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter and 
LinkedIn.76 Social media, in general, can be a great tool for employers in order to 
                                                          
70Social media sites such as Linkedin. 
71George, above n 61, 29. 
72Fair Work Ombudsman, Best Practice Guide: Workplace Privacy (2014) 
<https://www.fairwork.gov.au/how-we-will-help/templates-and-guides/best-practice-
guides/workplace-privacy>.  
73Ibid. 
74Murray Brown, ‘Applying for a Job with Big Brother: Is Online Vetting of Job Applicants Lawful in 
Australia?’ (2012) 37 Alternative Law Journal 186; Bill Greenwood, ‘Facebook: The Next Great 
Vetting Tool’ (2009) 26 Information Today 1. 
75Investopedia, Vetting <http://www.investopedia.com/terms/v/vetting.asp>.  
76Anthea Ellis, Social Media and the Workplace (2015) <http://www.surrypartners.com.au/social-
media-and-the-workplace/>. 
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consider a potential candidate for the job; however, breach of privacy through social 
media platforms is a significant legal issue within the workplace. 
 
Social media accounts can reveal significant personal information about prospective 
candidates such as age, religion, political views and qualifications. However, whilst 
this may be useful to employers, such information may be caught by APP 3.2, which 
relates to the collection of personal information of employees via their social media 
accounts.77 Therefore, it is useful for employers to recognise when they are allowed to 
access personal information about a candidate, as they may be in breach of the Privacy 
Act. 
 
Because the Privacy Act78 and Australian Constitution do not afford an employee a 
right to privacy, it is important to find a way to protect employees when employers 
access their social media accounts and personal information prior to the formation of 
the employment relationship. The privacy legislation, as mentioned earlier, applies to 
the collection of personal information by public employers, and to an extent, private 
employers with a turnover of no less than $3 million. These place significant 
restrictions on private employees having an action for breach of privacy against their 
private employer. However, employees still have a right to protect their personal 
information from being accessed, and Mack J notes that:79 
 
No man or woman on entering into an employment contract thereby agrees to forego 
those basic liberties which distinguish our society from more barbarous regimes. Were 
an employment contract to expressly limit the civil liberties of an employee [,] it would 
be void … The law goes further and will imply in a contract of employment terms 
protective of those liberties.80 
                                                          
77Erica Marr, E-Recruitment: The Effectiveness of the Internet as a Recruitment Source (LLM-thesis, 
Queensland University of Technology, 2007) 58. See also Antony Funnell, ‘Cyber Vetting and 
Personality’, ABC (online), (3 March 2013) 
<http://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/futuretense/cyber-vetting-and-personality/4518948>. 
78Fair Work Ombudsman, above n 72. This is with regard to private employers. 
79Re Security Arrangements in Retail Stores 107 ARJ (1979) 72, 81. 
80According to Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) s 341(1)(a), prospective employees have a workplace right 
which means that prospective employees have the benefit of certain rights in the workplace. According 
to Fair Work Act s 13, ‘a national system employee is an individual so far as he or she is employed, or 
usually employed, as described in the definition of national system employer in section 14, by a national 
system employer, except on a vocational placement’. Furthermore, Fair Work Act s 14 states that ‘(1) 
A national system employer is: (a) a constitutional corporation, so far as it employs, or usually employs, 
an individual; or (b) the Commonwealth, so far as it employs, or usually employs, an individual; or (c) 
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Therefore, private employers still need to tread carefully when accessing personal 
information of a private employee and follow the APPs accordingly.81 The APPs 
include a private employee accessing and collecting personal information of a current 
or prospective employee when reasonably necessary and disclosing the handling of 
this information to the employee with their consent. 
 
One example of how privacy and collection of information can play a role in pre-
employment is demonstrated in the case of Austin v Honeywell Ltd.82 In this case the 
prospective employee was not offered a position due to pre-employment screening of 
the candidate’s personal information and the employer found the content on the social 
media sites to be unsatisfactory. However, the court in this case held that the Privacy 
Act is not a workplace law as a ‘workplace law’ is defined ‘as any … law of the 
Commonwealth, a State or a Territory that regulates the relationships between 
employers and employees’.83 The court went further by explaining that ‘the Privacy 
Act incidentally imposes duties on some employers in respect of prospective 
employees but otherwise the Privacy Act does not concern the regulation of the 
employment relationship’.84  
 
As a result, workplace policies are important for addressing such issues and ought to 
reflect the principles of the Privacy Act and the allocated APPs in order to maintain 
the contractual duties between employer and employee. Taking the above mentioned 
into account, employers and especially employees need to be aware of the implications 
of breaching privacy during employment. The breach of privacy by an employer and 
                                                          
a Commonwealth authority, so far as it employs, or usually employs, an individual; or (d) a person so 
far as the person, in connection with constitutional trade or commerce, employs, or usually employs, an 
individual as: (i) a flight crew officer; or (ii) a maritime employee; or (iii) a waterside worker; or (e) a 
body corporate incorporated in a Territory, so far as the body employs, or usually employs, an 
individual; or (f) a person who carries on an activity (whether of a commercial, governmental or other 
nature) in a Territory in Australia, so far as the person employs, or usually employs, an individual in 
connection with the activity carried on in the Territory.’ 
81See, eg, Janneke Hoek, Paula O'Kane and Martin McCracken, ‘Publishing Personal Information 
Online: How Employers’ Access, Observe and Utilise Social Networking Sites within Selection 
Procedures’ (2016) 45 Personnel Review 67. 
82(2013) 277 FLR 372. 
83Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) s 12. 
84(2013) 277 FLR 372, 60. 
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employee during employment may be detrimental to the employment relationship and 
the employment contract.85  
 
3.2.3.2 Privacy Concerns During Employment 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the employment contract is an essential part to the 
employment relationship between an employer and employee. Therefore, this is the 
focal point when boundaries and obligations need to be established between the 
employer and the employee. Chapter 2 referred to the express and implied duties that 
form part of the employment contract, which is relevant when dealing with privacy 
issues and confidentiality as well as the restraint of social media use during and outside 
of working hours.86 
 
The privacy concerns that may arise during employment when social media play a role 
include, firstly, employees using social media during working hours on the office 
device or employer-sponsored device and whether employers may access that 
information, which may constitute personal information. Secondly, employees may 
post information about the employer on a social media platform from their private 
network and outside the workplace, which makes it difficult for the employer to 
manage the conduct of an employee. Lastly, the inappropriate use of social media by 
an employee, in particular the publishing of personal information of an employer, may 
lead to dismissal. However, the publishing of the personal information may not 
necessarily have harmed the interest of the business, which means that the dismissal 
may be unfair, unjust and unreasonable. 
 
When considering these concerns, it is evident that social media use by employees 
within and beyond the workplace be monitored in accordance with their duties and 
obligation in the employment contract.87 Therefore, besides breach of privacy being 
                                                          
85The duties of honesty, fairness and mutual trust and confidence is an integral to the employment 
relationship. 
86George, above n 61, 34. See also Michael Specht, Social Media in the Workplace (11 May 2009) 
<http://specht.com.au/michael/2009/05/11/social-media-in-the-workplace/>.  
87O’Halloran, above n, 1. See also, Rosemary Owens, Joellen Riley and Jill Murray (eds), The Law of 
Work (Oxford, 2nd Ed, 2011) 213. See also McManus v Scott‐Charlton (1996) 140 ALR 625; Ronald 
McCallum and Greg McCarry, ‘Worker Privacy in Australia’ (1996) 17 Comparative Labour Law 
Journal 13, 14; Louise Thornthwaite, ‘Chilling Times: Labour Law and the Regulation of Social Media 
Policies’ (Paper presented at Macquarie University, 2013), 9. 
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regulated by the Privacy Act, workplace policies are convenient to deal with the access 
of personal information of an employee and the restrictions placed on this access.88 
This will ensure that an employer’s liability is limited while an employee is protected 
from their personal information being circulated. This will further be discussed in 
Chapter 4. 
 
The FWC deals with unfair dismissal cases regarding employees breaching privacy 
regulations by misusing information about their employers and possibly co-workers 
and posting this information on a social media platform. These cases will be explored 
accordingly within the following two sections.89 In its decision, the FWC has given 
consideration to the following on the dismissal of employees regarding the 
inappropriate use of social media within the employment relationship:90 
 
(i) whether the employee has an understanding of how social media works; 
(ii) whether the post is directly linked to the employee’s work; and 
(iii) whether the comments made have a reasonable expectation to be seen as 
private. 
 
These were the considerations made in the case of Glen Stutsel v Linfox Australia Pty 
Ltd.91 An employee made racial and sexist remarks against two of the company 
managers on Facebook in the public domain. The employee argued that he did not 
have satisfactory technological knowledge and that he thought the privacy setting was 
enabled.92 The employee made the argument that he had a freedom of expression in 
accordance with the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights and that 
‘the proposition in terms of the right to privacy is simply that Ms Russell’s decision to 
investigate Mr Stutsel’s page for no apparent reason, in an arbitrary way, to use the 
                                                          
88John Clark, ‘Social Media and Privacy’ (2010) 29 Air Medical Journal 104, 107. 
89See in general Linfox Australia Pty Ltd v Glen Stutsel [2012] FWAFB 7097 (3 October 2012); Ms Lee 
Mayberry v Kijani Investments Pty Ltd ATF The Dawe Investments Trust Subway Wallsend T/A Subway 
[2011] FWA 3496 (14 July 2011); Sally-Anne Fitzgerald v Dianna Smith T/A Escape Hair Design 
[2010] FWA 7358 (24 September 2010). 
90Andrew Denton, Privacy Considerations and Social Media in the Workplace (21 May 2014) 4 
 <http://www.vicbar.com.au/GetFile.ashx?file=pdf/Privacy Considerations and Social Media in the 
Workplace - Andrew Denton - 21 May 2014.pdf>.  
91[2011] FWA 8444 (19 December 2011). 
92Ibid 79. 
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language of the Convention, was an unwarranted invasion of Mr Stutsel’s right of 
privacy’.93  
 
However, the employer argued that there is a sufficient nexus between the comments 
made outside of the workplace with the workplace itself and that a tribunal cannot 
make a decision on a matter such as ‘right to privacy’.94 This argument against right 
of privacy was not acknowledged by the Commissioner, who found that the comments 
were made amongst friends, which was not seen as malicious, and that there was not 
a breach of privacy under these circumstances.95  
 
Also, the Commissioner found that the social media policy was flawed and only 
included induction training on social media use and stated that ‘in the current 
electronic age, this is not sufficient and many large companies have published detailed 
social media policies and taken pains to acquaint their employees with those policies. 
Linfox did not’.96 This is a privacy issue concerned with the use of social media and 
in particular the use of it beyond the workplace. However, the control and management 
of the use of social media by employees beyond the workplace through a social media 
policy will be discussed in Chapter 4. 
 
In Griffiths v Rose,97 the employer made use of some desktop software (Spector360) 
in order to monitor laptops used by employees. It took information every 30 seconds 
and this information was uploaded to a server every time the employee connected to 
the network.98 The employer had a policy in place that prohibited an employee from 
using the laptop and network in accessing pornography.99 Mr Griffiths received a copy 
of this policy and he signed this policy stating that he read and understood the terms 
in the policy. The software identified that Mr Griffiths accessed several pornography 
sites at home on the laptop provided by the employer.100 The employer initiated an 
                                                          
93Ibid [58]-[59]. 
94Ibid [68]-[69]. 
95Ibid 81. 
96Ibid 87. 
97(2011) 192 FCA 130, [41]. 
98Ibid [3]. 
99Ibid [4]-[5]. 
100Ibid [9]. 
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investigation and even though Mr Griffiths had used his own internet provider, Mr 
Griffiths being dismissed.101  
 
Mr Griffiths took his employer to court and argued that the policy was prohibited by 
the Privacy Act as the employer was not allowed to collect personal information 
through the desktop software (Spector360).102 The Federal Court in this regard held 
that the employer, as owner of the laptop, is correct in saying that it can only be used 
according to what the policy states.103 The policy was put in place for a reason and that 
is to ensure that pornographic material does not appear in the workplace. Therefore, 
the employer was not in contravention of the APPs and collected the data in accordance 
with the company policies.104 
 
As seen from the cases discussed above, the APPs and workplace policies play an 
important role in the collection of personal information and the inappropriate use of 
social media can affect the employment relationship when personal information is 
accessed and used improperly by either an employer or employee. However, for an 
employer to bring a case against an employee for the inappropriate use of social media 
and publishing of personal information, the following elements must be satisfied:105 
there must be an interference with the individual’s private affairs; this interference 
must be intentional; there must be a reasonable expectation of privacy; the interference 
of privacy must be of a serious nature; and the individual’s privacy interests must 
outweigh the other party’s freedom of expression rights. Some of these elements could 
be hard to prove for an employer, but it is a start to monitoring privacy in the workplace 
and beyond. 
 
In order to avoid liability for a breach of privacy during employment, employers as 
well as employees need to be aware of the kind of personal information collected and 
                                                          
101Ibid. 
102Ibid [14]. 
103Ibid [43]. 
104See also Stutsel v Linfox Australia Pty Ltd (2011) 217 IR 28; [2011] FWA 8444 and Linfox Australia 
Pty v Ltd v Stutsel (2012) 217 IR 52; [2012] FWAFB 7097 (3 October 2012). 
105Australian Law Report Commission, Serious Invasions of Privacy in the Digital Era, Discussion 
Paper no 80 (2014) 5-8 <http://www.alrc.gov.au/publications/serious-invasions-privacy-dp-80>.  
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how it will be managed and distributed within the workplace and beyond.106 In 
particular, employees should be made aware that information they email or post on 
social media may result in a dismissal, even if the email or social media post was made 
outside of working hours.107 Furthermore, and relevant to Chapter 4, the fact that an 
employee disregards a social media workplace policy may not be enough to justify a 
summary dismissal and there may need to be some aggravating circumstances to lead 
to their dismissal.108 However, on occasion, employees will make use of social media 
outside of working hours to post inappropriate comments about a colleague or 
employer. The question which arises is when an employee posts inappropriate 
comments about a colleague or employer, can the employer monitor the employee’s 
conduct outside of working hours and if so, can the employer dismiss the employee 
because of the comments posted on social media? 
 
This question was addressed in the case of McManus v Scott-Charlton,109 where the 
court stated that ‘I am mindful of the caution that should be exercised when any 
extension is made to the supervision allowed an employer over the private activities of 
an employee. It needs to be carefully contained and fully justified’.110 Therefore, 
‘exceptional circumstances’ should be present when an employer wants to monitor an 
employee’s conduct outside working hours.111 An example of where an employer 
might have an interest in an employee’s conduct outside of work is where the conduct 
is directly related to the workplace. Where the conduct of an employee outside of work 
has a connection to their work, the court will need to draw a delicate line between the 
individual’s public and private life. This conduct can consequently lead to dismissal 
of the employee.112 
                                                          
106Proper induction and training should also be provided by employers to current employees on their 
right to privacy in the workplace and the use of social media when distributing private information about 
a fellow employee or employer. 
107See Chapter 2 where a ‘workplace’ is defined to include anywhere outside an office or building. 
Therefore, posts made outside of working hours may still be a ground for dismissal. 
108George, above n 61, 48. See also Laws v London Chronicle (Indicator Newspapers) Ltd [1959] 2 All 
ER 285. 
109(1996) 70 FCR 16. 
110Ibid [60]. 
111Appellant v Respondent (1999) 89 IR 407, 416. See also McManus v Scott-Charlton (1996) 70 FCR 
16, [56] where the court held that: ‘once an employee’s conduct can be shown to have significant and 
adverse effects in the workplace – because of its impact on workplace relations, on the productivity of 
others, or on the effective conduct of the employer’s business – that conduct becomes a proper matter 
of legitimate concern to an employer, and does so because of its consequences.’ 
112See also a discussion of this case in the section on cyberbullying. 
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Generally, when an employer is faced with an employee misusing social media, they 
must decide whether a dismissal for this misconduct is fair or not.113 An example of 
such a decision can be observed in case of Pedley v IPMS Pty Ltd t/as Peckvonbartel 
(Pedley),114 in which the FWC noted that ‘the applicant’s conduct in sending the email 
to clients of PVH was incompatible with his duty to his employer and conduct liable 
to summary dismissal’.115 Furthermore, the conduct of the employee, in order to be 
dismissed, must be ‘conduct which in respect of important matters is incompatible with 
the fulfilment of an employee’s duty, or involves an opposition, or conflict [with their] 
duty to [the] employer, … or is destructive of the necessary confidence between 
employer and employee’.116 Therefore, when an employee posts any negative 
comments on a social media platform, it is possible that such an activity would be 
contrary to their duties towards the employer and could subsequently be used as 
confirmation to dismiss the employee and be seen as an invasion of privacy.117  
 
Even though employees can be summarily dismissed for their inappropriate use of 
social media towards an employer because of breach of privacy, an employer needs to 
be careful to not dismiss an employee unfair and unreasonably. This was the case in 
Judith Wilkinson-Reed v Launtoy Pty Ltd t/as Launceston Toyota.118 In this case, an 
employee was dismissed because of a private conversation the employee had on 
Facebook with the business owner’s wife, when he told her that everyone at work 
thought the owner was a ‘tosser’.119 At the time this private conversation was taking 
place, the owner and his wife had separated. The owner of the business saw the 
Facebook message through accessing his ex-wife’s account, using her password.120 
The Commissioner in this case held that ‘I do not believe the breach was particularly 
serious. The remark was not made to another employee or a customer of the business 
and, would have remained private to the parties to the conversation had Mr. Nixon not 
accessed his estranged wife’s email account. It was certainly not such a serious breach 
                                                          
113See Rankin v Marine Power International Pty Ltd (2001) 107 IR 117; [2001] VSC 150, 352. 
114[2013] FWC 4282. 
115Ibid [41]. 
116Blyth Chemicals v Bushnells (1933) 49 CLR 66, 81-82. 
117Piper Alderman, Social Media in 2013 – The Year in Review (December 2013) 
<http://www.piperalderman.com.au/__files/f/5290/Top%20Social%20Media%20moments%20-
%201213-v2.pdf>.  
118[2014] FWC 644 (24 January 2014). 
119Ibid [13]. 
120Ibid [14]. 
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of confidentiality as to justify termination of the applicant’s employment’.121 
Furthermore, even though the conversation was private, the comments expressed in 
the post and the small nature of the workplace, will possibly lead to the employment 
relationship deteriorating.122 However, the dismissal was unfair. 
 
The above examples demonstrate that both employees and employers need to be aware 
of the consequences social media can create within a workplace and even outside the 
workplace when dealing with or posting personal information that can lead to a breach 
of privacy. Furthermore, by claiming that employees did not understand the privacy 
settings on their social media platforms is not enough to warrant them from being 
dismissed by an employer for an invasion of privacy, as held by the Linfox cases. 
However, as noted by the Wilkinson-Reed case, employers need to investigate the 
comments made by employees in context before deciding to dismiss the employee 
because of the content breaching privacy principles.  
 
3.2.3.3 Privacy Concerns Post-Employment 
In addition to the unfair dismissal cases regarding the inappropriate use of social media 
outside of the workplace, one of the relevant issues concerned with privacy post-
employment is who owns a social media account if an employer asked an employee to 
set it up for the business. Most businesses use LinkedIn to gain a reputation and usually 
it will be employees who are contracted to set up such an account.123 This can become 
problematic when an employee is dismissed or resigns from the workplace and the 
company’s private information is held by that employee.124 It is therefore crucial for 
employers to put in place a well-drafted contract that sets out the employee’s duties 
and responsibilities with regard to login details and ownership of social media accounts 
in order to circumvent any problems in the future.125 
 
                                                          
121Ibid [61]. 
122Ibid [82]. 
123See Kirsten Hodgson, LinkedIn for Lawyers: Connect, Engage and Grow your Business (LexisNexis, 
2012) 80. 
124In a case in the United States of America, Ardis health LLC v Nankivell (United States District Court, 
Eastern District Pennsylvania, Case No 11-4303, 12 March 2013), an employer applied for an injunction 
(which was granted) requiring a previous employee to return all login information relating to the 
employer’s website. 
125George, above n 61, 61. 
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The main problem for employers post-employment; however, seems to be when 
employees leave their positions and move on to a competitor or other employer and 
use confidential information of the company on social media platforms and access this 
information later through their own social media accounts. One solution to avoid 
problems with previous employees regarding social media accounts is by including a 
restraint of trade clause in the employment contract.126 This can help prevent previous 
employees dispersing private and confidential information to future employers. In the 
case of Hays Specialist Recruitment (Holdings) Ltd v Ions,127 Mr Ions (who was still 
an employee at Hays), kept a copy of confidential information regarding clients of 
Hays by using LinkedIn. Mr Ions downloaded the list of clients from the employer’s 
database and uploaded them to his own LinkedIn account.128 Mr Ions was leaving the 
company and starting a new company and so he sent invitations to the clients regarding 
this new venture.129 In the meantime, Mr Ions deleted his LinkedIn account.130 The 
High Court held that this was a breach of his express and implied duties and stated ‘Mr 
Ions’ contract of employment signed by him on 12 January 2001 required him to 
devote his whole time and attention during business hours to the business of Hays and 
to use his endeavours to promote Hays’ interests in every respect, giving at all times 
the full benefit of his knowledge, expertise and skill’.131  
 
As demonstrated by this example, former employees can cause harm to former 
employers by exacting revenge through social media and by making negative 
statements towards the former employer, which can damage the goodwill and business 
reputation and ultimately the employment relationship. Referring to Chapter 2 of this 
thesis, the employment contract consists of implied duties, which must be met by both 
                                                          
126See in general Planet Fitness Pty Ltd v Brooke Dunlop & Ors [2012] NSWSC 1425. 
127[2008] EWHC 745. 
128Ibid [1]-[3]. 
129Ibid [4]. The clause specifically read: ‘You must not, during the course of your employment or at any 
time thereafter, make use of, or disclose or divulge to any person, firm or company, any trade secrets, 
business methods or information which you know, or ought reasonably to have known to be of a 
confidential nature concerning the businesses, finances, dealings, transactions, client database or other 
affairs of the Company or the Group or of any person having dealings with the Company which may 
have come to your knowledge during the course of your employment unless it is necessary for the proper 
execution of your duties hereunder, and you shall use your best endeavours to prevent the publication 
or disclosure of any such information.’ 
130Ibid [37]. 
131Ibid [4], [51]. See also George, above n 61, 63. The same view will most likely be held in Australia 
where it will be a breach of an employee’s duty of good faith and fidelity. See also Naiman Clarke Pty 
Ltd v Tuccia [2012] NSWSC 314 in this regard. 
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the employer and employee. However, when social media is inappropriately used, such 
in the case above, implied duties like good faith and fidelity will be breached. Even 
though the employment contract comes to an end, employer and employees still have 
employment and statutory duties imposed on them.132  
 
With the development of the digital era, privacy needs to be protected now more than 
ever as new threats and exposure to individual privacy emerge.133 Exposure of private 
and confidential information by employees and employers through social media has 
become an everyday routine and challenge. These challenges leave employers and 
employees exposed in the digital world with limited recourse. It remains to be seen 
whether private employers will be able to take action, within privacy legislation, when 
personal information is disclosed inappropriately through social media platforms. As 
discussed, the employment relationship forms an integral part of how to deal with 
invasion of privacy within the workplace. However, this simultaneously raises 
concerns for breach of confidentiality. This thesis is not covering this area of law in 
depth, but it arises in the context of privacy and is particularly relevant when 
considering employee duties towards the employer and how the inappropriate use of 
social media can lead to a breach of confidentiality within the employment contract. 
 
3.2.4 Privacy and Confidentiality 
In the first part of the chapter, privacy risks associated with social media and the scope 
of privacy law were considered. However, given the fact that a right to privacy is not 
recognised and in the absence of a tort of invasion of privacy, a discussion on privacy 
and confidentiality is relevant to the inappropriate use of social media by an employee 
within the workplace and beyond. The equitable doctrine of confidentiality is 
important to the employment relationship and in protecting employers and employees 
in terms of confidential information, which may include personal information as 
described in the Privacy Act. As mentioned in Chapter 2, confidentiality is implied in 
the employment contract and a breach of this confidentiality may lead to dismissal of 
an employee. Therefore, breach of confidentiality, because of unreasonable comments 
made on social media, may lead to dismissal of employees. Therefore, this section will 
                                                          
132Naiman Clarke Pty Ltd v Tuccia (Naiman Clarke) [2012] NSWSC 314. 
133Veronica Siow, ‘The Impact of Social Media in the Workplace: An Employer’s Perspective’ (2013) 
32(4) Communications Law Bulletin 12. 
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focus on examining breach of confidentiality in the employment contract with 
reference to social media use, which is related but distinguishable from a breach of 
privacy.  
 
Given the limited scope of the Privacy Act and protections under common law for 
breach of privacy, a question that arises is whether the duty of confidence, (in 
particular the breach of confidence) can be relied on to ensure the protection of privacy. 
The suggestion that the law of breach of confidence should be a means to develop the 
protection of privacy in Australia has gained some criticism.134 The ALRC argues 
that135 privacy and confidentiality are seen as different concepts; the equitable doctrine 
of breach of confidence is not suitable for the protection of privacy because it goes on 
the conscience of the confidant; and there exists uncertainty as to whether breach of 
confidence will offer privacy protection beyond the scope of unauthorised 
publication.136 
 
In Hosking and Hosking v Runting and Pacific Magazines NZ Ltd,137 the court also 
held that ‘privacy’ and ‘confidentiality’ are two separate concepts and stated that 
‘breach of confidence, being an equitable concept is conscience-based’ and ‘invasion 
of privacy is a common law wrong which is founded on the harm done to the plaintiff 
by conduct which can reasonably be regarded as offensive to human values’.138 In this 
regard, ‘confidentiality’ and ‘privacy’ can form part of one scenario, but it is up to the 
courts to establish that each of the elements contained within a breach of 
confidentiality also forms part of a breach of privacy. 
 
                                                          
134See Jillian Caldwell, ‘Protecting Privacy Post Lenah: Should the Courts Establish a New Tort or 
Develop Breach of Confidence?’ (2003) 26(1) University of New South Wales Law Journal 90; Linda 
Tompkins, ‘Confidentiality Agreements in a Commercial Setting: Are They Necessary?’ (2008) 27 
Australian Resources & Energy Law Journal 198; Normann Witzleb, ‘Monetary Remedies for Breach 
of Conﬁdence in Privacy Cases’ (2007) 27 Legal Studies 430. 
135George, above n 61 120. See also Australian Law Reform Commission, For your Information: 
Australian Privacy Law and Practice, Report no108 (12 August 2008), [15.139-15.140] 
<http://www.alrc.gov.au/publications/report-108>.  
136Australian Law Reform Commission, Obligations of Confidence, 
<http://www.alrc.gov.au/publications/15.%20Federal%20Information%20Laws/obligations-
confidence>. 
137[2005] 1 NZLR 1. 
138Ibid 307. 
101 
 
In Commonwealth v John Fairfax and Sons Ltd 139 it was held that ‘the court will act 
to restrain the publication of confidential information improperly or surreptitiously 
obtained or of information imparted in confidence which ought not to be divulged’. 
This statement can be understood as a breach of confidence being used to restrict the 
disclosure of private information. The law of breach of confidentiality falls within 
equitable relief, whereas privacy falls within common law relief.140 However, common 
law duties are also imposed upon the employment relationship when applying the duty 
of confidence.141  Therefore, the underlying rule for exercising equitable relief ‘lies in 
the notion of an obligation of conscience arising from the circumstances in or through 
which the information was communicated or obtained’.142  
 
A breach of confidence generally forms the protection of four particular classes: 
(i) trade secrets;  
(ii) personal confidences;  
(iii) government information; and 
(iv) literary and artistic confidences.143  
 
In this regard, any personal information regarding an employee that an employer 
possess, for example emails, internet or social media usage, will be subject to the duty 
of confidence when it is ‘improperly or surreptitiously acquired’.144  This duty, under 
common law, may then possibly be recognised as invasion of privacy.  However, as 
discussed above, the High Court has left the development of this idea open; whereas 
other lower courts, as discussed, imposed liability for unreasonable intrusion.145  This 
would be the case where both employers and employees misuse confidential 
information to their own advantage. 
 
In order to bring an equitable action, the court in Coco v AN Clark (Engineers) Ltd146 
held that the following elements are required: 
                                                          
139(1980) 147 CLR 39, 50. 
140Prince Albert v Strange (1849) 1 Mac & G 25; 41 All ER 1171; Argyll (Duchess) v Argyll (Duke) 
[1967] 1 Ch 302 (Argyll v Argyll). 
141Prout v British Gas (1992) FSR 478. 
142Moorgate Tobacco Ltd v Phillip Morris Ltd (No. 2) (1984) 156 CLR 414, 438. 
143George, above n 61, 109. 
144ABC v Lenah Game Meats (2001) 208 CLR 199, 224. 
145Ibid.  See also Doe v ABC (2007) VCC 281; Giller v Procopets [2008] VSCA 236. 
146[1969] RPC 41, 47. 
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(i) the information has some characteristic of confidence; 
(ii) the information has been conveyed under circumstances where there is an 
obligation of confidence; and 
(iii) there has been a misuse of the information. 
 
Each element will be discussed accordingly. The first element requires the court to 
establish the necessary characteristic of confidence at hand. In the case of Australian 
Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd,147 the court held that certain 
information is more vulnerable than others.148 Whether private information is at hand, 
it needs to be obvious that it also indicates confidentiality. According to the Lenah 
Game Meats case, the court regards personal and private information such as medical 
reports, health information, personal relationships and finances as confidential, which 
means that any information falling outside this scope needs to be assessed against other 
factors in order to prove that it has a characteristic of confidence.149 The court will 
consider the nature of the information; whether the information was expressly 
confidential; if not expressly confidential, it was otherwise treated as confidential; and 
whether it would be seen as confidential by a reasonable person.150 Therefore, 
confidential information is information that is not mere ‘trivial tittle tattle’ or against 
public interest.151  
 
The second element requires the court to establish whether the information has been 
conveyed under circumstances where there is an obligation of confidence. Normally 
under these circumstances, equity will intervene to protect the necessary confidential 
                                                          
147(2001) 208 CLR 199. 
148Ibid 42 - ‘Certain kinds of information about a person such as information relating to health, personal 
relationships, or finances, may be easy to identify as private; as may certain kinds of activity which a 
reasonable person, applying contemporary standards of morals and behaviour, would understand to be 
meant to be unobserved’. 
149George, above n 61, 111. See also W v Egdell [1990] Ch 359, 389; Minter Ellison (a firm) v Raneberg 
[2011] SASC 159, [30]. 
150Ibid. See also Sullivan v Sclanders & Goldwell Int Pty Ltd (2000) 77 SASR 419. 
151Ibid 112. In the case of Saad v Chubb Security Australia Pty Ltd [2012] NSWSC 1183, 183, photos 
were taken of a woman from CCTV cameras which was installed in her workplace. These photos were 
uploaded to Facebook and some comments written with the photo was present. The court held: ‘In the 
present case, the plaintiff was…the sole subject and focus of the photographic images. It is at least 
arguable that the unauthorised images of her amounted to an interference in what was essentially an 
activity forming part of her private, though not secret life associated with her employment. I do not 
consider that, at this stage of the proceedings, it is open to conclude that the cause of action for breach 
of confidence based on invasion of the plaintiff’s privacy would be futile or bad in law…’ 
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information. In Australia, a person who entrusted confidential information to another 
is bound by an obligation of confidence.152 When employees post information on 
social media and even via email about fellow employees or their employers, they fail 
to uphold their obligation of confidence if the information was conveyed to them 
confidentially.153  
 
The last element requires the court to establish a misuse of the confidential 
information. When confidential information is conveyed to a social media user and 
this person posts this information, it is a breach of confidential information and 
therefore a misuse of the information. Misuse of information may include posting it 
electronically, in hardcopy or by word of mouth.154 This can also create the issue of 
cyberbullying, which will be discussed later in this chapter. 
 
It is significant that a breach of confidentiality must meet all the criteria discussed 
above. With these elements in mind, it is useful to consider whether there exists a duty 
of mutual trust and confidence between an employer and employee and whether a 
breach of confidence can be seen as a means to ensure the protection of privacy in the 
workplace.  This is especially relevant with the advancement of social media in the 
workplace and the potential misuse of confidential and private information.  
 
When considering a breach of confidentiality, Telford argues that ‘a more practical 
development would have been to differentiate between privacy as a right and privacy 
as a cause of action’ if cases were to be differentiated from breach of confidentiality 
actions.155 However, this has not been done and therefore, referring to the case of 
Lenah Game Meats, the court held that the equitable breach of confidence seems to be 
the appropriate legal action in order to protect an individual’s private information. 
Specifically, Gleeson CJ held that:156 
 
The law should be more astute than in the past to identify and protect interests of a kind 
which fall within the concept of privacy … For reasons already given, I regard the law 
                                                          
152Attorney-General v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No 2) [1990] 1 AC 109, 268. 
153See, eg, Norman South Pty Ltd v Geoffrey Edlesten v Stacey da Silva [2012] VSC 477. 
154George, above n 61, 114. 
155Paul Telford, ‘Gross v Purvis: Its Place in the Common Law of Privacy’ (2003) 10(4) Privacy Law 
and Policy Reporter 66, 68. 
156Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 199, [40], [55]. 
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of breach of confidence as providing a remedy, in a case such as the present, if the nature 
of the information obtained by the trespasser is such as to permit the information to be 
regarded as confidential. 
 
Therefore, to prevent a breach of confidentiality, employers need to ensure that the 
correct measures, such as social media workplace policies and training on this aspect 
are provided to employees. This will further be discussed in Chapter 4. According to 
Concut Pty Ltd v Worrell,157 equitable and contractual duties in relation to confidence 
may coexist and there may be a considerable overlap of these duties within the 
employment relationship.158 Confidential information of both employees and 
employers may be protected by way of implied contractual duties of good faith in the 
employment contract.  However, this information may also be protected through an 
action for breach of confidence by an express agreement by the parties.159 
 
Applying the elements of the duty of confidence above and taking into account implied 
duties of an employment contract as discussed in Chapter 2, a breach of dissemination 
of confidential information may arise. If, for example, an employee disseminates 
confidential business opportunities of an employer via social media, this might be a 
breach of an implied duty of trust and good faith between the parties.  Furthermore, if 
there is an express contractual term added to the employment contract dealing with 
confidential information, this will be a breach of confidence if information is conveyed 
over social media.160 
 
In relation to confidential information under an employment contract, the information 
that is dealt with must be specifically mentioned, either through an express term in the 
contract or the policy attached to the employment contract.  In Dais Studio Pty Ltd v 
Bullet Creative Pty Ltd,161 it was held that confidential information must be made 
known to the employee in order to be aware of that information.162  Therefore, in 
relation to the dissemination of information via social media platforms, the employee 
sharing confidential information must have known of its confidential nature.  
                                                          
157(2000) 75 ALJR 312. 
158Ibid [26]. 
159Optus Networks Pty Ltd v Telstra [2010] FCFCA 21, [38]. 
160Transpacific Industries Pty Ltd v Whelan [2008] VSC 403. 
161[2007] FCA 2054. 
162Ibid [95]. 
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However, this will similarly apply with the equitable duty of confidence in the 
employment relationship where there was wrongful use of information, whether in a 
traditional sense or through social media.163   
 
The extent to which an employee could breach confidence may seriously undermine 
the employment relationship in that employees can harm the employer’s business 
reputation and goodwill through breaching the employment contract duties implied 
within this relationship. However, an action for breach of confidentiality may be 
sufficient to remedy the breach in terms of the information that was regarded as 
confidential because of the restrictions within the Privacy Act and privacy principles.   
 
The breach of privacy and confidentiality can possibly create further legal issues like 
defamation because of the published material on a social media platform being 
defamatory. The second legal issue will examine defamation laws in Australia and 
how this creates significant challenges for employers within a social media framework. 
 
3.3 DEFAMATION 
A defamation claim is one of the more significant issues associated with the use of 
social media in the workplace. In 2013, Judge Elkaim made the following statement 
regarding social media and defamation: 
 
when defamatory publications are made on social media it is common knowledge that 
they spread. They are spread easily by the simple manipulation of mobile phones and 
computers. Their evil lies in the grapevine effect that stems from the use of this type of 
communication.164 
 
The quote by Judge Elkaim reflects the reach of social media and the speed with which 
damaging information can be communicated. This clearly has implications for 
employers and employees. As noted above, the inappropriate use of social media by 
current and even former employees can cause serious damage to reputation and 
relationships when social media communications are defamatory, especially within the 
                                                          
163Seager v Copydex Ltd [1967] 2 All ER 415. 
164Mickle v Farley [2013] NSWDC 295, [21]. 
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employment relationship. This section therefore examines the meaning of defamation 
and scope of defamation law in relation to the use of social media.  
 
There is no specific or particular definition of defamation in Australia;165 however, 
Richards, De Zwart and Ludlow note that ‘the essence of the tort of defamation is the 
protection of reputation, that intangible something that we all hold dear and which can, 
especially for a public figure, be so much larger than the individual and exist in more 
than one location (and thus be damages in more than one location)’.166 Therefore, 
defamation can be defined as ‘a common law tort whereby communication occurs 
between two or more people which tends to cause a third party's reputation to be 
negatively affected’.167 This communication can occur either verbally or in writing 
(for example, via social media).168 Defamation has the characteristic of injuring 
another party’s reputation.169 Therefore, it is measured against a hypothetical person 
and how that person would react to these defamation claims.170 The following verse 
from a poem by Thomas Moore paints a picture of how defamation was characterised 
since the early days:171 
They slander thee sorely, who say thy vows are frail – 
Hadst thou been a false one, thy cheek had look’d less pale! 
They say, too, so long thou hast worn those lingering chains, 
That deep in thy heart they have printed their servile stains: 
O, foul is the slander! – no chain could that soul subdue –  
Where shineth thy spirit, there Liberty shineth too! 
                                                          
165Roy Baker, ‘Defamation and the Moral Community’ (2008) 13(1) Deakin Law Review 1, 4. 
166Bernadette Richards, Melissa de Zwart and Karinne Ludlow, Tort Law Principles (Lawbook Co, 6th 
ed, 2013) 550. 
167Defamation can also be defined as ‘the tort of publishing to persons, other than the person defamed, 
imputations the effect of which is to lower the reputation of the person defamed in the eyes of the public 
at large’ – Belinda Robilliard, ‘Jurisdiction and Choice of Law Rules for Defamation Actions in 
Australia Following the Gutnick Case and the Uniform Defamation Legislation’ (2007) 14 Australian 
International Law Journal 185, 186.  
The general definition of ‘defamation’ is very broad. See also Katarina Klaric and Colette Downie, 
Legal Traps: the Internet & the Office - Employer Liability for Employee Internet Misuse (2010) 
<http://www.stephens.com.au/Sites/2196/Images%20Files/Newsletters/May%202010%20%20Legal
%20Traps.pdf>.  
168Baker, above n 165, 5. 
169Ibid. According to Armstrong, ‘the underlying principles of modern Australian defamation law were 
formulated in England more than 400 years ago, against a backdrop of limited forms of personal and 
social communication’ – David Grant, ‘Defamation and the Internet: Principles for a Unified Australian 
(and world) Online Defamation Law’ (2002) 3(1) Journalism Studies 115, 116. 
170Baker, above n 165, 4. 
171Thomas Moore, ‘The Irish Peasant to His Mistress’ (1779-1852) in Arthur Quiller-Couch, The Oxford 
Book of English Verse 1250-1900 (1999) <http://www.bartleby.com/101/583.html>.  
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In Australia, defamation laws, derived from the United Kingdom, are based on the 
common law as well as statute law.172 Following the colonisation of Australia, the law 
regarding defamation under common law was codified through the Defamation Act 
1847 (NSW), which was primarily applied in New South Wales but adopted into other 
colonies.173 Victoria repealed the Defamation Act 1847 and replaced it with the 
common law principles of defamation.174 South Australia applied the common law 
principles subject to amendments in the Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA).175 Queensland 
and Tasmania codified the law of defamation based on the Indian Penal Code 1860, 
which replaced the common law principles as Defamation Act 1889 (Qld) and 
Defamation Act 1957 (Tas).176 The Australian Capital Territory applied the common 
law as amended by the Defamation Act 1901 (NSW).177 Lastly, Western Australia 
adopted the Queensland Criminal Code for purposes of defamation laws, but continued 
to apply defamation laws under common law in accordance with the Criminal Code 
Act 1913 (WA).178 As a result of the Australian Constitution being enacted in 1901, 
some states and territories preferred to keep the Defamation Act 1847 within their laws 
while other states and territories enacted their own defamation laws.179 However, 
because of inconsistencies arising within each state and territory on defamation laws, 
this led to defamation laws being reformed in 2006. 
 
In 2005 it was announced that all states and territories would enact uniform legislation 
on defamation law.180 This was a ‘watershed’, as uniformity had been debated for a 
long time.181 The uniform defamation laws were successfully passed by all states and 
                                                          
172Breen Creighton and Andrew Stewart, Labour Law (The Federation Press, 2010) 42-43. 
173Ibid 42. See Barbara McDonald, ‘Legislative Intervention in the Law of Negligence: The Common 
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174Patrick George, Defamation Law in Australia (LexisNexis, 2nd ed, 2012) 70. 
175Ibid. 
176Ibid. 
177Ibid. 
178Ibid 71. 
179Mark Pearson, ‘A Review of Australia's Defamation Reforms After a Year of Operation’ (2007) 29 
Australian Journalism Review 41, 42. 
180Ibid. 
181Steven Rares, ‘Defamation and Media Law Update 2006: Uniform National Laws and the Federal 
Court of Australia’ (2006) 28 Australian Bar Review 1, 1. See also Australian Law Reform Commission, 
Unfair Publication: Defamation and Privacy, Report no 11 (1979). 
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territories in 2006;182 but each with some minor variations.183 For example, in January 
2006, Western Australia introduced the Defamation Act 2005 (WA).  
 
The change in statutory provisions for defamation has brought with it some significant 
changes to the general law on defamation. Rolph noted the following regarding the 
change in Australian defamation laws: ‘the changes are significant and bring about 
uniformity, but do not represent a radical departure from previous laws. It is seen as 
incremental’.184 The changes to defamation legislation include that: the Act now makes 
provision for defamation regarding online publications; there is no difference between 
common law slander and libel; and parties now have access to statutory defences that 
operate in addition to the common law defences.185 
 
These uniform defamation laws and changes now make provision for defamation 
within online publications. However, the development of social media and technology 
can still make it challenging when defamatory remarks are made, especially in trying 
to determine who published the material, what the material was and where it was 
published. This is a particular issue within the workplace where an employee, 
colleague or customer posts defamatory comments on social media anonymously 
about another employee or the employer.186 It is the anonymity of the defamatory 
social media posts that make the use of social media an issue. In regards to comments 
                                                          
182Other States and Territories also introduced their legislation: Defamation Act 2005 (NSW); 
Defamation Act 2005 (SA); Defamation Act 2005 (Qld); Defamation Act 2005 (Tas); Defamation Act 
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184David Rolph, ‘A Critique of the National, Uniform Defamation Laws’ (2008) 16 Torts Law Journal 
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Branscomb, ‘Common Law for the Electronic frontier’ (1991) 165 Scientific American 112, 112. 
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made on social media, the court in AB Ltd v Facebook Ireland Ltd187stated the 
following: 
 
It is indisputable that social networking sites can be a force for good in society, a truly 
positive and valuable mechanism. However, they are becoming increasingly misused as 
a medium through which to threaten, abuse, harass, intimidate and defame. Social 
networking sites belong to the ‘Wild West’ of modern broadcasting, publication and 
communication … Recent impending litigation … confirms that, in this sphere, an 
increasingly grave mischief confronts society.188 
 
Therefore, social media has made the way through which defamatory comments are 
made an issue within the employment relationship.  Issues concerning defamation in 
the workplace are well illustrated in the case of ‘The Bell’, an historic 18th century inn 
that was promoted and advertised as iconic accommodation on Facebook in order to 
gain customers.189 A dispute occurred between the owner of the inn and a previous 
employee who managed the Facebook page.190 The employee retitled the Facebook 
page as ‘Toad of Bell Enders – How not to run a Cotswold Pub’.191 At that stage, the 
Facebook page had more than 100 members and the owner began receiving defamatory 
comments by the members.192 The plaintiff received £9 000 in damages.193  
 
This example is but only one of few recent cases dealing with defamation within the 
workplace on a social media platform.194 The inappropriate use of social media in the 
workplace may trigger repercussions when defamatory remarks are made on a social 
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media site. This is a significant legal issue within the workplace and how the 
employment relationship is affected through defamatory material published online. 
The action for defamation is further blurred and complicated when defamatory 
remarks are made outside the workplace. To see how cases of defamation can be 
actioned in general and within a social media framework, an overview of defamation 
laws in Australia will be given followed by a discussion of where defamation laws are 
positioned currently in relation to social media in the workplace. 
 
3.3.1 Defamation Action 
Before an action for defamation can be brought against an individual, a distinction 
needs to be made between whether a person’s reputation is being harmed and whether 
it is free speech. In relation to the right of free speech, the case of Lange v Australian 
Broadcasting Corporation195 held that the freedom of speech in the Constitution is not 
conclusive. In this case, the then prime minister of New Zealand, David Lange, 
contended that the ABC’s program ‘Four Corners’ broadcast false and defamatory 
imputations about him and the Labour Party at that stage.196 The issues concerning this 
case were whether the ‘constitutional defence’ of freedom of speech extends to 
political discussions and whether these political discussions form part of qualified 
privilege under common law.197 The High Court held that ‘each member of the 
Australian community has an interest in disseminating and receiving information, 
opinions and arguments concerning government and political matters that affect the 
people of Australia’ and therefore provide protection to those who publish information, 
opinions and arguments.198  
 
Defamation law allows for certain defences such as honest statements, fact or opinion 
when assessing whether an action is suitable for defamation.199 It is argued that 
‘defamation provides a direct challenge to free speech, but the defences to defamation 
attempt to strike a balance between free speech and protection of reputation’.200 This 
thesis will not examine free speech, but forms part of an overall discussion to an action 
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for defamation. This thesis will therefore consider the protection of reputation and 
suitable defences regarding the use of social media platforms within the workplace. 
 
The protection of a person’s reputation is an important aspect to a defamation action 
as it is one of the elements that needs to be proven in order for an action to progress. 
Bower refers to the meaning of reputation as:201 
 
The esteem in which he is held, or the goodwill entertained towards him, or the 
confidence reposed in him by other persons, whether in respect of his personal character, 
his private or domestic life, his public, social, professional, or business qualifications, 
qualities, competence, dealings, conduct, or status, or his financial credit … 
 
Therefore, it is the published defamatory material that preys upon a person’s reputation 
and goodwill within the community.202 The damage that is caused through published 
material which is viewed by the community is subject to an action for defamation and 
damages. Likewise, Brennan J stated that ‘[a]lthough damages are awarded to 
vindicate the plaintiff’s reputation, damages are not awarded as compensation for the 
loss in value of a plaintiff’s reputation as though that reputation were itself a tangible 
asset or a physical attribute which, once damaged, is worth less than it was before’.203 
Therefore, in order to rely on reputation and a demand for damages, the High Court of 
Australia confirmed in Radio 2UE Sydney Pty Ltd v Chesterton204 that the test applied 
in defamation cases is whether an ordinary person reading the published material 
would think less of the plaintiff.205 It is also contingent on community standards.206 
Specifically, Kirby J explained the test as follows:207 
 
The recipient has been variously described as a ‘reasonable reader’, a ‘right-thinking 
[member] of society’, or an ‘ordinary man, not avid for scandal’. Sometimes qualities 
of understanding have been attributed, such as the ‘reader of average intelligence’. The 
point of these attempts to describe the notional recipient is to conjure up an idea of the 
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kind of person who will receive the communication in question and in whose opinion 
the reputation of the person affected is said to be lowered … 
 
Furthermore, the court in Radio 2UE Sydney Pty Ltd v Chesterton held that the test 
applied in defamation cases and ‘reputation’ extends to businesses and the test must 
be met objectively within the confines of the elements of defamation (which will be 
examined below).208 Therefore, the application of this test also extends to the 
reputation of a business and how the community will view a certain business and the 
people working within that business.209 However, the development of social media in 
the workplace has made it a challenge for employers and employees to identify what 
material is defamatory and by whom it was anonymously posted. This part of the 
chapter will therefore identify the elements of defamation in order to bring an action 
for defamation and will strongly focus on an employee using social media 
inappropriately within the workplace and beyond. 
 
For an employer to bring an action for defamation on a social media platform against 
an employee, the following three elements must be proven when an action for 
defamation is considered:210 
 
(i) the information published is of a defamatory matter; 
(ii) the information published identified the person (plaintiff); and 
(iii) the information published was indeed defamatory. 
 
These elements will be used to examine the general action for defamation and extend 
into a discussion on how social media impacts these elements within the workplace. 
Therefore, employers, who believe that the reputation of the business has been 
damaged, need to prove each of these elements. These three elements will be discussed 
accordingly within the ambit of social media and defamation in the workplace. 
 
                                                          
208Radio 2UE Sydney Pty Ltd v Chesterton, [36]. 
209See Murphy v Plasterers Society [1949] SASR 98. 
210 See Matthew Collins, The Law of Defamation and the Internet (Oxford University Press, 3rd ed, 
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3.3.1.1 Published Information and Defamatory Matter 
The earliest reference to a publication being defamatory, was in the case of Parmiter 
v Coupland211 in which the court held that ‘it is likely to injure the reputation of another 
by exposing the person to hatred, contempt or ridicule’.212 In Australia, the case of 
Gardiner v John Fairfax & Sons213 similarly found that published defamatory matter 
‘is anything which is likely to cause ordinary decent folk in the community, in general, 
to think less of the person’.214 These cases and tests indicate that the publication of 
defamatory matter needs to be considered carefully in order to determine the harm a 
person has caused. The publication of defamatory material is concerned with two 
points: firstly, publication through a positive act and, secondly, publication through 
omission.215 The court in Webb v Bloch216 stated that in order for a publication to be 
made through a positive act, there must exist intention on the part of the offender. The 
court further stated that ‘if he has intentionally lent his assistance to its existence for 
the purposes of being published, his instrumentality is evidence to show a publication 
by him’.217 Therefore, any positive acts such as ‘tweeting’,218 posting on Facebook or 
LinkedIn and emails to co-workers, employers or customers is determined by the test 
set out in the Webb v Bloch case.219 Any of these acts can lead to a defamation action 
when defamatory material is published.220 
 
As mentioned, publication can be done through a positive act or through omission. The 
second point of publication through omission was dealt with in the cases of 
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Urbanchich v Drummoyne Municipal Council221 and Frawley v New South Wales.222 
The court in Byrne v Deane223 held that the test for publication by omission is ‘whether 
having regard to all the facts of the case is the proper inference that by not removing 
the defamatory matter the defendant really made himself responsible for its continued 
presence in the place where it had been put?’.224 This test was applied in Urbanchich 
Drummoyne Municipal Council and Frawley v New South Wales.225 Therefore, if there 
is any lack of a positive act by the defendant, knowledge is still required for the 
publisher to be liable through omission.226  
 
There is still considerable disagreement as to whether defamatory published material 
through a positive act or omission should be punished. Kirby J commented in the case 
of Dow Jones & Company Inc v Gutnick227 that ‘[t]here are a number of difficulties 
that would have to be ironed out before the settled rules of defamation law … could 
be modified in respect of publication of allegedly defamatory material on the 
Internet’.228 Specifically, publication through social media fulfils the elements of a 
defamatory claim through its electronic characteristic. Furthermore, social media does 
not only contain words online, but also pictures and videos, which contributes 
enormously to how defamatory material will be presented.229  
 
Apart from information being published, the information needs to include defamatory 
matter. The Defamation Act 2005 (WA) defines ‘matter’ as:230 
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(a) an article, report, advertisement or other thing communicated by means of 
a newspaper, magazine or other periodical; 
(b) a program, report, advertisement or other thing communicated by means of 
television, radio, the Internet or any other form of electronic 
communication;  
(c) a letter, note or other writing;  
(d) a picture, gesture or oral utterance; and  
(e) any other thing by means of which something may be communicated to a 
person. 
 
Therefore, according to Davis, the definition of ‘matter’ refers ‘to the thing produced 
by the defendant that conveys or communicates some suggestion about the plaintiff to 
others’.231 The ‘matter’ can be tangible or intangible as seen from s 4 of the Defamation 
Act above.232 From this definition, ‘matter’ can extend to social media platforms. 
However, the matter being published can only be defamatory if it was read online by 
other persons and these persons understood the published matter.233 In this regard, 
courts have applied the laws and general rules in defamation cases published online, 
but according to Richards, it is necessary to address defamatory matter published on 
social media platforms within the workplace and beyond because of the issues social 
media present as an online platform where defamatory material may be published 
anonymously.234 
 
One of the earliest cases regarding defamation in the workplace is the case of Barach 
v University of New South Wales.235 In this case, Dr Paul Barach filed an action for 
defamation against the University of New South Wales after they terminated his 
employment.236 Several individuals published material about Dr Barach’s background 
and qualifications for which the university, in Dr Barach’s opinion, is vicariously 
liable.237 The published material ranged from emails to Facebook notifications.238 The 
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main dispute was whether Dr Barach’s reputation was injured, not only in New South 
Wales, but also in Australia and internationally. Garling J noted that ‘although the 
rationale of the test of defamation is the protection of reputation, compensatory 
damages which are awarded are not limited only to damage to reputation, because they 
are at large and may include more than one kind of compensation. Damages can 
include compensation for actual or anticipated pecuniary loss, as well as compensation 
for injury to feelings including any grief or distress which a plaintiff may have felt 
upon learning of the defamatory publication’.239 As a result, Dr Barach’s reputation 
was only injured within the state of New South Wales. 
 
Because of defamation being a tort of strict liability, intention is needed on the part of 
the defendant to bring an action for defamation.240 The court in Morgan v Odhams 
Press Ltd241 stated that: 
 
It does not matter whether the publisher intended to refer to the plaintiff or not. It does 
not even matter whether he knew of the plaintiff’s existence. And it does not matter that 
he did not know or could not have known the facts which caused the readers with special 
knowledge to connect the statement with the plaintiff. Indeed, the damage done to the 
plaintiff by the publication may be of a kind which the publisher could not have 
foreseen.242 
 
However, the issue with publication is when defamatory material is published 
anonymously. Where the author of the publication is anonymous, the issue is whether 
it may be possible to bring an action for defamation against the intermediary or 
publishing business who published the defamatory material. The court in Metropolitan 
International Schools Ltd. (t/a Skillstrain and/or Train2game) v Designtechnica Corp 
(t/a Digital Trends) & Ors243 stated that ‘when a search is carried out by a web user 
via the Google search engine it is clear that none of its officers or employees takes any 
part in the search. It is performed automatically in accordance with computer 
programmes’.244 Therefore, an intermediary such as Google cannot be held 
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accountable for posting defamatory material because it is done through social media 
networks like Facebook or Twitter, which automatically link to Google as an 
intermediary for these social media networks. However, Australian courts have 
criticised this approach. In the case of Trkulja v Yahoo! Inc & Another,245 Mr Trkulja 
claimed damages for defamation because of an article and photo published of him by 
Yahoo, as a criminal and part of the Melbourne criminal underworld.246 Pursuant to 
s 22 of the Defamation Act 2005 (Vic) Kaye J noted that ‘the plaintiff was awarded 
damages in the sum of $225,000 in respect of the publication of the articles through 
the “Yahoo! 7” search service. In this case, the jury accepted that Yahoo’s publication 
conveyed that “the plaintiff is such a significant figure in the Melbourne criminal 
underworld that events involving him are recorded on a website that chronicles crime 
in Melbourne”’.247 Therefore, the type of social media platform that is applicable will 
depend on liability for defamation. It is not made out whether Yahoo knew that the 
published material was false; however, if the social media platform is aware of 
defamatory material on their site and do not remove it within a reasonable time, they 
open themselves up to liability.248  
 
From this first element of defamation, it is submitted that the publication of defamatory 
material applies to every part of a person’s life and reputation and whether the 
community will see harm caused to that person through the publication.249 However, 
it becomes difficult to establish damages and harm when the defamatory posts have 
been published by an anonymous person through a social media platform. Therefore, 
the identification of a person, especially when the published material is between an 
employee and employer, is an important element to establishing an action for 
defamation. 
 
3.3.1.2 Identification of Person 
The second element regarding an action for defamation is to identify the person against 
whom the defamatory material has been published. When a publication identifying the 
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person is made, it is important to remember that an employer can be liable for any 
publication made by their employee (if the publication was made in the course of 
employment).250 When the plaintiff has been clearly identified in the defamatory 
material, this element is usually satisfied. In a case where the plaintiff’s name was not 
published, but referred to the plaintiff in general, the test is whether the reasonable 
person would identify the person in the material.251 One important consideration for 
defamation is that defamation laws protect individuals and therefore a group may not 
sue in order to protect their reputation.252 However, if a person is clearly identified 
within that group, the person can bring an action for defamation.253 In the case of 
Bateman v Shepherd,254 the court applied an objective test in identifying the person in 
the publication. In this case, Shepard published material on Bateman without referring 
to his name and all the facts combined led people to conclude who the person was in 
the published material.255 
 
Likewise, the case of Norman v Woods256 came to a similar conclusion regarding 
identification of a person in the published material. In this case, cartoons were 
published on Facebook depicting two women with the title ‘Shirley can’t believe MN 
still gets donations … Aren’t people educated to scams?’.257 However, no name was 
ever published with this title and the plaintiff referred to as ‘MN’.258 The court noted 
that ‘the scope of publication is accordingly confined to any person who read the 
Facebook post, knew all of the extrinsic facts specified in the statement of claim and 
understood the cartoon to refer to Ms Norman’.259  
 
The identification of employers or fellow employees may be more identifiable when 
material is published on a social media platform or through email. A good example of 
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identification of a person in defamatory material in the workplace is the case of Enders 
v Erbas & Associates Pty Ltd (No. 2).260 In July 2010, Mr Erbas, the managing director, 
sent an email to the staff members regarding absenteeism in the workplace. The email 
confirmed that in 30 days, he had totalled ‘24 sick days, 21 latecomers and 26 days of 
holidays’.261 The email further stated that this level of absenteeism was unfair to those 
who come to work every day and that the absenteeism is costing the company ‘big 
dollars’.262 An electronic diary was attached to the email showing the days on which 
the staff came late or were sick. Mr Erbas also highlighted the names of staff who were 
absent on those days. 263  
 
The plaintiff, Ms Enders, had taken 17 days’ sick leave in the period noted and had 
been receiving breast cancer treatment.264 Ms Enders claimed that numerous 
defamatory accusations were made in the email including that she pretended to be sick 
and therefore made up the story.265 In the case, Gibson J did not uphold these claims, 
but she did agree that there were some defamatory allegations in the email, which 
included that the employees had ‘hurt the management’ by taking some time off 
work.266 Gibson J also concluded that although the email had displayed defamatory 
allegations, it was not done with malicious intent and therefore not defamatory.267 
Therefore, as mentioned above, a person, who formed part of a group, may bring an 
action for defamation if the publication, via social media or email, was made to a group 
without identifying an employee specifically. However, in this case the court found 
that it was not defamatory for the employer to send an email to the group of employees 
as the employer argued qualified privilege because of the interest the employees had 
in the matter. Defences by employers and employees in a defamation action will be 
discussed below. 
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Another case dealing with publication of material defaming an employee is the case of 
Saad v Chubb Security Australia Pty Limited t/as Chubb Security & Anor.268 In this 
case, the plaintiff was an employee of the Commonwealth Bank of Australia and filed 
an action for defamation against the bank and Chubb because her image was posted 
on Facebook using CCTV footage caught in the workplace.269 The footage was 
accompanied by degrading comments on Facebook.270 However, the action of the 
plaintiff was not successful because she did not specifically convey how the 
defamatory material was published against her as a claimant.271 This example 
demonstrates that both employers and employees should be careful in bringing an 
action for defamation as it can be rejected because of relevant legal principles.272 
Therefore it is imperative that a person who brings an action for defamation be 
confident that it is indeed defamatory material. 
 
3.3.1.3 Defamatory Material 
The third element to prove an action for defamation is the release of defamatory 
material. Not only should the plaintiff identify the material273 that was published about 
them, but also show that the published material was indeed defamatory. The court in 
Jones v Skelton274 stated that defamation must be interpreted in accordance with its 
‘natural and ordinary meaning’ and that this test is based on the ordinary knowledge 
of the reader.275 Furthermore, the court in Prefumo v Bradley276 states that: 
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a matter is defamatory if it is likely to lead ordinary reasonable persons to think less of 
the plaintiff or is likely to expose a plaintiff to hatred, contempt or ridicule amongst 
ordinary reasonable persons, or is likely to cause the plaintiff to be shunned or avoided 
amongst ordinary reasonable persons, even if there is no moral discredit on the 
plaintiff’s part.277 
 
The published form of social media is different to ordinary published forms such as 
newspapers and magazines in that the communication of defamatory material is seen 
as unexpected and careless due to the anonymity it provides for the publishers.278 In 
regards to published material on social media, defamatory legislation still applies to 
scenarios where social media is used as a vehicle for defamation and, therefore, the 
reasonable person will consider the whole publication and not just parts.279 The case 
of North Coast Children’s Home Inc (Caspa) v Martin280 is an example of where 
defamatory material was identified as being communicated through a social media 
platform. In this case, the defendant, a 71-year-old foster carer, made Facebook 
publications about the abuse he suffered 30 to 40 years ago at the Children’s Home.281 
The Facebook publications gained many likes; however, when the plaintiff demanded 
the posts cease, the defendant left it on Facebook.282 Because of the continuing 
publications of defamatory material on social media by the defendant, the court made 
a ruling on damages in favour of the plaintiff because of the false imputations made 
by the defendant.283 Accordingly, Gibson DCJ awarded costs to the plaintiffs.284 
 
More specifically, the case of Cairns v Modi provides insight into how social media 
can negatively impact a person within the workplace through the publication of 
defamatory remarks/matter.  Furthermore, one of the first defamation cases regarding 
social media is Cairns v Modi.285 Chris Cairns was a well-known cricket player who 
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played for New Zealand. In 2007 and 2008, Chris Cairns was appointed to captain one 
of the Indian Premier League teams.286 In 2010, Lalit Modi, who was the former 
Chairman and Commissioner of the Indian Premier League and Board of Cricketing 
Control, tweeted that ‘Chris Cairns removed from the IPL auction list due to his past 
record of match fixing. This was done by the Governing Council today’.287 Further to 
this, Modi told a journalist at Cricinfo on the day the tweet went public that ‘we have 
removed him from the list for alleged allegations [sic] as we have zero tolerance of 
this kind of stuff. The Governing Council has decided against keeping him on the 
list’.288 
 
Accordingly, Chris Cairns brought a case of defamation on social media against Modi. 
Bean J found that Modi had ‘singularly failed to provide any reliable evidence that [the 
Claimant] was involved in match fixing or spot fixing, or even that there were strong 
grounds for suspicion that he was’.289 Bean J found that damages of up to £90 000 
were reasonable. The judge’s reasoning was that these allegations were ‘as serious an 
allegation as anyone could make against a professional sportsman’.290 The extent of 
such a publication on social media platforms makes an action for defamation valid but 
challenging within the employment relationship because of the defamatory material 
being published not only in the workplace but outside.  
 
It is argued that the use of social media can affect both public and private life, but the 
point at issue with defamation and social media is whether employees can be dismissed 
when defamation claims have been made outside of working hours. Is it a breach of 
the employment contract if an employee publishes defamatory remarks not within the 
scope of employment that could lead to dismissal? 
 
A recent occurrence brought the above mentioned questionable issue to light when a 
man was dismissed for writing defamatory remarks on his Facebook page.291 Mr Nolan 
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worked for Meriton Apartments as a hotel manager. He posted defamatory remarks on 
Ms Ford’s Facebook page, calling her a ‘sl**t’ and other racial posts.292 Ms Ford is a 
feminist activist and a journalist who has close to 80 000 Facebook followers. Meriton, 
evidently, looked into the matter and dismissed Mr Nolan.293 The question is whether 
this dismissal was fair even though the defamatory remarks were not made within the 
scope of employment and outside of working hours. It is argued that it does not make 
a difference whether the comments were made on social media within or outside of 
working hours.294 Ultimately, it is the employer’s reputation that must be mended as 
the close relation between the employee’s social media comment and employer’s 
reputation has damaging effects.295 Even though the ‘employee is perfectly entitled to 
have his personal opinions, he is not entitled to disclose them to the “world at large” 
where to do so would reflect poorly on the company and/or damage its reputation and 
viability’.296 
 
3.3.1.4 Concluding Remarks 
With the ever-increasing use of social media in the workplace, issues concerning 
defamation and the consequences for the employment relationship have come to the 
fore in recent times. In this regard, the use of social media beyond the workplace has 
also presents a challenge for employers and the implications of monitoring an 
employee’s behaviour and conduct accordingly (see Chapter 4). Furthermore, this is 
made more complex by the need to distinguish between what constitutes protected free 
speech and defamatory material. This part of the chapter identified the elements 
needed to bring a cause of action for defamation and applied it to long-established 
principles of law and how these principles can apply to social media within the 
workplace and beyond. Therefore, it is useful that employers understand the harm 
social media can cause in the workplace and beyond and that each of the elements, 
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namely publication, identification and defamatory meaning, must be proven in light of 
the inappropriate use of social media by an employee. 
 
The cases discussed in regards to published information and defamatory matter 
indicate how defamation law play a significant role in social media and online 
platforms.297 The predicament this entails is how to deal with defamation laws with 
the inappropriate use of social media within the workplace and beyond.298 Even though 
the uniform defamation legislation includes online platforms as a way to publish 
defamatory matter, MacCallum notes that the defamatory laws need a review, focusing 
on social media platforms, especially in the workplace.299 Subsequently, this thesis 
argues that social media is a significant legal issue in regards to defamation and that 
defamation laws need to address the potential risks of social media.  
 
The case law and commentary discussed above also referred to cases where damages 
were rewarded to victims of defamation. However, not all cases are concerned with 
defamation and employers or employees, depending on who the action is brought 
against, may have defences to these actions. The next section will deal with defences, 
in particular truth, privilege and honest opinion, and how these defences can justify 
the published defamatory material. 
 
3.3.2 Defences 
An employee or employer in a defamation action can raise a number of defences that 
justify or excuse them from the defamatory publication on a social media platform. 
According to Descheemaeker, the word ‘defence’ is labelled ‘those ingredients of 
tortious liability (ie the elements required for the success of the action, whether they 
be defined positively, by their presence, or negatively, by their absence) which fall on 
the defendant to prove or disprove, by contrast with the prima facie cause of action, 
which contains the elements that are for the claimant to prove’.300 Therefore, an 
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employer and employee has certain defences they can raise for their actions taken on 
a social media platform and this part will examine the different defences available to 
employers or employees.  Part 4 Division 2 of the Defamation Act 2005 (WA)301 
includes the following defences: truth, privilege and honest opinion.  
 
3.3.2.1 Truth 
If the defamatory material is true, it is one of the defences an employee has against 
such a publication.302 The purpose of this defence is to protect the person making a 
statement from an action for defamation as the statement is true.303 In the case of Rofe 
v Smith’s Newspapers Ltd304 the court held that when defamatory material is 
substantially true, it will lower the reputation of that person and will not damage it.305 
Therefore, it is necessary to prove the defamatory imputation.306 
 
There exist two types of statutory ‘truths’ within this section, substantial and 
contextual truth.307 In regards to substantial truth, the plaintiff must prove the 
substantial truth of the published material.308 This was held in the case of Alexander v 
Rys;309 however, however, this defence involves an extended process of ‘fact 
finding’.310 According to the Defamation Act 2005 (WA), ‘substantial truth’ can be 
defined as ‘true in substance or not materially different from the truth’.311 Therefore, 
‘a true and not a misleading picture must be presented to the reader’.312  
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Even though this is a statutory truth, the common law approach applies in all other 
respects. The common law approach was expressed in the case of Polly Peck 
(Holdings) v Trelford313 in the English Court of Appeal. O’Connor J held that:314 
 
Where a publication contained several defamatory statements which in their context had 
a common sting and the plaintiff complained of one or more, but not all, of them, the 
defendant was entitled to justify the sting or assert that it was fair comment; that in either 
case the particulars of such pleas could be derived from parts of the publication of which 
the plaintiff did not complain … 
 
Therefore, if the imputation did not continue damaging the plaintiff’s reputation, the 
plaintiff could then argue partial justification (which is also known as the ‘Polly Peck’ 
defence).315 This defence was not warmly welcomed in Australia;316 however, the case 
of David Syme & Co Ltd v Hore-Lacy317 suggests that ‘a defence which alleges a 
different meaning to that relied on by the plaintiff would merely be an argumentative 
plea’ and therefore will take into consideration other imputations that are in line with 
the same claim.318 With the implementation of the uniform defamation legislation, it 
introduced a regular contextual truth defence. 
 
On the other hand, contextual truth refers to material that the plaintiff has not 
complained about; however, it can be considered within a claim as additional 
information that does not hurt the plaintiff’s reputation any further.319 Levin J went 
further by noting the following regarding contextual truth:320 
 
It is to operate in circumstances where a publication conveys various imputations, 
substantially different one from the other, but in respect of which the plaintiff elects to 
sue on one or some only. It entitles the defendant properly to defend the action by 
pleading the other imputations not sued upon, and justifying them to bring about a just 
result … 
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Therefore, the contextual truth defence was introduced in order to ‘prevent the partial 
truth defence from operating unjustly in a situation where the matter complained of 
contained a serious charge … together with a minor change’.321  
 
In terms of social media and defamation, the case of Dabrowski v Greeuw322 set the 
scene regarding the truth defence, which is a defence for disclosing the truth regarding 
the published defamatory matter. In this case, the defendant posted on her Facebook 
page ‘separated from Miro Dabrowski after 18 years of suffering domestic violence 
and abuse. Now fighting the system to keep my children safe’.323 The plaintiff stated 
that the posts were only removed two months after asked to do so and that the post was 
defamatory.324 The court held that ‘[i]t is a defence to the publication of defamatory 
matter if the defendant proves that the defamatory imputations carried by the matter of 
which the plaintiff complains are substantially true’.325 Therefore, the court must find 
that the ‘defamatory stings’, as noted in the Polly Peck (Holdings) v Trelford case, are 
objectively true.326 The court further noted that ‘Ms Greeuw does not have to prove 
that every word she published was true but she must establish the “essential” or 
“substantial” truth of the stings of the defamation. To prove the truth of some lesser 
defamatory meaning does not provide a complete defence’.327 As mentioned above, 
there exists two types of statutory truths and the court held that in order for a person 
to succeed with the ‘truth’ defence, the defendant must establish that the defamatory 
material was ‘substantial’.328 The court found that the plaintiff could not prove the 
substantial truth of defamation and therefore the post was defamatory.329 
 
When social media posts are made outside of working hours, the employer will usually 
complain about the publication rather than the defamatory material of the publication. 
This is known as contextual truth where the employer will be able to sue for one and 
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not the other.330 However, the employee can state that the other meaning is true and 
therefore the meaning the employer is complaining of will not harm the reputation of 
the employer.331 
 
3.3.2.2 Privilege 
If the employee cannot prove that the defamatory material was true, it is possible for 
them to show that the publication was privileged. This is done either through the 
defence of absolute privilege or qualified privilege.332 When the employee uses the 
defence of qualified privilege, this defence must determine that the occasion was one 
where a person had a duty or interest to receive it.333 For example, in Ives v State of 
Western Australia,334 Mrs Ives made a complaint at the Perth Police Station that she 
had a restraining order against Mr Ives because Mr Ives posted the following words 
on a social media site: ‘But sometimes after what she did I just want to kill her!! I want 
to beat up her body and smash her to pieces and make her regret everything!!!’. It went 
further and stated that: ‘The cops are dead meat if they try to keep us apart!!’.335 
Therefore, she felt threatened by these posts. 
 
A sergeant went to the house of Mr Ives’ mother (and others living there) and told 
them about what happened between Mr and Mrs Ives. As a result, Mr Ives brought a 
case against the sergeant for approaching his mother, in the presence of his children, 
and telling her about the threatening social media posts. This is what caused an action 
for defamation. However, the court held that the statements made by the sergeant to 
Mr Ives’ mother was a defence of qualified privilege and relevant to the occasion.336 
 
In the circumstances where social media is used, it is necessary to identify the relevant 
terms and conditions of the social media platform because those people who register 
on these platforms and share the necessary information provides an occasion where 
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there was a duty to publish and interest to receive it.337 One example of defamation on 
social media by a government employee is the case of Banjeri v Bowles.338 In this case, 
Banerji worked as a public servant for the Immigration Department and regularly 
criticised Australia’s policies on refugee laws. However, Banerji tweeted under a 
pseudonym ‘La Legale’ and no one knew that she was working for the Immigration 
Department. As a result, the Immigration Department found her tweets to breach the 
Code of Conduct because it was harsh and defamatory and dismissed her.339 Banerji 
argued that she has freedom of political expression, including criticising the 
government’s policies.340 The Fair Work Commission held that Banerji was fairly 
dismissed due to there being a Code of Conduct and Social Media Policy in the 
Immigration Department.341 The fact that the Immigration Department had measures 
in place dealing with the inappropriate use of social media indicates that the defence 
of privilege will not always count in the employee’s favour and therefore employees 
need to be cautious and vigilant when posting comments on social media platforms.  
 
3.3.2.3 Opinion 
Other than proving the defence of truth and privilege, the employee can also prove that 
the publication was an expression of opinion.342 Section 31 of the Defamation Act 2005 
(WA) states that for the opinion defence to succeed the post or remark must be an 
expression of an opinion rather than a statement of fact; the opinion must be in the 
interest of the public; or the opinion is based on proper material.343  
 
The most recent example of where the opinion defence was relied upon was in 
McEloney v Massey.344 The court held that ‘the imputations on the Facebook page 
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were defensible as either fair comment or honest opinion … but … this does not mean 
that a member of a Facebook page has carte blanche to defame service providers or 
other persons or that all statements made necessarily qualify as opinions’.345 Therefore, 
if the opinion defence does not fulfil the elements under s 31 of the Act, then the 
opinion defence will not apply. 
 
The publication of material in the 21st century can be portrayed as ‘an age when tort 
law is dominated by the search for the deep pocket’.346 The damages awarded by courts 
indicate that employees and employers need to be cautious when posting something in 
connection with their employment. As can be seen from the examples given above, 
social media has made it easier to communicate with others, but with this type of 
communication comes the risk of employers being liable for inappropriate comments 
made or dismissal of employees because of their unacceptable activities on social 
media within and beyond the workplace. The risk of defamation occurring on social 
media platforms within the workplace and beyond is useful to consider in the digital 
age and it is necessary for employees and employers to be aware of the defamation 
laws surrounding publication of defamatory material in order to prevent unnecessary 
harm to a person’s reputation in the workplace. 
 
The third and last key issue is cyberbullying and will be dealt with in the following 
section. This legal issue will examine the repercussions cyberbullying can have in the 
workplace, especially for the employer, in the sense of being vicariously liable. 
 
3.4 CYBERBULLYING 
The preceding discussion has examined how the inappropriate use of social media in 
the workplace can create risks associated with privacy and breaches of confidentiality, 
as well as the risk of defamation that can be damaging to the reputation of employers 
and employees. Associated with these issues, are the legal risks and issues that arise 
when social media within and beyond the workplace is used to engage in 
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cyberbullying. This is one of the most serious misuses of social media. Cyberbullying, 
as explained below, presents a significant risk to workplace safety.347 The issue of 
cyberbullying can impact on the employer–employee relationship and also the duties 
and obligations of each outside of the workplace. This section therefore provides an 
overview of the meaning and nature of cyberbullying and the implications to the 
employer–employee relationship. 
 
3.4.1 What is Workplace Bullying? 
Workplace bullying can be a detrimental issue to the employment relationship. In order 
to recognise what workplace bullying entails, it is helpful to refer to definitions relating 
to workplace bullying and what will entail workplace bullying within the ambit of 
legislation. Akella defines workplace bullying as ‘a repeated hurtful negative act or 
acts (physical, verbal or psychological intimidation) that involve criticism and 
humiliation to cause fear, distress, or harm to the individual’.348 Similarly, Bartlett and 
Bartlett describe workplace bullying as ‘a repeated and enduring act which involves 
an imbalance of power between the victim and the perpetrator and includes an element 
of subjectivity on the part of the victim in terms of how they view the behaviour and 
the effect of the behaviour’.349 Evans, Fraser and Cotter note that ‘[b]ullying is a 
complex, dynamic social behaviour that involves intent to harm, repetition, and power 
imbalance’.350 According to the Fair Work Ombudsman, a worker will be bullied if a 
person or group of people repeatedly act unreasonably towards them or a group of 
workers and the behaviour creates a risk to health and safety.351 Definitions of 
workplace bullying point to destructive behaviour that is ongoing and harmful to the 
person against whom it is targeted. This is reflected in the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth). 
 
                                                          
347Government of Western Australia, Worksafe, Workplace Cyberbullying (October 2013) 
 <http://smartmove.safetyline.wa.gov.au/mod/page/view.php?id=316>.  
348Devi Akella, ‘Workplace Bullying: Not a Manager’s Right?’ (2016) 6 Journal of Workplace Rights 
1, 1. 
349James Bartlett and Michelle Bartlett, ‘Workplace Bullying: An Integrative Literature Review’ (2011) 
13 Advances in Developing Human Resources 69, 72. 
350Caroline Evans, Mark Fraser and Katie Cotter, ‘The Effectiveness of School-Based Bullying 
Prevention Programs: A Systematic Review’ (2014) 19 Aggression and Violent Behaviour 532, 540. 
351Fair Work Ombudsman, Bullying & Harassment (2014) <https://www.fairwork.gov.au/employee-
entitlements/bullying-and-harassment>.  
132 
 
The Fair Work Act provides the following definition of when an employee is bullied 
in the workplace:352 
 
(1) A worker is bullied at work if:  
(a) while the worker is at work in a constitutionally-covered 
business:353  
(i) an individual; or  
(ii) a group of individuals;  
repeatedly behaves unreasonably towards the worker, or a group of workers 
of which the worker is a member; and  
(b) that behaviour creates a risk to health and safety. 
 
Apart from the Fair Work legislation, the Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (Cth)354 
also includes that employers have a duty to ensure the health and safety of their 
employees. Safe Work Australia published a guideline in 2013 on bullying in the 
workplace and they define workplace bullying as ‘repeated and unreasonable 
behaviour directed towards a worker or a group of workers that creates a risk to health 
and safety’.355 Unreasonable behaviour according to Safe Work Australia includes 
‘abusive or offensive language, unjustified complaints and spreading 
misinformation’.356 
 
Therefore, bullying behaviour can take many forms including physical, psychological 
and emotional bullying.357 Pagura notes that the following can be considered bullying 
in the workplace:) aggressive conduct; threatening behaviour; belittling and 
humiliating comments; unreasonable work expectations; and showing of inappropriate 
material.358 However, with the advent of technology in the workplace, these forms of 
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bullying can become more challenging when used within social media platforms and 
trigger cyberbullying as a significant challenge in the workplace environment and 
beyond. According to Piotrowski, cyberbullying can be explained as ‘initiated by a 
perpetrator via online or wireless communication technology and devices’.359 
Similarly, Tokunaga defines cyberbullying as ‘any behaviour performed through 
electronic or digital media by individuals or groups that repeatedly communicates 
hostile or aggressive messages intended to inflict harm or discomfort on others’.360 
The extent to which cyberbullying affects the employment relationship, will be 
discussed below. Furthermore, cyberbullying in the workplace can be instigated 
through ‘anonymous, fraudulent, aggressive, unwanted messages, spreading rumours, 
hacking into email accounts, threats, harassment, attacks, unwanted phone calls, 
malicious, abusive messages’.361 Therefore, the use of social media in the workplace 
causes cyberbullying to be a ubiquitous issue affecting the employment relationship. 
 
Under the Fair Work legislation, all national system employees are covered against 
bullying including outworkers, volunteers and contractors.362 Therefore, if a person 
reasonably believes they have or are being bullied in the workplace, they can apply to 
the FWC for an order to stop the bullying.363 However, the FWC can only make interim 
orders and cannot order pecuniary penalties for the employee who is being bullied 
unless the employer, who was given these orders, contravenes them and will be fined 
accordingly.364 Therefore, the FWC may only make orders that will stop the employee 
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from ongoing bullying in the workplace by either the employer or co-workers.365 
According to the Fair Work Act, the following orders may be made:366 
 
(i) ongoing bullying to end; 
(ii) regular monitoring by employer; 
(iii) compliance of anti-bullying policies; and 
(iv) employers providing training and education to employees on what bullying 
behaviour is, especially cyberbullying. 
 
Furthermore, the Fair Work Act also provides that the FWC must take the following 
factors into account when making the above-mentioned orders:367 
 
(i) if the FWC is aware of any final or interim outcomes arising out of an 
investigation into the matter that is being, or has been, undertaken by 
another person or body – those outcomes; and  
(ii) if the FWC is aware of any procedure available to the worker to resolve 
grievances or disputes – that procedure; and  
(iii) if the FWC is aware of any final or interim outcomes arising out of any 
procedure available to the worker to resolve grievances or disputes – those 
outcomes; and  
(iv) any matters that the FWC considers relevant. 
 
An example of workplace bullying orders under s 789FF of the Fair Work Act is the 
case of Rachael Roberts v Launceston Pty Ltd as trustee for the VIEW Launceston Unit 
Trust T/A View Launceston; Ms Lisa Bird; Mr James Bird.368 In this case, Ms Roberts 
filed an application pursuant to section 789FC of the Fair Work Act for orders to stop 
bullying at work. The application alleged that bullying occurred in the course of Ms 
Roberts’ employment as a real estate agent with the VIEW Launceston franchise 
located in Tasmania (‘View’), and alleged two persons working at View, Mr James 
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Bird and Mrs Lisa Bird, had bullied her. Ms Roberts alleged that she was countlessly 
humiliated and also asked to perform sexual favours. Commissioner Wells stated that 
he is content that bullying will keep on recurring in the workplace and pursuant to s 
789FF of the Fair Work Act he orders for the bullying to stop.369 However, there is no 
compensation given to Ms Roberts, only a decision that there is a risk of bullying 
continuing at work and the parties will need to discuss the matter further in a 
conference.370 
 
The risk of bullying, particularly cyberbullying, in the workplace, is not only 
detrimental to an employee’s general physical and psychological wellbeing, but also 
to an employee’s safety in the workplace.371 According to the Work Health and Safety 
Act, employers have an implied duty of care towards their employees in regards to 
their safety and wellbeing in the workplace.372 The difficulty with both the Fair Work 
Act and Work Health and Safety Act is that the alleged bullying must take place while 
the employee is at work.373 This is significant within the Work Health and Safety Act, 
which refers to the duty of workers while at work.374 This raises concerns on how 
employers will deal with this risk outside of ‘working hours’. If the bullying occurs 
outside of working hours, can it be said that it happened ‘at work’?375 Therefore, the 
employee can only make a claim to the FWC if that employee reasonably believes that 
they have been bullied at work.376 An employer may argue that if bullying took place 
outside of working hours, they do not have a duty towards the employee to protect 
their health and safety.  
 
Bullying that occurs in the workplace may also continue outside the workplace via 
social media platforms and emails.377 Whether cyberbullying occurs within working 
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hours or outside, it is a serious matter to be addressed by employers.378 According to 
Smith, Fisher and Russell, the definition of cyberbullying include ‘an aggressive, 
intentional act carried out by a group or individual, using electronic forms of contact, 
repeatedly and over time against a victim who cannot easily defend him or herself’.379 
On the other hand, Kowalski defines cyberbullying ‘through email, instant messaging, 
in a chat room, on a website or gaming site, or through digital messages or images sent 
to a cellular phone’.380 When an employee is being bullied by either a co-worker or 
employer through email, social media platforms or mobile phones, it is necessary to 
consider the relevant law on cyberbullying outside working hours and whether an 
employer’s duty to ensure the health and safety of their employees extends to outside 
working hours. This will also impact on the employer–employee relationship and 
whether an employer can dismiss the employee for such conduct. 
 
The underlying principle for workplace bullying outside of working hours was laid 
down in the case of McManus v Scott-Charlton.381 In this case, the court held that it 
was reasonable for an employer to inform the employee that his conduct outside of 
working hours must come to an end. The court held:382 
 
Once an employee’s conduct can be shown to have significant and adverse effects in 
the workplace – because of its impact on workplace relations, on the productivity of 
others, or on the effective conduct of the employer’s business – that conduct becomes a 
proper matter of legitimate concern to an employer, and does so because of its 
consequences. 
 
Therefore, appropriate measures must be put in place when cyberbullying starts 
impacting on the employment relationship because of the consequences it may cause. 
Furthermore, in the case of Little v Credit Corp Group Ltd383 an employee made sexual 
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comments towards a new employee.384 The FWC held that: ‘for a young person who 
seemingly frequently used Facebook, it strikes me as highly implausible that he was 
incapable of adjusting privacy settings’.385 The employee’s defence was that it was 
done outside of working hours, but the FWC further held that ‘it was not when the 
comments were made which is important, but the effect and impact of those comments 
on the employer, its employees and new employees’.386 
 
The issue relating to cyberbullying outside the workplace was further determined in 
the case of Sharon Bowker & Ors v DP World Melbourne Ltd & Ors.387 In this case, 
the FWC had to decide when the use of social media is considered within the 
workplace and to what extent the workplace bullying took place. A group of employees 
made various comments on a Facebook page toward co-workers outside of the 
workplace, which fell within the ambit of the definition of workplace bullying.388 The 
question was whether the FWC had jurisdiction to put an end to the bullying when it 
was outside of working hours.  
 
In relation to workplace bullying outside the workplace, the FWC took into account 
the Explanatory Memorandum of the Work Health and Safety Bill 2011 (Cth), which 
states that ‘the primary duty of care is tied to the work activities wherever they occur 
and is not limited to the confines of a physical workplace’.389 Therefore, the duty to 
care for employees does not end when they leave the workplace, as Chapter 2 argued 
that ‘workplace’ is not confined to an office. The FWC then held that ‘being “at work” 
is not limited to the confines of a physical workplace. A worker will be “at work” at 
any time the worker performs work, regardless of his or her location or the time of 
day’.390 The relevance to cyberbullying outside of the workplace, further posed the 
question as to whether there is a requirement for an employee to be at work when 
workplace bullying takes place on a social media platform. The FWC held that ‘[t]he 
relevant behaviour is not limited to the point in time when the comments are first 
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posted on Facebook. The behaviour continues for as long as the comments remain on 
Facebook. It follows that the worker need not be ‘at work’ at the time the comments 
are posted’391 However, the FWC noted that there will be cases when ‘at work’ will 
present challenges and provided that ‘for example, a worker receives a phone call from 
their supervisor about work related matters, while at home and outside their usual 
working hours. Is the worker ‘at work’ when he or she engages in such a conversation? 
In most cases the answer will be yes, but it will depend on the context, including 
custom and practice, and the nature of the worker’s contract’.392 This was a similar 
scenario discussed in Chapter 2 and whether an employee’s home is considered a 
‘workplace’. Therefore, cyberbullying within and outside the workplace presents 
regulatory challenges and whether employers have the right to control and monitor the 
employee’s use of social media beyond the workplace. 
 
Currently, there is little national uniformity on cyberbullying legislation within the 
workplace. Although legislation such as the Fair Work Act and Health and Safety Act 
includes bullying in the workplace, it is still not clear how cyberbullying fits within 
the employment relationship.393 However, the Parliament of Victoria introduced 
‘Brodie’s Law’, which specifically deals with bullying offences under the Crimes Act 
(Vic).394 This law was introduced following the tragic death of a young waitress Brodie 
Panlock, who committed suicide as a result of ongoing, insidious bullying by her co-
workers.395 
 
The enactment of these kinds of laws indicates that the person responsible for the 
bullying may face prosecution, but will possibly release the employer of their duty of 
care to provide a safe and healthy work environment.396 In this case, it is necessary to 
consider vicarious liability within the employment relationship and cyberbullying and 
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whether employers will be liable for any inappropriate use of social media by 
employees outside of working hours. 
 
3.4.2 Vicarious Liability of the Employer Through Cyberbullying Posts 
The increase in the use of social media has made cyberbullying a concern for 
employees and employers in the workplace and has played a vital role within the 
modern employment relationship.397 The employment relationship can be affected 
through cyberbullying in the workplace as both the employer and employee has an 
implied duty of care towards each other, as discussed in Chapter 2. However, the 
implied duty of care by an employer towards an employee plays a greater role when 
cyberbullying is proliferating not only within the workplace but also outside it. 
Therefore, this section will examine whether an employer will be vicariously liable for 
the inappropriate use of social media by their employees towards co-workers within 
and beyond the workplace. 
 
Generally, when an employee commits a tort within their employment, an employer 
may be vicariously liable for the conduct. This was defined in the case of The Catholic 
Child Welfare Society and Others v Various Claimants (FC) and The Institute of the 
Brothers of the Christian Schools and Others398 where it was stated that:399 
 
The relationship that gives rise to vicarious liability is in the vast majority of cases that 
of employer and employee under a contract of employment. The employer will be 
vicariously liable when the employee commits a tort in the course of his employment. 
 
Further to this, vicarious liability can be defined as ‘liability that a supervisory party 
(such as an employer) bears for the actionable conduct of a subordinate or associate 
(such as an employee) based on the relationship between the two parties’.400 Vicarious 
liability within the context of the employment relationship rests on two pillars: (i) that 
both parties need to be within an employment relationship; and (ii) that the tort had to 
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be committed within the course of employment.401 As a result, the foundation for 
vicarious liability is not based on fault, but on the employment contract.402  
 
The second limb of vicarious liability often creates problems as the employee may not 
always act within the course of employment.403 Generally, the employer will not be 
liable for any conduct by an employee outside the course of employment; however, 
the court in the case of New South Wales v Lepore and Another; Samin v Queensland 
and Others; Rich v Queensland and Others404 noted that an employer may be 
vicariously liable when there is a ‘sufficiently close connection’ to the employer’s 
business and the conduct of the employee.405 Gleeson J particularly stated that:406 
 
Not everything that an employee does at work, or during working hours, is sufficiently 
connected with the duties and responsibilities of the employee to be regarded as within 
the scope of the employment. And the fact that wrongdoing occurs away from the 
workplace, or outside normal working hours, is not conclusive against liability. 
 
This is illustrated by the case of Leslie v Graham,407 where two employees shared an 
apartment on a business trip and sexual harassment took place. The employer was held 
vicariously liable due the trip being ‘work related’.408 Therefore, for an employer not 
to be vicariously liable, they must act with reasonable care towards the employee to 
keep them safe and healthy within the work environment. This is one of the duties of 
the employer under the employment contract; however, the employee has a reciprocal 
duty of care towards the employer and co-workers. 
 
This opens up the scenario whether an employer will be liable on the general law of 
vicarious liability for an employee misusing social media outside the course of 
                                                          
401David Neild, ‘Vicarious Liability and the Employment Rationale’ (2013) 44 Victoria University of 
Wellington Law Review 707, 707. 
402Ibid. See also Engin Mustafa, ‘The Liability for Employers for the Conduct of their Employees – 
When does an Employee’s Conduct Fall within “The Course of Employment”?’ (2016) 24 Human 
Resource Management International Digest 44-47. 
403Ibid. See also Alison Todd, ‘Vicarious Liability for Sexual Abuse’ (2002) 8 Canterbury Law Review 
281. 
404195 ALR 412 (2003) 195 ALR 412. 
405Ibid 481. See also Deatons Pty Ltd v Flew (1949) 79 CLR 370. 
406Ibid [40]. See also Sestili v Triton Underwriting Insurance Agency Pty Ltd [2007] SASC 241. 
407[2002] FCA 32. 
408See also Webb v State of Queensland [2006] QADT 8 where the employer was vicariously liable for 
an employee’s conduct regarding sexual harassment via email. 
141 
 
employment. When an employer is trying to protect its business reputation, it is then 
firstly important for the employer to establish that the person who is making the 
remarks outside of working hours is indeed an employee of the business.409 If this has 
been established, secondly an employer needs to establish whether the comments or 
remarks made were ‘work related’ in order to establish liability.410 If they were, then 
an employer may possibly be liable for the conduct of an employee outside of work 
hours if reasonable steps have not been taken.411 
 
As in the case of Malcolm Pearson v Linfox Pty Ltd, if an employer introduced 
appropriate social media policies in the workplace that applies to both an employee’s 
conduct within and outside the workplace, the employer has taken reasonable steps to 
secure its liability. However, this will be a case-by-case scenario. 
 
3.5 CONCLUSION 
Chapter 2 discussed the role that social media has come to play in the workplace 
environment and its pervasive use, which has implications for the employer–employee 
relationship, and the concomitant control and monitoring of social media use. 
Therefore, in Chapter 2, the duties of both employee and employer were discussed in 
relation to social media and the effect of the inappropriate use of social media on the 
employment relationship. Against this background context, Chapter 3 has examined 
three key legal issues social media present in the workplace, namely privacy, 
defamation and cyberbullying. Within the limited scope of the thesis, the chapter 
focused on providing an overview of key principles of the relevant areas of law and 
the application to social media in general, within the workplace and outside. 
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the use of social media has given rise to concerns about the 
use of social media in the workplace. Firstly, privacy was considered pre-, during and 
post-employment. The breach of privacy by either an employer or employee using 
social media is a noteworthy challenge in the workplace. Although a right to privacy 
is not recognised by the Australian Constitution, the Privacy Act as amended extends 
                                                          
409Dover-Ray v Real Insurance Pty Ltd [2010] FWA 8544 (5 November 2010). 
410See also Charles Power, How to Avoid Vicarious Liability (2014) Employment Law Handbook 
<http://www.employmentlawhandbook.com.au/how-to-avoid-vicarious-liability/>.  
411See for example the case of Blakey v Continental Airlines, 751 A.2d 538, 2000 WL 703018 where an 
employer was liable for illegal remarks made on a blog by an employee. 
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to dealing with the increase of technology in workplace environments; although it does 
not specifically refer to social media platforms as a mechanism through which an 
employer may breach privacy of an employee. The Privacy Act includes the APPs, 
which require an employer to only collect reasonable personal information of an 
employee and inform employees when personal information will be collected. 
However, APPs are very restricted in that they mainly protect Commonwealth public 
system employers and employees and only private employers and their employees in 
businesses with a turnover of more than $3 million. This indicates that there are limited 
privacy protection laws to protect private employers and employees, especially in 
scenarios dealing with the inappropriate use of social media. 
 
The breach of privacy was further considered in light of confidential information and 
the impact breach of confidentiality has on the employer–employee relationship. This 
chapter argued that confidentiality may be breached by an employee if the employee 
takes confidential information from an employer and uses it on a social media platform 
for their own gain. By doing this, the employee will be in breach of confidentiality, 
under the equitable doctrine and common law contract, because this type of action will 
cause harm to the reputation of the business. Thus, it was argued that dismissal of an 
employee, through the inappropriate use of social media, is possible through implied 
duties in the contract or express terms relating to duties of confidence. Therefore, the 
control and monitoring of social media platforms as well as giving access of 
information to employees, needs to be monitored closely within the workplace. 
Chapter 4 will therefore examine the role of workplace surveillance in general and 
when using social media, within and beyond the workplace. 
 
The second key issue discussed was defamation. The misuse of social media in the 
workplace can have a negative impact on the employer–employee relationship where 
defamatory material is published of a co-worker or employer that can lead to action 
against the employer and dismissal of the employee. However, as discussed, for an 
action of defamation to be brought against an employee, an employer must prove that 
there was a publication of the defamatory matter, identify the person who published 
the matter and lastly that the matter/material was indeed defamatory. In terms of social 
media, this may be affected if posts on social media are made anonymously. The cases 
considered in this part dealt with defamation in general as well as in the workplace and 
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how dismissals and damages can be considered regarding the inappropriate use of 
social media within and outside the workplace. This could be damaging to an 
employer’s business reputation. However, employers need to be aware of dismissing 
an employee summarily for the posts they have made on social media because the 
employee can have a defence for their actions. This was particularly significant in the 
case of Linfox Australia Pty Ltd v Glen Stutsel412 in which Fair Work Australia held 
that:413  
 
In ordinary discourse, there is much discussion about what happens in our work lives 
and the people involved. In this regard, we are mindful of the need not to impose 
unrealistic standards of behaviour and discourse about such matters or to ignore the 
realities of workplaces … In the present matter, the Commissioner considered that the 
statements and comments made by the Applicant were distasteful. However, when 
viewed in the context of the Facebook conversations he considered that they were not 
of such a nature as to warrant dismissal for serious misconduct, or even as to constitute 
a valid reason for termination.  
 
If the employee told the truth, and it was simply privileged information or that the 
employee only gave their opinion of the employer, then the employee will have a 
defence against an action for defamation.  
 
Lastly, the issue of cyberbullying was discussed and how it can affect the employment 
relationship. As discussed in Chapter 2, both the employer and employee have a duty 
of care in the workplace and when this duty of care is overstepped it may lead to a 
dismissal of the employee or unreasonable behaviour by an employer. Therefore, when 
an employer is aware of any cyberbullying in the workplace, it is their duty to take 
care that no one will get hurt and the employee must be disciplined. The issue with 
cyberbullying and legislation is that the act of cyberbullying needs to take place ‘at 
work’. However, the case law discussed in this section argued that it is not necessary 
to be ‘at work’ when cyberbullying takes place and a perpetrator can be disciplined for 
conduct outside the workplace. Likewise, an employee has a duty of care not to hurt 
any of their co-workers or employers through the inappropriate use of social media by 
                                                          
412[2012] FWAFB 7097 (3 October 2012). 
413Ibid [25], [27]. 
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engaging in cyberbullying conduct. This can also lead to a dismissal of the employee 
and it is important to note that an employer may be vicariously liable for an employee’s 
conduct outside of work in regards to the cyberbullying conduct. 
 
The above-mentioned issues illustrate the implications of using social media in the 
workplace and the kind of legal challenges that may arise that could impact on the 
employment relationship. To avoid these issues from arising in the workplace, an 
employer will need to monitor an employee when accessing social media sites within 
the workplace and to an extent outside the workplace. The following chapter will 
therefore discuss the monitoring and control of workplace surveillance of employee’s 
social media use within and outside the workplace. This discussion will further focus 
on whether an appropriate workplace surveillance policy, coupled with a social media 
policy, will be effective in monitoring employees this way. 
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CHAPTER 4 
CONTROL AND MANAGEMENT OF SOCIAL MEDIA 
IN THE WORKPLACE 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The use of social media has become an integral part of the workplace environment as 
discussed in Chapter 2. Furthermore, there is no doubt that social media has become 
part of everyday life; however, in Chapter 3, it was highlighted that the use of social 
media in the workplace also presents certain legal challenges concerning privacy, 
defamation and cyberbullying. Therefore, an important issue to be considered is the 
means by which employers regulate social media in the workplace environment in 
order to manage an employee’s conduct within and beyond the workplace that is 
reasonable, fair and appropriate. However, the use of workplace surveillance to control 
and monitor social media use is a challenge for employers because of the construction 
of current workplace surveillance legislation in regard to social media platforms. This, 
together with possible breach of privacy, raises concerns in the control and 
management of social media by an employee and how social media policies and 
employment contracts should be drafted. The employment contract as well as 
workplace policies are important tools to regulate the use of social media within the 
workplace and beyond.  
 
This chapter will therefore examine the control and management of social media in the 
workplace and how it can affect the employer–employee relationship.1 This chapter 
will focus on how employers can control and manage employees’ conduct through the 
                                                          
1Barker v Casco Australia Pty Ltd 7 October 2011 (unreported, Mackay District Court): In this case, 
Barker injured her right bicep and median nerve in 2008. As a result, Barker did not return to work since 
her injury and provided medical certificates to support her injuries. Barker acknowledged that she could 
not do her work properly as a result of this. However, WorkCover received surveillance footage which 
indicated that Barker had some capacity to do her work, even though she had done nothing. See 
Workplace Health and Safety, Electrical Safety Office, Workers' Compensation Regulator, Government 
of Queensland, Surveillance and Other Related Issues of Credibility (2015) 
<https://www.worksafe.qld.gov.au/forms-and-resources/case-studies/common-law-claim-case-
studies/surveillance-and-other-related-issues-of-credibility>. 
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use of workplace surveillance and by implementing appropriate social media 
workplace policies for conduct within but importantly also outside the workplace.  
 
Although workplace surveillance is not new, advancements in technology provide a 
wide range of measures by which employers can monitor the workplace and employee 
activities. This; however, also raises concerns about privacy and the extent to which 
surveillance can extend beyond the workplace given the use of social media within 
and outside the workplace for both personal and professional purposes. 
  
In addition to workplace surveillance, this thesis focuses on the employment 
relationship and the employment contract. It has also been noted that workplace 
policies are an important aspect of managing the employment relationship apart from 
employment contracts. This chapter therefore considers the role of workplace polices, 
which also links to surveillance, in more detail. It is argued that it is essential to have 
well-developed policies designed specifically for the appropriate use of social media 
in the workplace and provide education and training to employees regarding the use of 
social media within and beyond the workplace.  Furthermore, it is also useful for 
employers to provide employer-sponsored devices to employees to control and 
monitor their use of social media.2 Whether social media policies can or should form 
part of the employment contract is also examined. Further, this thesis provides an 
example of a social media policy (see Appendix 1) that aims to assist employers in 
monitoring and controlling workplace conduct within and outside in relation to social 
media use.  
 
4.2 WORKPLACE SURVEILLANCE 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the right of employers to control and monitor an employee’s 
conduct and activities can be found in the implied duties of the employment contract. 
With the rise of social media use in the workplace, one area an employer can control 
the use or inappropriate use of social media is through workplace surveillance.3 
                                                          
2See, eg, Dorothy Bollinger, ‘Social Media and Employment Law: A Practitioner’s Primer’ (2011) 20 
Temple Political & Civil Rights Law Review 323, 326. 
3The Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) s 27(2)(m) permits state governments to regulate workplace 
surveillance. See for example Occupational Safety and Health Regulations 1996 (WA) reg 5.23 which 
states that an employer must ensure employee’s health and safety within a workplace. See also 
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Workplace surveillance is not a new phenomenon. Ball refers to workplace 
surveillance as ‘management’s ability to monitor, record and track employee 
performance, behaviours and personal characteristics in real time (for example, 
Internet or telephone monitoring) or as part of broader organizational processes’.4  
 
The purpose of using workplace surveillance is to ‘recognise that employees are 
justified in monitoring workplaces for purposes of protecting property, monitoring 
employee performance and ensuing health and safety’.5 However, notwithstanding the 
benefits of workplace surveillance (noted below), the control and monitoring of an 
employee’s use of social media through workplace surveillance may have a negative 
impact on the employment relationship. It is therefore important to be cognisant of 
how workplace surveillance of social media platforms may affect the employment 
relationship when conducting workplace surveillance and developing associated 
workplace policies.6  
 
Leonard notes that ‘workplace monitoring and surveillance is becoming increasingly 
common’ and the ‘ability to undertake surveillance of employee communications is 
often a significant benefit to employers’. 7 Likewise, Craig notes that there are a couple 
of reasons why workplace surveillance is an effective tool to use for monitoring 
conduct of employees.8 Firstly, the employer will implement surveillance in order to 
try and exclude theft from occurring or any other security threat.9 Secondly, it will 
reduce liability of an employee in terms of misconduct.10 Lastly, an employer can 
increase productivity in the workplace by monitoring workplace performance.11 
Relevant to social media and the workplace, Ball further notes that ‘with the 
                                                          
Worksafe, Government of Western Australia, Occupational Health and Safety Regulations 1996 (June 
2015)  
<http://www.commerce.wa.gov.au/worksafe/occupational-safety-and-health-regulations-1996>.  
4Kristie Ball, ‘Workplace Surveillance: An Overview’ (2010) 51 Labor History 87, 87. 
5Australian Law Reform Commission, Surveillance Devices: Workplace Surveillance (2012) 
<https://www.alrc.gov.au/publications/14-surveillance-devices/workplace-surveillance>.  
6For purposes of this thesis, the relationship between an employer and independent contractor will not 
be taken into account. 
7Peter Leonard, ‘Surveillance of Workplace Communications: What are the Rules?’ (August 2014) 
Privacy Law Bulletin, 115. 
8John Craig, Privacy in Employment Law (Hart Publishing, 1999) 26. 
9Ibid 27. 
10Ibid 28. See also John Weckert (ed), Electronic Monitoring in the Workplace: Controversies and 
Solutions (Idea Group Publishing, 2005) ch 1. 
11Ibid 32-33. 
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emergence with the blogosphere, organisations are keen to protect themselves from 
defamation, and employees’ web activities are checked for offensive or libellous 
content, sometimes even if they are posted on private servers outside company time’ 
(as discussed below).12  
 
Similarly, Roth cites the following reasons why employers engage in workplace 
surveillance and believe they are entitled to monitor equipment: ‘(i) detecting 
excessive personal use of computers, (ii) avoiding legal liability, including in relation 
to sexual harassment claims arising from office emails containing pornography, (iii) 
preventing employees from leaking confidential information, and (iv) maintaining the 
security of the computer system’.13 This is well illustrated by the examples cited by 
Friedman and Reed in which the New York Times fired 24 employees for sending 
‘potentially offensive emails’ and Chevron, who reportedly paid US$ 2 million to 
settle a lawsuit brought by employees based on sexually explicit emails they 
received.14 
 
Besides the legitimate interests in conducting workplace surveillance, there are equally 
compelling counter arguments, one being the issue of privacy, which has been raised 
as a legal challenge for employers in Chapter 3. Ball, for instance, notes that excessive 
monitoring can be detrimental because ‘privacy can be compromised if employees do 
not authorize the disclosure of their information, and it is broadcast to third parties’ 
and because of ‘function creep’.’15 The latter occurs when more information is 
gathered than is intended or needed and it is used for purposes for which employees 
have not been consulted, such as promotion.16 Even though this is the case, the 
surveillance of social media by employers, may be more beneficial than harmful when 
applied appropriately.  
 
                                                          
12 Ball, above n 4, 92. 
13 Lenny Roth, Workplace Surveillance (Parliament of New South Wales, Briefing Paper No 13/04) 
<https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/researchpapers/Documents/workplacesurveillance/workplace%2
0surveillance.pdf> 1.  
14 Barry Friedman and Lisa Reed, ‘Workplace Privacy: Employee Relations and Legal Implications of 
Monitoring Employee E-mail Use’ (2007) 19 Employee Responsibility Rights Journal 75, 77. 
15 Ball, above n 4, 93. 
16 Ibid 93. 
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The use of surveillance can also erode loyalty and trust, which are central to the 
employment relationship. Significantly it is perceived or experienced as a serious 
infringement of privacy. From an employee perspective, electronic surveillance not 
only violates privacy but also infringes on their human dignity, decreases employee 
loyalty, increases stress, and ultimately decreases productivity’.17 Employers have 
electronically monitored the workplace environment and employee activities using 
clock in systems, time-sheets, record books and, importantly, the appointment of 
supervisors and managers. Advancements in technology have provided a whole range 
of technologies that can now be used to conduct workplace surveillance, monitor and 
control employee’s behaviour and their use of technical equipment and social media 
platforms in the workplace and beyond. In addition to the above-mentioned ways of 
monitoring, CCTV has been around for a long time and is perhaps the most well-
known and common use of technology for workplace surveillance. Other workplace 
surveillance technologies include screening devices, metal detectors and biometric 
technology.18 However, using sophisticated software applications, employers can also 
monitor employees’ phones, computers, email and Internet use.19  
 
In relation to the use of electronic workplace surveillance, Charlesworth bleakly points 
out, ‘the modern employee may be watched by CCTV whilst working in an open plan 
office, her telephone calls recorded, her office conversation monitored by listening 
devices, her movements noted by sensors in her seat [and] her whereabouts in the 
building pinpointed by location badge’.20 This may sound fanciful but consider the 
common use of swipe cards, cameras, GPS tracking devices on company vehicles and 
computer software that can remotely control an employee’s computer and keystrokes. 
Hence it is not surprising that employees may be concerned about privacy. 
 
The ALRC thus notes that:21 
 
                                                          
17 Friedman and Reed, above n 14, 80. 
18 Surveillance also includes testing of employees for alcohol and drug abuse in the workplace.  
19Karen Wheelwright, ‘Monitoring Employees' Email and Internet Use at Work - Balancing the Interests 
of Employers and Employees’ (2002) 13(1) Journal of Law, Information and Science 70, 71. 
20 Andrew Charlesworth, ‘Opinion. Privacy, Personal Information and Employment’ (2003) 1(2) 
Surveillance & Society 217, 218. 
21ALRC, above n 5, 205. 
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Employers are justified in monitoring workplaces for the purposes of protecting 
property, monitoring employee performance or ensuring employee health and safety. 
However, the interests of employers must be balanced against employees’ reasonable 
expectations of privacy in the workplace. 
 
An employer has a right to implement workplace surveillance; however, this is not 
unfettered and is regulated by laws specific to workplace surveillance, for example, 
the Surveillance Devices Act 1998 (WA). Similar laws apply in other states and 
territories.22 Even though an employer has a right to implement workplace 
surveillance, these laws may restrict the lengths to which an employer can go to control 
and monitor employees in the workplace. This can create an obstacle for an employer 
when looking to monitor and control an employee’s use of social media outside the 
workplace. Therefore, a key aim of this thesis is to examine the nature of workplace 
surveillance legislation and policies and how an employer can control and monitor an 
employee when they are working in an office or at home in their private space.23  
 
4.2.1 Legal Framework of Workplace Surveillance 
Australia does not have uniform laws regarding surveillance and as a result, each state 
and territory has its own laws to monitor and control the conduct of their employees 
within each jurisdiction.24 This part of the chapter will address the specific workplace 
surveillance legislation and the legislative framework around implementation of 
workplace surveillance in general and examine the control and monitoring of the use 
of social media by employees within and outside the workplace.25  
 
4.2.1.1 Surveillance, Surveillance Devices and Limitations  
The ordinary meaning of ‘surveillance’ refers to ‘the act of carefully watching 
someone or something especially to prevent or detect a crime’.26 In a workplace 
                                                          
22Workplace Surveillance Act 2005 (NSW); Surveillance Devices Act 1999 (Vic); Listening Devices Act 
1991 (Tas); Workplace Privacy Act 2011 (ACT); Invasion of Privacy Act 1971 (Qld); Surveillance 
Devices Act 2007 (NT); Listening and Surveillance Devices Act 1972 (SA). 
23See discussion on ‘workplace’ in Chapter 2. See also Andrew Charlesworth, ‘Opinion. Personal 
Information and Employment’ (2003) 1(2) Surveillance and Society 217, 218. 
24Leonard, above n 7, 115. 
25Ibid. 
26Merriam-Webster Dictionary, ‘Surveillance’   
<http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/surveillance>.  
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context, States and Territories have implemented laws dealing with workplace 
surveillance and workplace devices in order to control and monitor an employee. 
 
Although State and Territory legislation vary in terms of the scope and meaning of 
‘surveillance’ and ‘surveillance device’, they generally include optical (or visual), 
listening and tracking devices,27 and in some jurisdiction data surveillance (see below). 
Surveillance devices include cameras, webcams, Global Position Systems, computer 
keyboard keyloggers, digital audio voice recorder, recording pens and monitoring 
software. For the purpose of this section, the WA legislation is illustrative. Pursuant to 
the Surveillance Devices Act 1998 (WA), a surveillance device includes: ‘a listening 
device, an optical surveillance device or a tracking device’.28  
 
The Surveillance Devices Act (WA) prohibits a person from using, installing and 
maintaining a listening, optical and tracking surveillance device to record a private 
conversation or private activity.29 A ‘private conversation’ under this Act refers to ‘any 
conversation carried on in circumstances that may reasonably be taken to indicate that 
any of the parties to the conversation desires it to be listened to only by themselves, 
but does not include a conversation carried on in any circumstances in which the 
parties to the conversation ought reasonably to expect that the conversation may be 
overheard’.30 This is a significant consideration for social media in the workplace 
because employers must identify between private and public distributed conversations 
before taking any action against the employee.  In relation to this, employers must also 
be vigilant in identifying whether the employee made use of an employer sponsored 
device or their personal device.  This is relevant in the control and monitoring of social 
media conversations beyond the workplace addressed in social media policies and 
terms in the employment contract later in this chapter.  
 
 
 
                                                          
27 Crimes (Surveillance Devices Act) 2010 (ACT); Surveillance Devices Act 2007 (NSW); Surveillance 
Devices Act 2007 (NT); Invasion of Privacy Act 1971 (Qld); Surveillance Devices Act 2016 (SA); 
Listening Devices Act 1991 (Tas); Surveillance Devices Act 1999 (Vic); Surveillance Devices Act 1998 
(WA). The Surveillance Devices Act 2004 (Cth) applies to Commonwealth government agencies. 
28Surveillance Devices Act 1998 (WA) s 3. 
29Ibid 5-7 and specifically s 9. 
30Ibid s 3. 
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The Surveillance Devices Act (WA) does not specifically refer to workplace 
surveillance; however, it will apply to employers.31 Moreover, despite gaps in the 
legislation and the absence of any specific provisions, surveillance in the workplace 
should be conducted according to appropriate and transparent workplace policies and 
practices (as discussed later in this chapter).  
 
4.2.1.2 Specific Workplace Surveillance  
Most surveillance legislation does not deal specifically with the workplace. However, 
a few states and territories, for example the ACT, NSW, and to some degree Victoria, 
have specific workplace surveillance laws.32  
 
The Workplace Privacy Act (ACT), for instance, states that ‘an employer may only 
conduct surveillance of a worker in a workplace if – (a) the employer gives written 
notice to the worker under this section; and (b) the surveillance is conducted in 
accordance with the notice’.33 The definition of ‘worker’34 refers to employees, 
independent workers, outworkers and volunteers and ‘workplace’ refers to ‘a place 
where work is, has been, or is to be, carried out by or for someone conducting a 
business or undertaking’.35 Therefore, this Act makes provision for employee email 
surveillance unless otherwise stated. Furthermore, this Act provides for covert 
surveillance, which means that an employer can implement workplace surveillance 
without giving notice to the employee where unlawful activity is suspected.36 
 
                                                          
31See also Katrin Scheicht, Amelia Berman, Laure Joncour and Claire Darbourne, Global Update: 
Monitoring your Employees’ Use of Technology (2012) Norton Rose Fulbright 
<http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/knowledge/publications/61978/global-update-monitoring-your-
employees-use-of-
technology?utm_source=Mondaq&utm_medium=syndication&utm_campaign=View-Original>.  
32See Workplace Surveillance Act 2005 (NSW); Workplace Privacy Act 2011 (ACT); Surveillance 
Devices Act 1999 (Vic) pt 2A. 
33Workplace Privacy Act 2011 (ACT) s 13(1). The following must be stated in the notice given to the 
employee: (i) type of surveillance which will be used; (ii) who the person is subjected to surveillance; 
(iii) date of surveillance; (iv) purpose for use of surveillance; and (v) whether it will be continuous – 
See Emma Reilly, Australia: Workplace Privacy Act 2011 (ACT): Workplace Directions (2011) Moray 
& Agnew 
<http://www.mondaq.com/australia/x/137436/Employee+Rights/Workplace+Privacy+Act+2011+AC
T>.  
34Ibid s 7. 
35Ibid s 10. 
36Ibid s 24.  
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The Workplace Surveillance Act 2005 (NSW) has similar restrictions to the ACT 
legislation. This Act provides that ‘surveillance devices must not be used in a 
workplace without sufficient notice being provided to employees, must not be used in 
a change room, toilet, or shower facility, and must not be used to conduct surveillance 
of the employee outside work’.37 Under this legislation, an ‘employee’ is seen as 
someone who is employed by an employer and related corporation.38 This Act will 
only apply when those employees are under surveillance during work. The definition 
of ‘at work’ refers to ‘when the employee is: (a) at a workplace of the employer (or a 
related corporation of the employer) whether or not the employee is actually 
performing work at the time, or (b) at any other place while performing work for the 
employer (or a related corporation of the employer)’.39 According to this section, an 
employer is entitled to use any type of surveillance outside of working hours to observe 
the conduct of employees.40 Covert surveillance on the part of the employer applies in 
a similar way as the ACT legislation.41 
 
In Victoria, the Surveillance Devices Act 1999 (Vic) provides for the following 
offence: ‘an employer must not knowingly install, use or maintain an optical 
surveillance device or a listening device to observe, listen to, record or monitor the 
private activities or conversations of a worker in a toilet, washroom, change room or 
lactation room in the workplace’.42 The Act further defines ‘private activity’ as ‘an 
activity carried on in circumstances that may reasonably be taken to indicate that the 
parties to it desire it to be observed only by themselves, but does not include – (a) an 
activity carried on outside a building; or (b) an activity carried on in any circumstances 
in which the parties to it ought reasonably to expect that it may be observed by 
someone else’.43 The only exception to when surveillance will be allowed within the 
scope of ‘private activity’ is, for example, where the interest of the business needs 
protection against unlawful acts.44 
 
                                                          
37Ibid ss 15, 16. 
38Ibid s 3. 
39Ibid s 5. See also NSWLRC: NSW Law Reform Commission, Surveillance: An Interim Report, Report 
98 (2001) Rec 57 
40This includes personal emails and devices of the employee. 
41Workplace Surveillance Act 2005 (NSW) div 2. 
42Surveillance Devices Act 1999 (Vic) s 9B. 
43Ibid s 3. 
44Ibid s 7(2). 
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This workplace surveillance legislation indicates that it is important to identify what a 
‘private activity’ is and how it applies within the workplace and beyond.  This is 
significant to the discussion given in Chapter 2 on what a ‘workplace’ is and how 
surveillance applies to private conversations over social media outside working 
activities. 
 
4.2.1.3 Data or Computer Surveillance  
Of particular relevance to the thesis on social media in the workplace and the issue of 
surveillance, is computer and data surveillance. Data surveillance is essentially any 
device or program that can be used to record or monitor the input and output data from 
a computer.45 A computer is broadly defined as ‘any electronic device for storing or 
processing information’,46 which includes smartphones, iPads and notebooks. While 
general legislation may apply to the workplace, only a few jurisdictions namely NSW, 
South Australia, Victoria and the Northern Territory include specific provisions on 
data surveillance generally and with reference to the workplace.47  
 
By way of example, in the Workplace Surveillance Act 2005 (NSW), states that 
‘surveillance’ on an employee includes:48 
 
‘computer surveillance’, which is surveillance by means of software or other equipment 
that monitors or records the information input or output, or other use, of a computer 
(including, but not limited to, the sending and receipt of emails and the accessing of 
Internet websites) … 
 
Section 10 of the NSW Act further provides that: 
 
(1) A person must not knowingly install, use or maintain a data surveillance 
device on or in premises to record or monitor the input of information into, 
or the output of information from, a computer on the premises if the 
installation, use or maintenance of the device involves: 
                                                          
45 Surveillance Devices Act 2007 (NT) s 3. 
46 Ibid s 3. 
47 Surveillance Devices Act 2007 (NSW); Surveillance Devices Act 2007 (NT); Surveillance Devices 
Act 2016 (SA); Surveillance Devices Act 1999 (Vic). 
48Ibid s 3. 
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(a) entry onto or into the premises without the express or implied 
consent of the owner or occupier of the premises, or 
(b) interference with the computer or a computer network on the 
premises without the express or implied consent of the person 
having lawful possession or lawful control of the computer or 
computer network. 
 
However, data surveillance provisions are limited in their application. Although the 
NSW and South Australian provisions on data surveillance applies to ‘a person’, the 
Northern Territory and Victoria provisions on data surveillance provisions apply to 
law enforcement agencies49 and is silent on the application to other persons. The 
legislation is therefore not helpful in terms of the workplace and defining the 
limitations on monitoring employees. However, where an employer engages in 
inappropriate data and computer surveillance, for instance to monitor private social 
media accounts without consent, they may be subject to a computer offence under the 
criminal code.50  
 
4.2.1.4 Concluding Remarks  
Surveillance laws, as discussed above, prohibit an employer from using certain devices 
to monitor private activities that could adversely affect the control and monitoring of 
employees within and beyond the workplace. Surveillance laws only prohibit the use 
of surveillance devices to record and monitor private conversations and activities. 
Generally, activities in the workplace are mostly public and therefore there would not 
necessarily be an expectation of privacy; an employee could reasonable expect an 
employer to monitor public activities. Moreover, various daily business or 
management activities would not constitute surveillance, such as the management of a 
workplace intranet or email system, or asset tracking. Moreover, a vexed problem is 
the use of mobile devices for both personal and work activities in which activities can 
be so intermingled it is not possible to be able to separate the surveillance of private 
and public activities. This is discussed further below in relation to the practice of ‘bring 
                                                          
49 Surveillance Devices Act 2007 (NT) s 14; Surveillance Devices Act 1999 (Vic) s 9. 
50 See, eg, Criminal Code Act 2016 (NT) div 10 and Crimes Acts 1958 (Vic) s 247A. 
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your own device’. Surveillance laws do not necessarily address these issues, and as 
noted, few jurisdictions have workplace specific surveillance laws.  
 
As noted, there is no uniform workplace surveillance law in Australia. The fact that 
states and territories vary in the scope and application of surveillance devices can be 
problematic for employers who operate across multiple jurisdictions and when having 
to deal with different aspects of surveillance. Moreover, not all jurisdictions include 
specific provisions on computer surveillance, which is most relevant to the discussion 
on social media in the workplace and use of employer-owned devices on which social 
media can be accessed and used. 
 
It is submitted that there is a need for reform of workplace surveillance laws and more 
specifically workplace surveillance legislation in WA. This is because unlike some 
states and territories that include specific workplace surveillance of computer-based 
devices as a means to control and monitor an employee’s conduct, WA does not make 
specific reference to computer-based devices. Nonetheless, the legislation has been 
drafted in a way to not expressly ‘exclude’ these devices from the Surveillance Devices 
Act 1998 (WA). The ALRC has proposed that in order for uniformity to occur it will 
be ‘preferable to enact a Commonwealth law to replace state and territory surveillance 
device laws, rather than attempting to achieve uniformity in state and territory laws’.51 
However, even though uniform laws have been proposed regarding surveillance and 
privacy, it has been noted that not all States and Territories will benefit from this 
uniformity; what will be effective in one state or territory will not necessarily be 
effective in another.52 It is proposed that this matter is a subject for further research 
(see Chapter 5). 
 
Notwithstanding the patch-work of legislation and the potential for reform, the 
legislation provides some protection to employees to the extent that the law limits the 
employers’ use of surveillance devices. In addition to legislation, the rights, duties and 
obligations, workplace surveillance can be further clarified and implemented via the 
                                                          
51Ibid 198. 
52Louise Thornthwaite, ‘Chilling Times: Social Media Policies, Labour Law and Employment 
Relations’ (2016) 54 Asia Pacific Journal of Human Resources 332. 
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employment contract; providing that the contract does not breach any statutory or 
common law.  
 
4.2.2 Workplace Surveillance and Employment Contracts  
Workplace surveillance is relevant to the employment relationship because it concerns 
the employment contract and any bargaining agreements the employer enters. 
Furthermore, if an employee is obligated to be subjected to workplace surveillance, it 
will either be contained within a workplace policy or the employment contract.53 
Generally, an employee may provide express consent by virtue of terms in the 
employment contract or by accepting a workplace policy in being monitored on social 
media. Moreover, express consent may be obtained by clicking an acceptance box on 
a device so that all activities on devices used at the workplace and connected to 
workplace systems will be monitored, thereby not distinguishing between private and 
public activities. 
 
An example where the court applied the principles of contract and policies collectively, 
was in the case of Romero v Farstad Shipping (Indian Pacific) Pty Ltd (No 3).54  In 
this case an altercation commenced between Ms Romero (an officer on board a supply 
ship) and Captain Martin in relation to professional competence.55  After Ms Romero 
complained about how she was treated, Farstad underwent an investigation in relation 
to the conduct of both parties.  However, Ms Romero was not satisfied with the way 
in which the investigation was conducted and alleged that Farstad failed to comply 
with their own Workplace Harassment and Discrimination Policy which, according to 
Ms Romero, has been incorporated into her contract.56  Justice Tracey, at first instance, 
held that the policy did not form part of the employment contract and therefore no 
breach of contract or policy.57   
 
However, on appeal, the court held that ‘many employment contracts operate 
effectively without the employer’s policies on various matters being incorporated as 
                                                          
53Mark Giancaspro, ‘Do Workplace Policies Form Part of Employment Contracts? A Working Guide 
and Advice for Employers’ (2016) 44 Australian Business Law Review 106, 106. 
54[2016] FCA 1453. 
55Ibid [1]. 
56Ibid. 
57Ibid [2]. 
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terms. The existence of the Policy and its status as being contractual is quite different 
from the question of whether or not compliance with it is an essential term.58  The 
court went further by explaining that ‘even if the terms of the Policy had not comprised 
the initial terms of Ms Romero’s contract, they became terms at the time at which the 
parties varied or changed their contractual relationship to include those terms’.59  
Therefore, the appeal court agreed with Tracey J that the Policy did not form part of 
the employment contract and therefore no breach of the contract or policy. 
 
As will be discussed later in this part of the chapter, the consideration of the policy 
and employment contract in the above mentioned case, will be similarly applied in 
scenarios concerning social media use within and beyond the workplace. 
 
The duties of the employee and employer in regards to the employment contract are 
important considerations because this articulates the behaviour of both parties in the 
employment contract. It has been stated in Chapter 2 that an employee has a duty to 
obey their employer and therefore, if an employer decides to monitor an employee 
within the workplace, it is an implied duty that forms part of the employment contract. 
Sempill explains that:60  
 
A toll that reinforces the employer’s power in the employment relationship by giving 
the employer an additional opportunity to enforce obedience to the employer’s 
directions and by providing a means to gain objective evidence of behaviours which 
might be used to justify dismissal, particularly summary dismissal of employees.61 
 
Therefore, most cases referred to in this part will consider the dismissal of employees 
due to a breach of policy, either connected to the employment contract or not, and will 
be further clarified in relation to social media use and termination of employment.  The 
duties, as mentioned by Sempill above, form an important part to the employment 
                                                          
58Romero v Farstad Shipping (Indian Pacific) Pty Ltd (No 3) [2017] FCAFC 102, [63]. 
59Ibid [65]. 
60Julian Sempill, ‘Under the Lens: Electronic Workplace Surveillance’ (2001) 14 Australian Journal of 
Labour Law 111, 112. 
61Ibid 116. See also Johanna Betteridge, Privacy and Surveillance in the Workplace (Victoria) (2003) 
TEN Public Paper 
<http://www.tved.net.au/index.cfm?SimpleDisplay=PaperDisplay.cfm&PaperDisplay=http://www.tve
d.net.au/PublicPapers/February_2003,_Lawyers_Education_Channel,_Privacy_and_Surveillance_in_t
he_Workplace__Victoria_.html>.  
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contract. Therefore, if a workplace policy does not form part of an employment 
contract, the employee still has a duty to obey reasonable instructions given by the 
employer and follow the employer’s decisions. It is important that the employer clearly 
informs the employee that they are still required to obey workplace surveillance 
policies even though not connected to the employment contract itself.62 Therefore, the 
employer has, to some extent, the right to terminate an employee, on reasonable 
grounds, when found to breach a workplace policy, especially relating to social media 
use.  However, an employer does not always have power over their employee, 
especially in cases where employers wanted to monitor the employee outside of 
working hours due to privacy principles.63  
 
An exception to the monitoring of employees outside of working hours was the case 
of McManus v Scott-Charlton64 where the court held that ‘it was within the scope of 
the employer's power to exercise control over the employee's conduct outside his 
course of employment and physical confines of the workplace in this instance as it was 
considered to be within the scope of the employer's legitimate interests’.65 The court 
went further by stating that ‘while the employee's conduct may not have been engaged 
“in connection with” his employment, it could still properly be said to have a 
relationship to – to be attributable to – that employment’.66 
 
Nevertheless, the courts are prepared to consider scenarios outside of the employment 
relationship regarding conduct outside the workplace. The reality is that employees are 
employed by employers to fulfil their duties as set out in the employment contract and 
anything that impacts on this relationship.  This is the case even outside the workplace, 
and will be questionable and open for dismissal depending on the circumstances of 
each case. In the case of Orr v The University of Tasmania,67 a professor was dismissed 
                                                          
62Warnings can be given to employees if they do not follow orders. 
63See for example Australian Telecommunications v Hart (1982) 43 ALR 165; Wall v Westcott (1982) 
1 IR 45. 
64(1996) 140 ALR 625.  
65In this case, there was an alleged case against an employee sexually harassing a female employee 
outside of working hours. 
66McManus v Scott-Charlton, 636. In the case of Rose v Telstra (1998) AILR 45, the Vice President 
stated that: ‘modern law of employment has its basis on contract and an employee's behaviour outside 
of working hours will only have an impact on their employment to the extent that it can be said to breach 
an express or implied term of his or her contract of employment.’ 
67(1957) 100 CLR 526. 
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for having an affair with a student off campus.68 The court stated that ‘the fact that 
Professor Orr was engaging in a sexual relationship with one of his students made it 
impossible for him to dispassionately carry out his duties of examining and presenting 
candidates for their degrees’.69 Therefore, if the interest of the business is gaining a 
bad reputation by conduct of employees outside the workplace, it is reasonable for the 
employer to monitor these employees subject to a workplace surveillance policy.70 
This will be similarly applied in the application of social media policies and the 
monitoring of inappropriate use of social media. 
 
A further important nexus between workplace surveillance and employment contracts 
is in regard to workplace health and safety. According to s 3 of the Work Health and 
Safety Act 2011 (Cth):71 
 
The main object of this Act is to provide for a balanced and nationally consistent 
framework to secure the health and safety of workers and workplaces by: 
(a) protecting workers and other persons against harm to their health, safety 
and welfare through the elimination or minimisation of risks arising from 
work. 
 
Furthermore, the Occupational Safety and Health Act 1984 (WA)72 provides that: 
 
An employer shall, so far as is practicable, provide and maintain a working 
environment in which the employees of the employer (the employees) are not exposed 
to hazards and in particular, but without limiting the generality of the foregoing, an 
employer shall –  
(a) provide and maintain workplaces, plant, and systems of work such that, so 
far as is practicable, the employees are not exposed to hazards. 
                                                          
68Ibid 529. 
69See also R v Railways Appeal Board; Ex parte Haran [1969] WAR 13. In this case the issue was 
whether an employer could validly dismiss an employee for misconduct which occurred at work and 
extended to outside work conduct. 
70See the case of Shaun Kinnane v DP World Brisbane Pty Limited [2014] FWC 4541 (9 July 2014). In 
this case, an employer arranged for covert surveillance of his employee as the employer believed that 
the employee, who took medical leave, was working on his own business and against medical 
restrictions. The evidence showed that the employee was working on his own business and therefore 
the employer dismissed the employee. However, the Fair Work Commission stated that the dismissal 
was unfair and gave numerous reasons for this decision. 
71Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (Cth) s 3(1)(a). 
72Occupational Safety and Health Act 1984 (WA) s 19(1)(a). 
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Even though legislation requires that an employer needs to ensure that their employees 
are safe, the argument regarding workplace surveillance can fall on both sides of the 
coin. On the one hand, the employer will maintain that to keep employees safe and 
free from risk, workplace surveillance is needed, especially in circumstances of 
bullying and harassment. On the other hand, employees will maintain that it is 
infringing upon their privacy and they feel harassed by being subjected to workplace 
surveillance.73 According to Braue, subjecting employees to workplace monitoring ‘is 
likely to cause resentment among workers if they feel they are being spied upon or 
continually pressured to improve their performance. While the use of such programs 
is quite legal, it could backfire on employers by fostering low morale, widespread 
resentment and a negative public image that can be difficult to repair’.74 Even though 
employees might feel this way, it is important to understand that employers have a 
duty to keep their employees safe and with the necessary underlying workplace policy, 
which incorporates workplace surveillance in an effective way, it can benefit both the 
employee and employer. 
 
Monitoring employees in and beyond the workplace presents various challenges 
regarding the monitoring of social media use and how it should be regulated. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, a ‘workplace’ can be categorised as anywhere and not an old-
fashioned office anymore and therefore employers are able to monitor employees 
outside the workplace. This ensures the control of an employee’s conduct outside of 
the workplace in order to protect the interests of the business, especially when posting 
comments on social media. If the correct workplace policies on social media are in 
place, and the employment contract makes provision for it, an employer is entitled to 
dismiss the employee on the evidence provided. However, if an employee’s social 
media accounts were monitored and did not damage the business interest of the 
employer and the employee is dismissed, this may result in the unlawful termination 
of an employee.  
 
                                                          
73Johanna Betteridge, Privacy and Surveillance in the Workplace (Victoria) (2003) TEN Public Paper 
<http://www.tved.net.au/index.cfm?SimpleDisplay=PaperDisplay.cfm&PaperDisplay=http://www.tve
d.net.au/PublicPapers/February_2003,_Lawyers_Education_Channel,_Privacy_and_Surveillance_in_t
he_Workplace__Victoria_.html>.  
74David Braue, ‘Every Breath You Take’ (2000) The Bulletin, 65. 
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4.2.3 Key Issues Concerning Workplace Surveillance  
The use of social media in the workplace and workplace surveillance to track, monitor 
and control conduct within and beyond the workplace ‘challenge privacy’ and 
inevitably raise concerns about workplace privacy. When an employer considers the 
implementation of workplace surveillance, they need to be aware of the challenges in 
regards to such implementation. Therefore, the ease with which social media can be 
used within and beyond the workplace, combined with the legal challenges, gives rise 
to complicated workplace surveillance issues. As discussed above, certain states and 
territories have enacted legislation that specifically deals with workplace surveillance; 
however, in the absence of such legislation, issues can arise when dealing with the 
control and monitoring of social media beyond the workplace, especially with privacy 
and breach of workplace surveillance laws. Therefore, this section discusses 
workplace surveillance in relation to privacy, the use of personal devices for work 
activities and surveillance that extends beyond the workplace. 
 
4.2.3.1 Workplace Surveillance and Privacy in the Workplace 
One of the key issues and concerns about workplace surveillance is privacy. It is not 
surprising that employees may believe that personal emails and social media accounts 
used to communicate with family or friends, and to conduct private matters, are private 
even if accessed and used during working time. Employees may have a reasonable 
expectation that their private communication and activities will not be monitored and 
if so it will be a breach of privacy. Certainly, as discussed above, workplace 
surveillance legislation does restrict the use of surveillance devices in the workplace 
to monitor private conversations and activities. However, if accessed on employer-
owned devices and work email systems, the conduct and content may lose the element 
of privacy. This raises further issues in relation to ‘bring your own devices’, which is 
discussed below.  
 
Nonetheless, a key issue when using surveillance devices in the workplace and that 
further creates a privacy issue is the protection of data that is lawfully collected using 
surveillance devices, which includes visual, audio and written data. In this regard, the 
Privacy Act (Cth), discussed in Chapter 3, provides some protection to employees with 
regards to the use, storage and disclosure of personal information through the 
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application of the APPs.75 However, APPs do not extend to conduct between private 
individuals. They also do not apply to all organisations (see Chapter 3) and state 
entities. Moreover, privacy and data protection laws across states and territories are 
limited. For instance, Western Australia does not have specific privacy laws.  
 
Therefore, relevant to this section is the application of the APPs to workplace 
surveillance and data protection. For public and private entities that are subject to the 
Privacy Act, they must implement workplace surveillance policies in accordance with 
the Privacy Act76 as well as the nine APPs.77 Data collected by means of surveillances 
devices that consists of personal information must be dealt with in accordance with the 
APPs.  
 
It is worth recalling that in terms of the Privacy Act, ‘personal information’ is:78 
 
Information or an opinion about an identified individual, or an individual who is 
reasonably identifiable: 
(a) whether the information or opinion is true or not; and 
(b) whether the information or opinion is recorded in a material form or 
not.79 
 
Taking this into account, it is possible that videos and any other form of surveillance 
will identify an employee. Therefore, it will suffice as personal information, which is 
taken in a material form. If an employee believes that their privacy is being infringed 
upon in regards to workplace surveillance, they can lodge a complaint under s 40(1A) 
of the Privacy Act.80  
 
It is therefore necessary to have employment policies and practices regarding 
workplace surveillance that balances an employee’s expectation for privacy with the 
                                                          
75Fair Work Ombudsman, Best Practice Guide: Workplace Privacy (2014) <www.fairwork.gov.au>.  
76Privacy Act 1988 (Cth). 
77Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Australian Privacy Principles (2016) 
 <https://www.oaic.gov.au/privacy-law/privacy-act/australian-privacy-principles>.  
78Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) pt II, s 6. See also Jim Nolan, ‘Employee Privacy in the Electronic Workplace 
Pt 1: Surveillance, Records and Emails’ (2000) 7(6) Privacy Law and Policy Reporter 105. 
79The Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (Cth) s 187LA extends the definition of 
‘personal information’ to include ‘information kept’ under the Act. 
80This is done through the Australian Information and Privacy Commissioner. 
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employer’s obligation to keep employee’s safe from providing personal information 
to anyone.81 In order for workplace surveillance measures to be successful within the 
workplace, the employer needs to set-off workplace policies against the privacy 
expectations of employees.82 This will, in turn, ensure that all implied duties within 
the employment contract are adhered to and workplace policies regarding workplace 
surveillance on the misuse of email and social media sites respected by employees.  
 
A further challenge facing the employment relationship and workplace surveillance is 
whether employees should provide consent to employers when considering monitoring 
the conduct of employees on social media.83 As noted above, privacy law functions to 
protect the independence of a person and not to disclose personal information to the 
public.84 Not only are privacy laws protecting this interest, but it can also be created 
within an employment contract where employers are able to gain consent from 
employees through signing of the contract.85 Therefore, the consent of an employee 
can be made through express terms of privacy contained within workplace privacy 
policies, and if not, implied duties will become significant as the duty to obey and 
mutual trust and confidence exists between the parties.86 
 
Even though an employer may have these policies in place, dismissing an employee 
based on misuse of emails or social media sites will still have to be fair in their 
dismissal.87 Dismissal of employees on this basis will be discussed later in this chapter. 
                                                          
81Jim Nolan, ‘Employee Privacy in the Electronic Workplace Pt 2: Drug Testing, Out of Hours Conduct 
and References (2000) Privacy Law and Policy Reporter 7, 144. A discussion on privacy in Chapter 3 
indicated that the limitation of privacy monitoring is limited within private organisation who have less 
than $3 million turnover. See also Officer of the Federal Privacy Commissioner, Getting in On the Act: 
The Review of the Private Sector Provisions of the Privacy Act 1988 (2005) 74 < 
https://www.oaic.gov.au/privacy-law/privacy-archive/privacy-reports-archive/getting-in-on-the-act-
the-review-of-the-private-sector-provisions-of-the-privacy-act-1988>. 
82Steven Penning and Aaron Magner, ‘Workplace Surveillance and Privacy’ (2006) Commercial Law 
Quarterly 24, 25. 
83John Weckert (ed), Electronic Monitoring in the Workplace: Controversies and Solutions (Idea Group 
Publishing, 2005) ch XII. 
84Ibid 35. 
85See Steven Willborn, ‘Consenting Employees: Workplace Privacy and the Role of Consent’ (2006) 
66 Louisiana Law Review 975, 979. 
86R v Darling Island Stevedoring & Lighterage Co Ltd; ex parte Halliday and Sullivan (1938) 60 CLR 
601, 622. 
87In Windsor Smith v Liu and Others [1998] Print Q3462 the Australian Industrial Relations 
Commission held that: ‘The question of whether there was a valid reason for the termination of 
employment is no longer the critical 
question in determining whether the termination was contrary to the Act … Under the Workplace 
Relations Act 1996, the principal question is whether the termination was harsh, unjust or unreasonable. 
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Examining workplace surveillance and privacy on a broader and international level, 
the ILO promotes the protection of employee’s personal information and provides the 
following guidelines for monitoring employees through workplace surveillance:88 
 
(i) Personal data should be processed lawfully and fairly, and only for reasons 
directly relevant to the employment of the worker. 
(ii) Personal data should, in principle, be used only for the purposes for which 
they were originally collected. 
(iii) If personal data are to be processed for purposes other than those for which 
they were collected, the employer should ensure that they are not used in a 
manner incompatible with the original purpose, and should take the 
necessary measures to avoid any misinterpretation caused by a change of 
context. 
(iv) Personal data collected in connection with technical or organisational 
measures to ensure the security and proper operation of automated 
information systems should not be used to control the behaviour of 
workers. 
(v) Workers and their representatives should be kept informed of any data 
collection process, the rules that govern that process, and their rights. 
(vi) All persons, including employers, workers’ representatives, employment 
agencies and workers, who have access to personal data, should be bound 
to a rule of confidence consistent with the performance of their duties and 
the principles in this code. 
(vii) Workers may not waive their privacy rights.89 
 
                                                          
In considering that question, the Commission is to ensure that a “fair go all round” is accorded to both 
the employer and the employee concerned.’ 
88International Labour Organisation, Code of Practice on the Protection of Workers’ Personal Data 
(Geneva, 1997) cl 5  
<http://www.ilo.org/safework/info/standards-and-instruments/codes/WCMS_107797/lang--
en/index.htm>. 
89See in general Paul Roth, ‘The International Labour Office Code of Practice on the Protection of 
Workers' Personal Data’ (1998) 5(1) Privacy Law & Policy Reporter 5, 6. 
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In line with the above mentioned international principles, employers, within Australia, 
can safeguard against breach of personal information, through workplace surveillance, 
by:  
 
(i) recognising any legal problems;  
(ii) including provisions of workplace surveillance into the employment 
contract as an express term;  
(iii) making employees aware of the workplace surveillance;  
(iv) introducing additional policies and procedures into the workplace 
regarding the monitoring of employees; and  
(v) using systems correctly which would not lead to the abuse of personal 
information of employees.90 
 
With the development of technology, especially social media in the workplace, 
technology allow employers to have ‘record keepers involved in traditional 
relationships with clients, customers, patients, research subjects and others to increase 
the volume of information held’ and therefore personal information is emerging ‘in 
directions never envisaged by the existing legal and official framework governing 
those relationships’.91  
 
This will increase the protection of privacy of the employee in the workplace and also 
set boundaries when employers are entitled to monitor the private activities of 
employees, whether in the workplace or outside. One inquiry into workplace privacy, 
which recommended a Workplace Privacy Bill, was the Victorian Law Reform 
Commission.92 The Commission indicated the following regarding the operation of 
this Bill:93 
 
                                                          
90J Cooper and L Croxford, Employment Law – Workplace Surveillance and Employee Information 
(July 2000) Australian Company Secretary, 361 in Joanna Betteridge, Privacy and Surveillance in the 
Workplace (February 2003) TEN 
<http://www.tved.net.au/index.cfm?SimpleDisplay=PaperDisplay.cfm&PaperDisplay=http://www.tve
d.net.au/PublicPapers/February_2003,_Lawyers_Education_Channel,_Privacy_and_Surveillance_in_t
he_Workplace__Victoria_.html>.  
91Gordon Hughes, ‘An Overview of Data Protection in Australia’ (1992) 18 Melbourne University Law 
Review 83, 85. 
92Victorian Law Reform Commission, Workplace Privacy: Final Report (2005) 
 <http://www.lawreform.vic.gov.au/sites/default/files/Privacy%2BFinal%2BReport.pdf>.  
93Ibid 36. 
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(i) providing a fair balance between the right of privacy and giving employers 
the right to protect their legitimate interests; 
(ii) be sufficiently flexible with future developments in the nature of 
technology; 
(iii) ensure that acts or practices which affect privacy are proportionate to the 
interest the employer is seeking to protect; and 
(iv) give adequate protection to workers without imposing excessive regulation 
costs on government. 
 
The Commission also applied this Bill not only within working relations but also 
within a non-working framework.94 Therefore, this Bill clearly distinguishes between 
public and private life and how the employer can monitor out of work conduct. 
Furthermore, it recognises the difference between an employer’s business interest and 
an employee’s expectation of privacy.95 However, Chapter 2 examined the employer–
employee relationship and depending on what the employment contract states will 
depend on whether an employee has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
workplace. Furthermore, the monitoring is not so much concerned with public life, but 
the conduct of the employee during work in the course of employment, which then 
connects it to what the employee does beyond the workplace and in public. This Bill 
is a good example of how employers will be able to monitor and control the conduct 
of employees beyond the workplace where the interests of the business is harmed. 
 
Employment matters such as workplace surveillance as well as privacy are not 
specifically covered under the Fair Work Act, but rather in an employment contract or 
workplace policy. These matters are mostly terms agreed upon between employer and 
employee and how it should be regulated. Thus, the employee will usually be placed 
in a position where they have to either agree to the terms of the employer or not, which 
creates disparity between the employer and employee.96 The rigorous application of 
these regulations in the workplace imposes strict use technology such as social media. 
However, due to the duties imposed on the employee to carry out tasks set out by the 
                                                          
94Ibid 39-40. 
95Ibid 40. 
96Dan Svantesson, ‘Online Workplace Surveillance - The View from Down Under’ (2012) 2(3) 
International Data Privacy Law 179, 181. 
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employer, these restrictions are undisputed.97 Thus, the level of workplace monitoring 
by an employer on an employer-sponsored device needs to be carefully considered in 
order to avoid, for example, accessing private information from an employee on an 
email, which will be considered breaching the employment contract or workplace 
policy on workplace monitoring.98  
 
4.2.3.2 ‘Bring Your Own Device’ 
It is uncontroversial that an employer has a right to monitor employer-owned 
equipment and mobile devices in the workplace, whether derived from workplace 
surveillance legislation or from implied rights under the employment contract. 
However, what is controversial is whether employers can or should monitor personal 
mobile devices owned and supplied by the employee and which may be used for both 
personal and work-related activities within and outside the workplace and working 
hours. 
 
The BOYD practice has gained significant interest to both employers and employees 
in regards to workplace monitoring.99 A BOYD practice and policy permits employees 
to use their own technological device for work activities but also for other purposes 
such as accessing social media sites for personal use.100 One advantage of a BYOD 
practice is that employers do not have to pay for any devices as the employee uses 
their own and work can be done more effectively as employees are able to use the 
device at any time and in any place.101 But even though this is attractive to an 
employee, an initiative such as BOYD can have negative effects on the business. 102 
                                                          
97Ibid. 
98Ibid. See also Anna Johnston and Myra Cheng ‘Electronic Workplace Surveillance, Part 1: Concerns 
for Employees and Challenges for Privacy Advocates’ (2003) 9(9) Privacy Law and Policy Reporter 
161. 
99Aurelie Leclercq-Vandelannoitte, ‘Leaving Employees to their Own Devices: New Practices in the 
Workplace’ (2015) 36(5) Journal of Business Strategy 18 – 24; Holy Ansaldi, ‘Addressing Challenges 
of the ‘Bring Your Own Device’ Opportunity’ (2013) 83(11) The CPA Journal 63-65; Phil Offer, 
‘Bringing Your Own Device to Work: The Business Dilemmas’, ABC (online), 9 July 2012 
<http://www.abc.net.au/technology/articles/2012/07/09/3541839.htm>.  
100Ibid. See also Raphael Rajendra, ‘Employee-Owned Devices, Social Media, and the NLRA’ (2014) 
30 American Bar Association Journal of Labour and Employment Law 47. 
101Simon Hinde, ‘Bring Your Own Device: The Pros and Cons’, The Telegraph (online), 2 October 
2013 
 <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sponsored/technology/business-technology/10347308/bring-your-own-
device-pros-cons.html>.  
102Ibid. See also Fiona Graham, ‘BYOD: Bring Your Own Device Could Spell End for Work PC’, BBC 
News (online), February 2012 <http://www.bbc.com/news/business-17017570>.  
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Employers may well be concerned about data security, the potential loss of data 
especially if a device is not backed-up by a secure workplace server, the inadvertent 
or intentional disclosure of confidential information, the potential for defamation 
claims (see Chapter 2) and liability for the devices (for example, insurance and 
licences).  
 
In terms of employers monitoring employee devices, one issue is that it is difficult to 
monitor only business-related information when it is potentially mixed with private 
information, especially as monitoring private information and activities may be a 
breach of privacy and a breach of surveillance legislation as outlined above. Therefore, 
the problem may arise where, for example, the employee inappropriately uses social 
media at home on their device to either defame or bully a co-worker or employer and 
the employer is not allowed to monitor such conduct because of privacy restrictions. 
Nonetheless if such conduct were to come to the attention of the employer, disciplinary 
action could be taken pursuant to the employment contract or a workplace policy. 
 
This does raise pertinent questions as to when an employer can monitor devices used 
by employees outside the workplace and to what extent the employer can monitor 
conduct of an employee at home, whether having an employer-sponsored device or 
not.  
 
4.2.3.3 Workplace Surveillance and Privacy Outside the Workplace 
A key question addressed in this thesis is the extent to which an employer can monitor 
and control an employee’s conduct outside the workplace and working hours with 
specific reference to technology and social media. As already indicated in Chapters 2 
and 3, there may be circumstances in which employer control over employee conduct 
can extend beyond the workplace. However, the monitoring of employee’s conduct 
outside the ‘workplace’ can be restricted and limited.103 According to Nolan, the 
employer does not have ‘an unfettered right to sit in judgment of out of work 
behaviour’.104 Furthermore, Ierodiaconou notes that ‘an employer’s ability to 
discipline workers for their after-hours conduct is limited to activities with a direct link 
                                                          
103Rose v Telstra Corporation Ltd [1998] AIRC 1592. 
104Jim Nolan, ‘Employee Privacy in the Electronic Workplace Pt 2: Drug Testing, Out of Hours Conduct 
and References’ (2000) 7(7) Privacy Law and Policy Reporter 139. 
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to their employment and which have a serious and significant impact on the workplace 
or employer’s interests’.105  
 
In terms of monitoring and surveillance, an employer must exercise great care when 
conducting workplace monitoring beyond the workplace as the conduct of an 
employee may not be work-related. This is significant because as noted the control and 
monitoring of social media on a device will differ when it is an employer-sponsored 
device and when it is the employee’s personal device.106 In Chapter 2, it was 
determined that a ‘workplace’ is not restricted to an office, but wherever the employee 
is conducting work. However, with this broad definition, the boundaries of work-
related activities and non-work-related activities can be blurred. Therefore, the 
inappropriate use of social media outside the workplace can affect the employment 
relationship and hence the employment contract, as discussed above. 
  
Nonetheless, employers may argue that they have a legitimate business interest in the 
conduct of an employee’s use of social media outside of working hours, especially 
where there is a nexus between the activity and the workplace, and it relates to 
concerns about protecting business interests, the reputation of the business and the 
impact of conduct on other employees (see Chapter 3 on the discussion on defamation 
and cyberbullying). As discussed above, the monitoring of employees outside the 
workplace and within their private lives will be regulated by the employment contract 
or workplace policy (see below). The monitoring of employees outside the workplace 
is most likely to arise when employees make use of employer-sponsored devices at 
home.107  
 
A seminal case in point regarding the use of an employer-sponsored device for 
personal use at home is Griffiths v Rose.108 In this case, the employee worked for an 
Australian Public Service and was sponsored a laptop from his Department, which he 
                                                          
105Mary-Jane Ierodiaconou, ‘After Hours Conduct’ (2004) 78(4) Law Institute Journal 42, 45. 
106See discussion below on employer-sponsored devices and an employee’s personal device. 
107See Brad Swebeck, Regulating Employee Conduct Outside of Work Hours: Managing Social 
Networking, Bullying and Harassment (2011) Hickson Lawyers; 
<http://www.mondaq.com/australia/x/146434/Discrimination+Disability+Sexual+Harassment/Workpl
ace+Update+Regulating+employee+conduct+outside+of+work+hours+managing+social+networking
+bullying+and+harrassment>.  
108[2011] FCA 30. 
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was actively using from home. While at home, the employee accessed pornographic 
material through this device. Before returning the laptop to the employer, he deleted 
all the material as well as the browsing history. During a routine inspection of the 
device using audit software, the pornographic downloading was discovered.109 Upon 
this discovery, the employee was charged with a breach of the Australian Public 
Service Code of Conduct.110 In particular, one of the policies the Department 
implemented stated that:111 
 
Employees are prohibited from using Departmental ICT facilities to deliberately access, 
display, download, distribute, copy or store: 
• pirated software and/or material; 
• racist material; 
• pornography; or 
• links to such material.112 
 
The sanctions available to the Department extended from giving warnings to 
termination of employees. The Department chose to terminate the employee because 
of his conduct.113 However, the employee argued that his actions were lawful and 
reasonable under the Code of Conduct and also submitted that the Department 
breached s 16 of the Privacy Act. Section 16 of this Act provides that if the Department 
breach the APPs, they are in contravention with s 14 of the Act.114 In particular, APP 
3 deals with the collection of solicited personal information, which states that:115 
 
                                                          
109The court stated at [3] that ‘Spector360 was a utility of a kind known as a “desktop logging system”. 
It performed a number of functions including logging the occurrence of particular keywords and taking 
a precise snapshot of the user’s desktop every 30 seconds. On the next occasion that a laptop installed 
with Spector360 was connected to the Department’s network it was configured to send the data it had 
collected to a dedicated server. For completeness, it might be noted that Spector360 also collected all 
emails, attachments, internet searches and instant messages performed by a user and sent them to the 
same dedicated server. Three of the Department’s security officers had access to this server.’ 
110Ibid [6]. The court also took note that the employee did not commit any offence and that the employee 
also did not forward any of the pornographic material to other colleagues or friends. 
111Use of District Facilities Policy. 
112Ibid [6]. 
113Ibid [5]. 
114Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) s 14. 
115Ibid. Previously NPP 1. 
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if an APP entity is an agency, it must not collect personal information (other than 
sensitive information) unless the information is reasonably necessary for or directly 
related to, one or more of the entity's functions or activities; 
if an APP entity is an organisation, it must not collect personal information (other than 
sensitive information) unless the information is reasonably necessary for one or more 
of the entity's functions or activities. 
 
When considering APP 3, it is clear that a software program such as Spector360 will 
breach an employee’s privacy by collecting personal information unfairly. However, 
the court held that the collection of information by the employer was done fairly and 
in accordance with the Code of Conduct.116 The court further pointed out that 
according to Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights117 
there was no unlawful behaviour by the Department in monitoring of these devices.118 
 
In concluding this case, when a device is sponsored by the employer, then the 
employer, as owner, has the right to determine what rules apply regarding taking that 
device home. Furthermore, if these rules were communicated or made clear to the 
employee, for example, not utilising it for personal use, the employer has a right to 
control, monitor and access the data on that device without it being unfair and 
unreasonable.119 
 
Taking the above-mentioned discussion into account, the issue with monitoring 
employees outside the workplace, is whether employers can dismiss their employees 
in regards to such conduct, specifically in relation to the misuse of social media by the 
employee. This is an important aspect regarding dismissal, as a dismissal of an 
employee who misused a social media platform outside the workplace can lead to an 
                                                          
116Griffiths v Rose, [23]. At [27] the court further held that: ‘the policy set out above does not warn 
employees that if they visit on-line banking sites Spector360 may record all of their banking details. It 
is difficult to see what interest the Department would have in such material. The Department’s answer 
to that is, in part, to suggest that the laptop could not be used for personal use. I would, however, reject 
that submission. It is plain from the policy that the Department does permit limited personal use of its 
IT facilities’ and therefore breach may be possible with such software. 
117International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights opened for signature 6 December 1966, GA Res 
2200A (XXI) (entered into force 23 March 1976). 
118Griffiths v Rose, [39]. Further international case law was referred to, Potter v Scottish Ministers 
[2010] CSOH 85 [530]. 
119See in general Beatrix van Dissel, ‘Social Media and the Employee’s Right to Privacy in Australia’ 
(2014) 4(3) International Data Privacy Law 222. 
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unfair dismissal under the Fair Work Act.120 In the case of Streeter v Telstra 
Corporation,121 an employee was involved in unlawful out of work activities with 
other co-workers in a hotel room.122 The court in this case had to determine whether 
the employer could dismiss the employee for such conduct outside the workplace. The 
court cited the case of Rose v Telstra Corporation123 and determined that if there exists 
a clear and relevant connection between conduct of an employee and their 
employment, it may be seen as a ground for dismissal.124 Furthermore, the conduct 
referred to must be so clear and relevant that the employment contract is ended by the 
employer.125 However, in this case the circumstances were not clear and relevant 
enough for the employee to be dismissed. Therefore, employers should be careful in 
dismissing employees for conduct outside the ‘workplace’. This corresponds with the 
duty of good faith between employer and employee as discussed in Chapter 2. 
 
Furthermore, the court in McManus v Scott-Charlton126 held that an employer can 
legitimately dismiss an employee where the employee’s conduct influenced the 
‘efficient equitable and proper conduct of the employer’s business’.127 Therefore, any 
conduct by an employee that exposes the employer’s business interest, is a ground for 
dismissal.128 The following should be taken into account by an employer when 
monitoring employer-sponsored devices:129 
 
(i) apply reasonable and clear policies or terms in the employment contract 
which stipulates the use of social media on an employer-sponsored device; 
(ii) the monitoring of the employee’s use of social media should only stretch 
as far as necessary to protect the interests of the business;130 and 
                                                          
120Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) pt 3-2. 
121[2007] AIRC 679. 
122Ibid. 
123[1998] AIRC 1592. 
124Streeter v Telstra Corporation, [82]. 
125Ibid [59]. 
126(1996) 140 ALR 625. 
127Ibid 626. The court further held that the employee’s conduct had an adverse effect on the employer’s 
business. 
128Daniel Ornstein, ‘Social Media Usage in the Workplace around the World – Developing Law and 
Practices’ (2012) 13(2) Business Law International 195, 197-198. 
129Ibid. 
130The case of Mayberry v Kijani Investments Pty Ltd ATF The Dawe Investments Trust Subway 
Wallsend T/A Subway [2011] FWA 3496 is a good example of when an employee’s use of social media 
did not harm the interests of the business. In this case, an employee posted a photo on Facebook where 
she dressed up as a car which was made from paper cups and cardboard. This photo which was posted 
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(iii) education and training on the unauthorised use of social media on such a 
device.131 
 
The second issue that needs consideration is the employer’s right to monitor an 
employee’s social media use outside of working hours. Generally, an employer does 
not have a right to prohibit an employee to use their social media networks outside 
working hours, only within working hours.132 However, Chapter 2 has established that 
the ‘workplace’ can be anywhere and not necessarily in the office. Does this mean that 
employers can restrict an employee from using social media when, for example, an 
employee is working from home? It is considered within the employment contract that 
the employee is not free from responsibility for any work-related misconduct.133 This 
would include the misuse of confidential information, privacy and harassment of other 
employees or the employer.134 
 
Therefore, when considering the conduct of employees outside of working hours and 
employment in regards to the use of social media, the employer should look to the 
following features when considering dismissal of an employee:135 
 
(i) the relationship between the employer and employee has been harmed due 
to the misuse of social media; 
(ii) the employer’s business interest has been damaged; or 
(iii) there was a clear breach of the duties of the employee as set out in the 
employment contract.136 
 
                                                          
showed that the employee took it behind the Subway counter. The employer then dismissed the 
employee because he argued that the employee stole the items which damaged Subway’s name. The 
employee argued that she took the paper cups and cardboard from her own bin at home. The 
Commissioner in this case held that there was no damage to the reputation of the business and dismissal 
was too harsh. 
131Ibid. Daniel also states that different jurisdictions apply these policies and monitoring differently. For 
example, in England, the government has enacted guidelines for employers to follow when monitoring 
employees. The monitoring should also be proportionate. 
132Ibid 201. See also for example National Labour Relations Act 1935 s 7. 
133Ibid. 
134See for example Crisp v Apple Retail UK Limited (2011) ET/1500258/11 and Karl Knauz Motors Inc 
v Robert Becker (2011) No 13-CA-46452. 
135Sean Millard and Natalie Novak, Social Media and the Workplace (2011) Workplace Law Update, 
Issue 17 
<http://www.ccilawyers.com.au/assets/320/files/WORKPLACE%20LAW%20UPDATE%20ISSUE%
20November%2011%20-%20Website%20version.pdf>.  
136These duties will be discussed later in this Chapter. 
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In considering these aspects, the Commissioner in Sally Ann Fitzgerald v Dianna 
Smith T/A Escape Hair Design137 held that the comment the employee made regarding 
her employer on Facebook was not discriminatory enough for a dismissal. Taking into 
account the relationship between the parties and the fact that the employee did not 
mention the employer’s name, there were no reasonable grounds to dismiss the 
employee.138  
 
Therefore, it is necessary for an employer to have some regulation in place when 
dealing with conduct of employees outside of working hours. Furthermore, the court 
in Dover-Ray v Real Insurance Pty Ltd139 held that the conduct of an employee when 
publishing on a social media site and not removing it, qualifies as a lawful reason to 
dismiss an employee.140 
 
In respect of this, employers should keep their workplace policies and practices up-to-
date in regards to the use of social media outside the workplace. In this way, employers 
can then assess whether there is a breach of privacy when monitoring an employee’s 
personal information on a sponsored device. Therefore, the workplace policy should 
consider indicating firstly, under which circumstance personal information will be 
gathered; secondly, who will be able to see this information in the workplace; thirdly, 
the time frame of how long information will be kept; and lastly the chance given to an 
employee to correct information provided.141 Furthermore, the policy relating to social 
media use outside of the workplace, should accord with the language in the 
employment contract, which outlines the duties and obligations of both the employer 
                                                          
137[2010] FWA 7358 (24 September 2010). See also in general Rose v Telstra Corporation Limited 
[1998] AIRC 1592 for a discussion on conduct outside of workplace where employees got into an 
altercation. 
138Ibid [86]-[89]. See also Meredith Booth, ‘Social Media poses Risks for Employers and Employees’ 
The Australian (online), 13 April 2015 
<http://www.theaustralian.com.au/life/social-media-poses-risk-for-employers-and-employees/story-
e6frg9zo-1227300689335?sv=89d24276c93a9d51b2b5dd77f35f49fb>.  
139[2010] FWA 8544 (5 November 2010). 
140Ibid [108]. 
141Monica Whitty, ‘Should Filtering Software Be Utilised in the Workplace? Australian Employees’ 
Attitudes towards Internet usage and Surveillance of the Internet in the Workplace’ (2004) 2(1) 
Surveillance and Society 39, 50. 
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and employee when matters arise where an employee’s conduct outside the workplace 
is unlawful.142 
 
When an employer considers monitoring employees outside the workplace, an 
employer needs to address the following when controlling the conduct of an employee 
using social media outside the workplace:143 
 
(i) explain to the employee why they are being monitored and the extent of 
monitoring; 
(ii) provide an explanation of circumstances under which the employee will be 
monitored, including social media platforms; 
(iii) guide employees on their duty of care and what information is allowed to 
be included on social media platforms regarding themselves and the 
employer; 
(iv) discuss the use of employer-sponsored devices and information accessed 
on this device; and 
(v) detail the penalties that will apply if an employee breaches the guidelines 
provided by the employer on the misuse of social media platforms. 
 
Because there is still some uncertainty as to how employers should incorporate 
workplace policies regarding the conduct of employees beyond the workplace, the next 
section discusses workplace policies specific to social media use within and beyond 
the workplace. 
 
4.3 SOCIAL MEDIA AND WORKPLACE POLICIES 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, the balance between work and personal life is less 
noticeable because a ‘workplace’ can be defined as anywhere and not necessarily in 
an office. Moreover, as private and public activities become more blurred and 
intermingled, especially in terms of the use of technology and social media, the 
management and control of employee conduct in relation to social media in the 
                                                          
142Issues regarding workplace privacy can be read together with the Guidelines on Workplace Email, 
Web Browsing and Privacy from the Federal Privacy Commissioner as a guideline for employers, 
<http://www.privacy.gov.au/materials/types/guidelines/view/6056>. 
143Leonard, above n 7, 119-120. 
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workplace becomes more challenging. As Akers argues ‘creating a murky middle 
ground between public and private conduct’ opens the possibility for employers to 
regulate and monitor employees outside of working hours.144 
 
To this end, it is essential for employers to have well defined polices and for employees 
to be very familiar with any workplace policies (including the employment contract) 
that extend to monitoring their conduct within and outside the workplace.145 As noted 
in Malcolm Pearson v Linfox Australia Pty Ltd,146 an employer has the right to regulate 
the general behaviour of employees in regard to social media in a social media policy. 
The FWC held that:147 
 
in any employment context the establishment of a social media policy is clearly a 
legitimate exercise in acting to protect the reputation and security of a business. It also 
serves a useful purpose by making clear to employees what its expected of them. 
 
Although social media is used for private communication, Brice, Fifer and Naron 
observe that ‘with the non-stop stream of individual expression on social media 
platforms … as would be expected, many posts and tweets discuss work and 
employment-related matters’.148 Furthermore, Vinson states that ‘social networks 
break down boundaries, make it easy for intended private communications to become 
public, and have a seemingly limitless reach’.149 Therefore, using workplace policies 
in a constructive way, will promote the benefits of the use of social media in the 
workplace as well as reduce the potential challenges it presents such as privacy, breach 
of confidentiality, defamation, cyberbullying (Chapter 3) and workplace surveillance 
(discussed above). This part of the thesis will therefore consider the nature and 
importance of workplace policies, specifically social media policies, and the 
                                                          
144Bridget Akers, ‘Face Off on Facebook’ (2009) 47 Law Society Journal 42 in Louise Thornthwaite, 
‘Chilling Times: Labour Law and the Regulation of Social Media Policies’ (2016) 54 Asia Pacific 
Journal of Human Resources 332. 
145O’Keefe v Williams Muir’s Pty Ltd t/as Troy Williams The Good Guys [2011] FWA 5311 (11 August 
2010).  
146[2011] FWA 4063 (19 March 2014). 
147Ibid. 
148Thomas R Brice, S Fifer and Gregory Naron, ‘Social Media in the Workplace: The NLRB Speaks’ 
(2012) 24(10) Intellectual Property & Technology Law Journal 1, 10. 
149K Vinson, ‘The Blurred Boundaries of Social Networking in the Legal Field: Just “Face” It’ (2010) 
41 University of Memphis Law Review 355, 405. 
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incorporation of workplace polices into the employment contract, with specific 
reference to social media use within the workplace and beyond. 
 
4.3.1 Workplace Policies 
Workplace policies have an important role to play in the control and management of 
the workplace and the employer–employee relationship. Owing to ‘today’s complex 
and numerous employment laws require employers to have workplace policies on a 
wide range of issues in place and ensure these are known and understood by their 
employees’.150  
 
According to the New South Wales Industrial Relations Department, a ‘workplace 
policy’ refers to ‘statements of principles and practices dealing with the ongoing 
management and administration of the organisation’.151 Therefore, a ‘workplace 
policy’ will ‘act as a guiding frame of reference for how the organisation deals with 
everything from its day-to-day operational problems or how to respond to 
requirements to comply with legislation, regulation and codes of practice’.152 This 
indicates that legal risks such as the use of social media in the workplace and beyond 
can be managed more effectively.  
 
Some of the advantages of introducing suitable and effective workplace policies 
include that:153 
 
• employees understand what is expected of them and how to behave in the 
workplace; 
• employees will be treated equally and fairly; 
• there is a system in place for dealing with complaints and to whom to 
address them; and 
• it provides employees with a better understanding of breach of duties. 
                                                          
150Australian Federation of Employers and Industries, Workplace Policies (2016) 
<http://www.afei.org.au/workplace-policies>. 
151New South Wales Industrial Relations, Workplace Policies and Procedures: Employment Essentials 
(July 2013) <www.industrialrelations.nsw.gov.au>.  
152Ibid. 
153Joanna Weekes, Advantages of Workplace Policies and Which Ones You Need (July 2013) Health & 
Safety Bulletin <http://www.healthandsafetyhandbook.com.au/advantages-of-workplace-policies-and-
which-ones-you-need/>.  
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The NSW Industrial Relations list the following aspects as constituting a well-written 
workplace policy: 
 
• consistency with the values of the organisation and employment 
legislation; 
• demonstrates that the organisation is being operated in an efficient and 
business-like manner; 
• ensures uniformity and consistency in decision-making and operational 
procedures; 
• saves time when a new problem can be handled quickly and effectively 
through an existing policy; 
• fosters stability and continuity; 
• maintains the direction of the organisation even during periods of change 
provide the framework for business planning; 
• assists in assessing performance and establishing accountability; and  
• clarifies functions and responsibilities.154  
 
These elements serve as a useful guideline to employers for developing a social media 
policy concerning the use of social media within and beyond the workplace. 
 
It is submitted that every organisation should have a specific policy dealing with the 
use of social media. As noted by Floyd and Spry, the increase of social media use in 
the workplace has made employers keen to include the use of social media into 
workplace policies.155 The FWC has made a remark regarding the failure of 
implementing social media policies in the workplace and stated that ‘in the current 
electronic age, this is not sufficient’.156 The implementation of a workplace policy 
regarding the use of social media has the effect of prohibiting the inappropriate use of 
social media outside working hours and whether an employee will be subject to 
dismissal when breaching this policy. In order to protect the interest of the business, 
                                                          
154 New South Wale’s Industrial Relations, above n 151, 1.  
155Louise Floyd and Max Spry, ‘Four Burgeoning IR issues for 2013 and Beyond: Adverse Action; 
Social Media & Workplace Policy; Trade Union Regulation (after the HSU affair); and the QANTAS 
Aftermath’ (2013) 37 Australian Bar Review 153, 153. 
156Glen Stutsel v Linfox Australian Pty Ltd [2011] FWA 8444 (19 December 2011), 87. 
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Hudson and Roberts explain that ‘the employer must create a Policy that furthers the 
employer's business purposes’, which then makes the employer ‘proactive rather than 
reactive’.157 
 
However, the introduction of social media policies can lead to employers monitoring 
and examining an employee’s private life beyond the employer–employee 
relationship.158 The issue with the latter is whether employees are being treated fairly 
when employers dismiss them according to the social media policy. What conduct, 
according to the policy, will subject the employee to being dismissed by their 
employer? Was the conduct in connection with employment? According to 
Thornthwaite, ‘the real possibility that for employees to comply with their implied 
contractual duties they cannot safely communicate about their working lives in these 
forums’ and therefore the implication is that employees are rarely seen as being off-
duty.159 In this case, an employer needs to be careful when considering out of hours 
conduct as they could breach the privacy of the investigated employee. 
 
The development of a workplace policy will include a planning and consultation stage, 
the drafting of a policy, followed by the development of a final policy that includes 
the necessary terms and conditions. It is essential for any policy to be made available 
to employees and to provide appropriate information and training sessions for 
employees on the policy. Robertson and Black indicate that ‘[a] critical aspect of such 
training would be to emphasise the likely contractual nature of the policies and that a 
failure to follow them may give rise to breach of contract proceedings’.160 Therefore, 
training and education on workplace policies is an important part of an employee 
understanding their duties towards the employer. Furthermore, the implementation of 
workplace policies needs to be effective and central to an employee’s employment.161 
The appropriate and constructive use of social media in the workplace, combined with 
social media policies, can help to maintain a positive employer–employee relationship. 
                                                          
157Susan Hudson and Karla Roberts, ‘Business Leadership Symposium: Drafting and Implementing an 
Effective Social Media Policy’ (2012) 18 Texas Wesleyan Law Review 767, 768. 
158Brice et al, above n 148, 10. 
159Louise Thornthwaite, Social Media, Unfair Dismissal and The Regulation of Employees’ Conduct 
Outside Work (2013) 26(2) Australian Journal of Labour Law 164, 176. 
160G Robertson and H Black, ‘Making the Most of Workplace Policies – Avoiding Potential Legal 
Pitfalls’ (2008) 60(2) Keeping Good Companies 100, 102. 
161J Catanzariti, ‘Burgeoning Workplace Policies May Hide Unwanted Obligations’ (2006) 44(7) Law 
Society Journal 46, 47. 
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However, there needs to be a balance between control and flexibility as restrictive 
social media policies may impact on an employee’s morale and productivity in the 
workplace.162  
 
As noted, employees may be subject to a wide range of workplace policies, including 
a social media policy. For policies to be effective and meaningful, they need to be 
well-drafted, regularly reviewed and implemented effectively. Policies need to be 
readily available and accessible to employees, and they should be regularly reminded, 
updated and informed about policies. The importance of regular information and 
training is aptly demonstrated in Agnew & Others v Nationwide News Ltd163 in which 
four employees were reinstated having been dismissed for breaching the company’s 
alcohol and drug policy. The employees had been drinking alcohol during their lunch 
break, which was grounds for their dismissal. However, it was found that the 
employees had misunderstood the policy. It was noted that the policy on alcohol 
consumption ‘had not always been clear cut’, that the company had been ‘battling a 
culture of drinking during and before working time’ but that breaches of the policy had 
not been dealt with consistently and there were ‘mixed signals about the policy and in 
particular the consequences of drinking during lunch breaks’.164 
 
Therefore, social media workplace policies need to be concise, consistent and well-
drafted in order to address the control and monitoring of social media within and 
beyond the workplace and also limit the challenges social media present in the 
workplace, as examined in Chapter 3.  One question that does arise however, is when 
and how workplace policies may form part of the employment contract and the 
consequences thereof.  This is useful to consider as employees may be held to both 
workplace policies and their employment contract simultaneously through the express 
and implied terms considered in Chapter 2. 
 
                                                          
162See James Richards, ‘What Has the Internet Ever Done for Employees? A Review, Map and Research 
Agenda’ (2012) 34 Employee Relations 22, 30; Annamarie Rooding, ‘Cyberbullying in the Workplace: 
Dealing with Social Networking Sites’ (2009) 12 Internet Law Bulletin 13. 
163 Nationwide News Pty Limited re Brian John Agnew, Barry Joseph Jelly, Frank Peinado and George 
Mandilakis v Nationwide News Pty Limited - PR936856 [2003] AIRC 1056 (27 August 2003). 
164 Ibid [9] – [12]. 
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4.3.2 Relationship Between Workplace Policies and Employment Contracts 
As noted above, employers may have a wide range of workplace policies, conveying 
aspects ranging from parking to health and safety. Workplace policies generally sit 
alongside employment contracts.  Though, some difficulties can arise when an 
employer wants to incorporate workplace policy terms into an employment contract, 
the relationship between workplace policies and employment contracts can co-exist, 
but both the employer and employee must intend to have them incorporated within one 
document.165 According to University of Western Australia v Gray,166 the court held 
that the employment contract may contain contractual terms relating to other 
documents like policies that may be explicitly referred to.167  Therefore, in relation to 
social media and the use thereof within and beyond the workplace, the employer may 
incorporate a social media policy expressly in the employment contract or the letter of 
appointment.168 
 
According to Hobhouse J, ‘the fact that another document is not itself contractual does 
not prevent it from being incorporated into the contract if that intention is shown as 
between the employer and the individual employee’.169 Furthermore, Irving notes that 
for a workplace policy to form part of an employment contract, written consent needs 
to be given by the employee, which then expressly forms part of the contract as a 
whole.170 This was confirmed in the case of Cicciarelli v Qantas Airways Ltd171 in 
which it was held that the actions by the employees incited unlawful industrial action 
and was in breach of their employment contract. 
 
Therefore, an employee who signs the contract agrees to the workplace policy forming 
part of that contract; however, employers need to be careful when incorporating such 
policy terms into the contract and need to help the employee understand the 
consequences of the inclusion of a workplace policy in the employment contract.172 
                                                          
165Romero v Farstad Shipping (Indian Pacific) Pty Ltd (2014) 231 FCR 403 [34]. 
166University of Western Australia v Gray (No 20) [2008] FCA 498. 
167Ibid [90]-[91], 
168See Victoria University of Technology v Wilson [2004] VSC 33 in relation to approval of policies in 
employment contracts. 
169Alexander v Standard Telephones & Cables Ltd (No 2) [1991] IRLR 286, 293. See also Goldman 
Sachs JBWere Services Pty Ltd v Nikolich [2007] FCAFC 120, [23]. 
170Mark Irving, The Contract of Employment (LexisNexis Butterworths, 2012) 227. 
171[2012] FCA 56, [321]-[325]. 
172Toll (FGCT) Pty Ltd v Alphapharm Pty Ltd (2004) 219 CLR 165, 180-182. 
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Owens, Riley and Murray further note that in order for a workplace policy to have an 
effect within the employment contract, the provisions must accord with the nature of 
the contract.173 One example where a workplace policy and employment contract 
united was in the case of Goldman Sachs JBWere Services Pty Ltd v Nikolich.174 In 
this case, Jessup J held that the following need to be considered when deciding whether 
a workplace policy and employment contract combined is contractual in nature:175 
 
(i) the nature of the term and whether it can form part of a contract; 
(ii) the expression of the term and whether it imposes obligations on the 
employer and employee;176 
(iii) whether the document, which contains both the policy and contract, was 
presented to the employee for signature; and 
(iv) if the employee indeed understood the document when they signed it.177 
 
A further example is the case of Romero v Farstad Shipping (Indian Pacific) Pty 
Ltd.178 In this case the workplace policy stated that the employer will ‘handle 
complaints promptly, with confidentiality, impartiality and with sensitivity to the 
complainant’s needs’; however, this was never done.179 The employee therefore 
indicated that because the policy formed part of her employment contract, the 
employer breached its duties. The court held that the workplace policy formed part of 
the employee’s contract and therefore mutual obligations were imposed on both the 
employer and employee.180 As the employee signed the contract, both parties were 
bound by it.181 
 
Workplace policies can become part of an employment contract when a new employee 
enters the workplace or when existing employees agree to include the terms of the 
policy into their current employment contracts. However, sometimes an employee will 
                                                          
173Rosemary Owens, Joellen Riley and Jill Murray, The Law of Work (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 
2011) 252. 
174[2007] 163 FCR 62; [2007] FCAFC 120. 
175Ibid [329]. 
176Ibid. 
177Ibid [327]. 
178(2015) 315 ALR 243. 
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180Ibid [55]. 
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not agree to this, which means that the employer cannot implement new procedures or 
expectations.182 When this occurs, it is then questionable whether the policy forms part 
of the contract or not. Rothman J in the case of Downe v Sydney West Area Health 
Service (No 2)183 held that ‘the employee either take some positive step or decline to 
take an objection in circumstances where objection would be necessary or at least 
expected’.184 Therefore, where an employee expressly indicates that they will not 
comply with the terms of the policy as set out in the contract of employment, such 
indication may lead to termination as a result of breach of contract.185 This further 
indicates that an employer can still exercise their duty towards the employee and ‘an 
employer is entitled, subject to the express provisions of the contract, to give lawful 
and reasonable directions to an employee as to the manner in which the employee shall 
perform work’.186 
 
Workplace policies are often amended to fit in with current changes in the workplace. 
Therefore, if a policy is to form part of an employment contract, the contract should 
also make room for amendments and variations. One example of where such leeway 
is provided is with the development of technology and social media in the workplace. 
Because of the perpetual changes in social media and the different challenges it 
presents, an employer needs to be able to update and change policies, which may have 
implications for changing contracts of employment. In the case of Riverwood 
International Australia Pty Ltd v McCormick,187 the court noted that an employer who 
changes their policies is ‘constrained by an implied term that it would act with due 
regard for the purposes of the contract of employment … so it could not act 
capriciously, and arguably could not act unfairly towards the employee’.188 When an 
employer decides to change an employee’s contract, which includes terms of a 
workplace policy, an employer should bear in mind that the terms should be fair and 
reasonable towards the employee. This would be in the case where employers include 
that they can monitor employees after hours; however, employers need to be clear on 
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the control and monitoring of employees who are not on duty as they could breach and 
employee’s privacy.  
 
One matter of concern regarding workplace policies and employment contracts 
regarding social media, is whether an employee, once the contract is signed with the 
variations, are subject dismissal for behaviour outside of working hours. Having a 
social media policy linked to the employment contract is one way of ensuring that both 
employers and employees fulfil their duties towards each other and to observe how 
employees conduct themselves outside the workplace. If the conduct of an employee 
on a social media platform is unsatisfactory, is it reasonable and lawful to dismiss the 
employee for such comments made.189 
 
An example of how the social media policy was incorporated into how the employees 
act outside the workplace was by the Commonwealth Bank of Australia. In 2011 the 
Commonwealth Bank of Australia presented a social media policy to its employees, 
which stated that if the employer or any employees were alerted to ‘inappropriate or 
disparaging content and information stored or posted by others in the social media 
environment’ regarding the employer or employee, the employer would remove these 
postings and assert dismissal of those employees.190 This policy certainly prohibited 
employees from even talking about anything regarding the bank off-duty. The Finance 
Sector Union raised its concern regarding this policy and stated that:191  
 
participation in a public debate about the four major banks increasing interest rates 
above the RBA increases or charging too much for their credit cards would also fall 
within the purview of the policy … Such conduct, whilst being a breach of the policy, 
would not constitute a breach of the employee’s duty of good faith under the contract 
of employment and would not cause damage to the reputation or interest of the banks. 
 
                                                          
189See for example Board of Bendigo Regional Institute of Technical and Further Education v Barclay 
(2012) 248 CLR 500. 
190Ewin Hannan, ‘Bank Threatens Staff with Sack Over Social Media Comments’, The Australian 
(online), 5 February 2011 
<http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/nation/bank-threatens-staff-with-sack-over-social-media-
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As a result, the Commonwealth Bank of Australia agreed to look at its social media 
policy again and make the necessary changes.192 Therefore, a social media policy 
needs to be clear, transparent and easy to understand. This example leads to 
consideration as to whether employers comply with the ‘better off overall test’. 
According to the Fair Work Act, this test states that:193 
 
For the purposes of determining whether an enterprise agreement passes the better off 
overall test, if a class of employees to which a particular employee belongs would be 
better off if the agreement applied to that class than if the relevant modern award applied 
to that class, the FWC is entitled to assume, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, 
that the employee would be better off overall if the agreement applied to the employee. 
 
This needs to be considered because the regulation of employees within the workplace, 
especially regarding their use of social media in the workplace, is important. 
Therefore, the ‘better off overall’ test needs to be applied in order to provide employees 
with fair and reasonable expectations within agreements and employment contracts in 
order to keep the employer–employee relationship respectable. In the case of 
Broadmeadows Disability Services,194 the social media clause in the enterprise 
agreement stated that it:195 
 
prohibits an employee from putting any comments about the employer’s business on 
any social media site at any time. Further the clause extends to conversations that take 
place about their employment and during their employment that are provided to a third 
party that results in the publication on Social Networking Media. 
 
The clause indicates that there is no mutual obligation on the parties – the only 
obligation rests on the employees. Therefore, the social media clause restricted the 
employees’ freedom to talk about their work.196 Commissioner Gooley concluded that 
the enterprise agreement, especially with the clause on social media, does not meet the 
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‘better off overall test’ and therefore the agreement is subject to changes that will 
represent a mutual obligation on both parties.197 
 
Furthermore, according to Goldman Sachs JBWere Services Pty Ltd v Nikolich,198 the 
court identified that the following terms from workplace policies can be seen as 
incorporated into the employment contract and which binds the two:199  
 
(i) terms normally found in an employment contract such as hours of work, 
grievance and remuneration;  
(ii) terms expressed in a fixed language and which relates to duties and 
obligations;  
(iii) it was made known to the employee that the workplace policy would form 
part of the employment contract and run concurrently when starting 
employment; and  
(iv) the employee was required to read and understand the terms of the 
workplace policy and was asked to sign a declaration by accepting this as 
part of the employment contract (see example of social media policy 
below).200  
 
Some other terms of a workplace policy that will likely form part of the employment 
contract include where the offer letter for employment stated that the workplace policy 
is connected to the employment contract,201 the hindering of an employment contract 
to continue without such a policy term202 and where training is provided in this area 
relating to the workplace policy that might affect the employment contract if not 
implemented thoroughly.203 
 
The above-mentioned case law and discussion on whether employment contracts 
include terms of workplace policies as well as whether employees can be dismissed 
regarding a comment made on social media of the employer outside of working hours 
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is challenging. Nereim notes that ‘allowing retaliation against one employee who 
speaks out on a matter relating to employment creates a workplace atmosphere in 
which there is fear of protest’.204 Therefore, employers should be careful in not 
restricting an employee’s freedom to talk on these social networks when it is not 
hurting the interests of the business. However, having a well-drafted social media 
policy that can correlate with the employment contract is a better way of monitoring 
an employee’s conduct within and outside the workplace when the employee is 
behaving in a manner that could harm or undermine the employer–employee 
relationship.  
 
A social media workplace policy should address the following criteria when an 
employer considers introducing some of the terms into an employment contract in 
order to maintain a positive employer–employee relationship:205 
 
(i) explaining that surveillance will be carried out on the employee’s social 
media platforms where permissible; 
(ii) discussing with the employee how it will be carried out and when it will 
begin; and 
(iii) explaining the duration of the monitoring, whether it is occasional or 
continuous.  
 
In addition to these, it is useful for an employer to clearly express in a social media 
workplace policy:206 
 
(i) the meaning of ‘social media’ within and outside the workplace; 
(ii) what reasonable use will be of social media by an employee;  
(iii) what misuse of social media is; 
(iv) the consequences of misusing social media within and outside the 
workplace; and 
(v) what workplace policies will be associated with the policy. 
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These principles will ensure that employees have a clear understanding on the use 
social media within and outside the workplace. Moreover, it will make the employee 
aware that if they harm the reputation of a business and if there is a misuse of social 
media, dismissal is a possibility, especially when coupled with other workplace 
policies such as privacy and workplace bullying (cyberbullying). Therefore, as 
discussed in Chapter 2, an employee has the implied duty of obeying an employer’s 
directions when dealing with the employment contract in connection with the 
workplace policies. For example, the implied duty of fidelity states that an employee 
must not behave in a manner contrary to their contractual obligations and the social 
media workplace policy requires the employee not to disclose confidential information 
of their clients. In this scenario, both the employment contract and the social media 
policy will be put into action if the employee defames a client of the employer on 
social media by releasing the details of that client.  
 
In this regard, the social media workplace policy and employment contract are 
connected in relation to the implied duties between an employer and employee. 
Therefore, the above measures, together with a clearly stipulated employment contract 
dealing with the use of social media within and outside the workplace, will ensure that 
an employer will be able to minimise the risks to the business associated with the 
misuse of social media by an employee and at the same time ensure that an employee 
still has an interest in their own privacy. 
 
This thesis, as mentioned previously, provides an example of a social media policy 
(see Appendix 1) that may be used by employers for the inappropriate use of social 
media by employees within and outside the workplace. This policy specifically deals 
with the necessary privacy challenges concerned with monitoring employees outside 
the workplace and what the consequences will be when employees misuse social 
media, which is against the social media workplace policy. 
 
Against this background, an employer will need to develop appropriate social media 
policies in the workplace to make a decision regarding termination if there is a misuse 
of social media by an employee within the workplace that could lead to breach of 
privacy, defamation or cyberbullying. These social media policies can also be 
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connected to the employment contract to couple express and implied duties of both the 
employee and employer within that policy. A proper social media policy will secure 
the adequate control and management of social media by an employee within and 
outside working hours. 
 
4.4 CONCLUSION 
This chapter introduced the legal challenges faced by employers in regards to the 
control and management through workplace policies of social media use by employees 
beyond the workplace. The first challenge addressed was whether workplace 
surveillance legislation is relevant to the monitoring of social media in the workplace. 
In summary, the Surveillance Devices Act 1998 (WA) does not specifically refer to 
monitoring of the conduct of employees in the workplace, whereas the Surveillance 
Devices Act 2007 (NSW) makes provision for the control and monitoring of employees 
in the workplace. However, these pieces of legislation do not specifically apply to the 
monitoring of social media outside the workplace. The question was also addressed as 
to whether uniform legislation will be applicable in regards to the monitoring of 
employees within and outside the workplace; the ALRC is in favour of such 
legislation. However, breach of privacy of an employee and whether the monitoring 
of information will fall within the walls of ‘personal information’ is an issue and may 
create legal challenges for employers.  
 
Furthermore, it was made clear in Chapters 3 and 4 that the Privacy Act207 only applies 
to public employers or private entities with a turnover of more than a certain threshold 
per annum and therefore privacy laws are not as effective in each state and territory 
because of this distinction. Therefore, surveillance laws need to address the issue of 
control and monitoring in the workplace and breach of privacy in this respect. 
Notwithstanding the advantages of adequate surveillance laws, it is unquestionably 
creating challenges for employers in the area of social media and the workplace.  
 
One of the main concerns discussed in this chapter was the breach of an employee’s 
privacy when monitoring their use of social media in and outside the workplace. 
Therefore, a distinction was drawn between monitoring of social media within and 
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outside the workplace in order to identify whether an employer has a ‘right’ to monitor 
employees and their use of social media. The main question and aim of this thesis is 
whether the monitoring of employees outside the workplace is possible. This question 
was addressed in the chapter and it was noted that if an employer sponsors a device to 
an employee, that device is possible to control and monitor by the employer. However, 
when an employee is using their own device, the appropriate connection between work 
and the employee’s conduct must be established. Once there is a connection with their 
employment and the misuse of social media outside the workplace, it is reasonable for 
an employer to establish whether an employee should be dismissed or not. 
 
In relation to the dismissal of employees, this part of the thesis considered whether a 
social media policy is possible to form part of the employment contract and once this 
is achieved, whether the employer can dismiss an employee on the basis of the policy 
forming part of the employment contract and any breach thereof will be a breach of 
the employee’s terms and conditions. The increase in case law and decisions by the 
FWC indicate that employers need to be aware of social media activities by their 
employees, now more than ever.208 This can only be addressed through the 
introduction of appropriate social media policies in the workplace managed 
concurrently with the employment contract in order to prevent legal consequences 
such as breach of privacy, defamation and cyberbullying. This is not only a duty owed 
to the employee using social media, but also their co-workers. 
 
Given the perpetual transmutation of social media, especially in the workplace, 
liability is a serious concern and needs to be addressed from the onset. This chapter 
endeavoured to identify the use of workplace policies attached to employment 
contracts and how the appropriate and transparent surveillance of an employee within 
and outside the workplace can play a vital role in the control and management of the 
employment relationship, while at the same time respecting the employee’s private life 
and expectations of privacy in the workplace. Also, workplace policies should not act 
                                                          
208See Sally-Anne Fitzgerald v Dianna Smith T/A Escape Hair Design [2010] FWA 7358 (24 September 
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as an unnecessary and onerous ‘chilling effect’ on the constructive use of social media 
for professional and personal activities. 
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CHAPTER 5 
OVERVIEW, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
This thesis has discussed the use of social media in the workplace and the implications 
for the employer–employee relationship as well as the employment contract as a 
whole. This final chapter provides an overview of the thesis and a summary of the key 
issues that address the research aims and questions set out in Chapter 1. The chapter 
presents recommendations and suggestions for further research on the use of social 
media in the workplace and beyond.   
 
5.2 OVERVIEW OF THESIS AND SUMMARY OF KEY ISSUES 
The main purpose of this thesis was to examine the extent to which an employer can 
manage and control an employee’s use of social media within and outside the 
workplace and working hours. The thesis therefore focused on the nature and 
significance of social media in the workplace, the employment relationship, and issues 
concerning privacy, defamation and cyberbullying. This was followed by a discussion 
on workplace surveillance and social media policies as a central discussion to the 
monitoring and control of the use of social media within and beyond the workplace.  
  
Chapter 2 commenced with a background discussion on social media in the workplace 
and noted that social media has become a global phenomenon and well entrenched in 
the workplace. However, although there are many advantages to social media there are 
also potential legal pitfalls for employers and employees. Social media in the 
workplace can be perceived as an effective advertising tool for employers. The 
everyday use of social media and email in the workplace has become a necessary tool 
to communicate with clients and co-workers.1 However, the wide use of social media 
in the workplace can create problems for employers and employees, especially when 
                                                          
1Teresa Thompson and Norah Bluvshtein, ‘Where Technology and the Workplace Collide: An analysis 
of the Intersection between Employment Law and Workplace Technology’ (2008) Privacy & Data 
Security Law Journal 283, 284. 
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social media is used inappropriately.2 A further issue arises with the use of social 
media by employees outside the workplace may have a negative effect on the 
workplace environment and employment relationship. Therefore, one aim of this thesis 
was to determine what constitutes a ‘workplace’ and how the potential misuse of social 
media outside the workplace provides the employer with the right to dismiss an 
employee because of this conduct. 
 
Chapter 2 then explored the meaning of a ‘workplace’. The ‘workplace’ is not 
generally defined in employment legislation; however, the Work Health and Safety Act 
2011 (Cth) does provide a definition for ‘workplace’. It was noted in this piece of 
legislation that a ‘workplace’ is not limited to an office or cubicle, but extends to an 
employee’s house and vehicle as well.3 The significance of the word ‘workplace’ in 
relation to the use of social media out of working hours was highlighted in the case of 
Ziebarth v Simon Blackwood (Worker’s Compensation Regulator)4 where it was held 
that because the employee’s contract held that he should be available out of working 
hours, the injury he sustained was at a ‘workplace’.5 Therefore, with the development 
of technology in the workplace and the use of mobile devices anytime and anyplace, 
it is reasonable to assert that a workplace can be anywhere. However, this can affect 
the employment contract and whether the inappropriate use of social media outside of 
working hours may be subject to dismissal of an employee.   
 
In this respect, an employee who misuses social media outside working hours can 
therefore be subject to disciplinary action, depending on the seriousness of the conduct 
and whether it was in connection with employment.6 This, in turn, impacts the 
employment contract and how the duties between an employer and employee are 
subject to change when the employment relationship and use of social media in the 
workplace connect. A further issue within this thesis was whether expressed and 
                                                          
2David Kelleher, 5 Problems with Social Networking in the Workplace (October 2009) Information 
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<http://www.information-management.com/specialreports/2009_165/socialnetworkingmedia-
10016208-1.html>.  
3Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (Cth) s 8. 
4[2015] QIRC 121. 
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6See in general Commissioner for Railways (NSW) v O’Donnell (1938) 60 CLR 681; Comcare v PVYW 
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implied duties within an employment contract extend to out-of-hours activities of 
employees and whether the employer will be able to dismiss the employee for such 
conduct.7 If an employee breaches an express or implied term within the employment 
contract, such as confidentiality, honesty or good faith as well as mutual trust and 
confidence,8 it is a ground for dismissal and therefore the employer may need to 
consider whether the misuse of social media beyond the workplace falls within such a 
category. The implication of this change is that employers and employees do not fulfil 
their implied duties under the employment contract.9 Consequently, when boundaries 
are overstepped by an employee in respect of the inappropriate use of social media 
beyond the workplace, it further places a burden on the employment contract and 
essentially a breach of the implied terms in the contract.   
 
Because employers place trust and confidence in their employees to perform the tasks 
contracted for, employers need to be cautious when considering using social media in 
the workplace.10 This research has demonstrated that social media in the workplace 
has become commonplace, as discussed in Chapter 2, and therefore can significantly 
impact on the employer–employee relationship. The impact social media has on the 
employment relationship creates legal issues and challenges for employers such as 
privacy, defamation and cyberbullying, as discussed in Chapter 3. Therefore, one of 
the key aims of this thesis was to address these legal challenges within the context of 
social media. 
 
The first key legal issue examined in this thesis was the breach of privacy through the 
inappropriate use of social media platforms in the workplace and beyond. As discussed 
in Chapter 3, there exists no definition for ‘privacy’ and no general right to privacy, 
hence the law provides limited protection and remedies in the regard. However, limited 
protection is provided by in privacy legislation. Privacy legislation in Australia is a 
complex area especially with the development of technology and breach of privacy by 
                                                          
7See in general Robb v Green [1895] 2 QB 315, 317. 
8The duty of mutual trust and confidence has been dismissed as an implied duty by the High Court in 
the case of Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Barker (2014)253 CLR 169. 
9See in general Australian Communications Commission v Hart (1982) 43 ALR 165; Russell v Trustees 
of the Roman Catholic Church for the Archdiocese of Sydney [2007] 69 NSWLR 198.  See also Gillies 
v Downer EDI Ltd [2011] 218 IR 1, 43. 
10Employers need to put in place efficient workplace policies dealing with the use of social media within 
and outside the workplace. 
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employers and employees through social media platforms. The Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) 
mainly applies to public employers and employees regarding breach of privacy and 
therefore limited protection is given to private employers and employees. However, 
with the introduction of the APP’s, which specifically deal with the collection and 
access of personal information by employers, it provides protection to private 
employers and employees to a limited extent.11 The aim of this key legal issue was to 
determine how employers and employees may breach privacy pre-, during and post-
employment using social media. This thesis submitted that the Privacy Amendment 
(Enhancing Privacy Protection) Act 2012 (Cth) was implemented to deal with breach 
of privacy through the development of technology in the workplace. Therefore, to 
protect those private employers and employees not subject to the Privacy Act and 
APPs, this thesis argued that workplace policies need to reflect the Privacy Act and 
give effect to the APPs when social media is inappropriately used within and beyond 
the workplace. This will add to the protection of personal and confidential information 
of employers and employees within the workplace. 
 
In conjunction with privacy is the principle of confidentiality, which applies to both 
employer and employee. Given that there is no cause of action for an invasion of 
privacy in Australia, as explained in Chapter 3, the equitable doctrine of confidentiality 
was an alternative remedy. The breach of confidentiality through social media 
platforms has raised an additional legal issue under privacy. This has been considered 
within the context of an employee relaying confidential information of an employer to 
potential future competitors. This thesis argued that the breach of confidentiality 
through social media platforms can cause harm to an employer’s business reputation. 
This may have significant consequences as employees may be dismissed because of 
their inappropriate actions through social media and the release of confidential 
information. Thus, this thesis argues that employers need to ensure that workplace 
policies are in place to inform employees of the consequences of such actions, 
especially beyond the workplace.  
 
                                                          
11Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Australian Privacy Principles, Privacy Factsheet 
17 (January 2014)  
<https://www.oaic.gov.au/individuals/privacy-fact-sheets/general/privacy-fact-sheet-17-australian-
privacy-principles>.  
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The second key legal issue considered in this thesis was whether the employment 
relationship is affected by defamatory remarks posted on social media. With the use 
of social media in the workplace, it creates opportunities for employers and employees 
to communicate with friends and co-workers more easily. However, communication 
on social media may also be negative and defamatory. When considering defamation 
in light of the use of social media in the workplace, the necessary elements need to be 
present in order for it to be classified as defamatory, as discussed in Chapter 3.12 
Therefore, these elements are central to bringing an action against an employee or 
employer for defamatory remarks made on a social media platform and a key aim to 
this thesis. In terms of the common law, there must be published information of a 
defamatory matter, the information must identify the plaintiff and the published 
information must indeed be defamatory. The general law of defamation and the 
elements apply to social media in the workplace. However, it was argued that it is 
difficult for employers to identify who posted defamatory remarks made outside of 
working hours as social media platforms allow employees to post anonymously. 
However, when employees are not posting remarks anonymously, it is argued that 
employees need to be aware of the potential consequences of their defamatory 
remarks, even if made on personal social media forums. This is important as it could 
lead to dismissal of that employee if it concerns the workplace and employment 
matters, whether it was published within the workplace or beyond.   
 
Furthermore, employers should be careful when dismissing an employee in regard to 
defamatory material posted on social media. Key cases such as Cairns v Modi;13 
Banjeri v Bowles14 and McEloney v Massey15 indicate that employers need to be aware 
of such conduct because circumstances can arise where a defence can be raised by an 
employee where they have made comments that point towards the truth or that was an 
opinion by an employee.16 Therefore, defamatory comments made by employees on 
social media may not necessarily harm the reputation of the employer because of these 
                                                          
12See Chapter 3. The elements are that: (i) The information was published; (ii) The information 
published also identified the person (plaintiff); and (iii) The information which was published was 
indeed defamatory. 
13[2012] EWHC 756 (QB). 
14(2013) FCCA 1052. 
15(2015) WADC 126.   
16See in general McEloney v Massey (2015) WADC 126; McManus v Scott-Charlton (1996) 70 FCR 
16. 
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defences. This thesis argued that, although social media may be an asset within the 
workplace, it can lead to disciplinary actions or unreasonable behaviour by employers 
and employees in the workplace.  
 
Beyond issues such as privacy, confidential information and defamation, an 
employer’s implied duty of care towards their employees applies greatly when social 
media is impacting co-workers and their productivity. This can lead to an employer 
being vicariously liable if not monitoring and controlling employees when 
inappropriately using social media in the workplace and beyond. The last key legal 
issue relating to the inappropriate use of social media in the workplace is 
cyberbullying, not only within the workplace, but outside of working hours and beyond 
the control of an employer. As discussed in Chapter 3, workplace safety is an important 
part in the regulation of employee safety within the workplace.17  Therefore, the key 
aim of this part of the chapter was whether the employment relationship is impacted 
by cyberbullying activities within and beyond the workplace. 
 
Because of the development of different types of technology in the workplace, 
legislation has not been updated to include cyberbullying as a legal issue in the 
workplace. The Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) and Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (Cth) 
include bullying as a definition but have not incorporated technological advancements 
to bullying into legislation. Therefore, it is the duty of an employer to be aware of the 
cyberbullying activities whether within the workplace or beyond. It has further been 
argued in this thesis that it is not necessary for an employee to be at work when bullied 
through social media.18 Therefore, the person who is bullying a co-worker or employer 
through social media may be disciplined for their inappropriate conduct outside of 
working hours. This thesis therefore argues that employers need to implement 
sufficient workplace policies dealing with what cyberbullying conduct is, that it is 
irrelevant whether the cyberbullying takes place within the workplace or beyond, and 
what the consequences of cyberbullying will be. Therefore, to avoid the key legal 
issues associated with the use of social media in the workplace, an employer will need 
                                                          
17Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) s 789FD.  See in general Geoff Wilkinson, ‘Brodie's Law Means Workplace 
and Cyber Bullies Face 10 years in Jail’, Herald Sun (online), 5 April 2011 
<http://www.heraldsun.com.au/news/workplace-and-cyber-bullies-face-up-to-10-years-jail-under-
anti-harassment-brodie-panlock-laws/story-e6frf7jo-1226033612374>.   
18Sharon Bowker & Ors v DP World Melbourne Ltd & Ors [2014] FWCFB 9227 (19 December 2014). 
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to incorporate a well-structured employment contract as well as social media 
workplace policies that address out-of-work activities involving social media 
activities. 
 
The final aim of this thesis was to consider current workplace surveillance and 
monitoring policies in Australia and to what extent an employer has the right to control 
and monitor the use of social media by an employee within and beyond the workplace. 
This thesis argued that workplace surveillance is one approach to monitoring the use 
of social media by employees in and beyond the workplace. The laws pertaining to 
workplace surveillance are not uniform19 and each state and territory has its own laws 
on how to monitor employees in the workplace.20 In Western Australia, for example, 
the Surveillance Devices Act 1998 (WA) does not specifically refer to workplace 
surveillance therefore sufficient workplace policies need to be incorporated in order to 
provide for such monitoring in the workplace.21 With the monitoring of employees, it 
is important for an employer not to breach an employee’s privacy in the workplace or 
to overstep their contractual boundaries.   
 
In terms of workplace policies addressing the use of social media in the workplace, 
Chapter 4 introduced a discussion on the monitoring of social media use by employees 
outside the workplace without breaching privacy principles through social media 
workplace policies. However, when implementing such a workplace policy, employers 
need a balance between their business interests and the interest of employees in order 
to maintain a good employer–employee relationship.22 
 
Furthermore, this thesis highlighted that employment contracts and workplace policies 
are important tools in regulating, monitoring and controlling an employee’s behaviour 
within and outside working hours. Both employment contracts and workplace policies 
relating to social media may co-exist, but it was emphasised that employees need to 
agree to this as one document and understand the consequences when breaching this 
                                                          
19However, the Australian Law Reform Commission considered implementing uniform laws regarding 
workplace surveillance and privacy. 
20See Workplace Surveillance Act 2005 (NSW); Workplace Privacy Act 2011 (ACT); Surveillance 
Devices Act 1999 (Vic); Surveillance Devices Act 1998 (WA). 
21See Chapter 4.  This needs to bear in mind the definition of a ‘workplace’ as discussed in Chapter 2. 
22Dan Svantesson, ‘Online Workplace Surveillance’ (2012) 2(3) International Data Privacy Law 179, 
189. 
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document. However, when social media workplace policies are linked with 
employment contracts, this thesis submits that employers need to clearly identify to 
employees the different kinds of monitoring of devices. This applies whether 
employers sponsor a device, which is subject to control and monitoring, or employees 
use their own device (BOYD), which is subject to monitoring of social media 
activities. Employers may, to a certain extent, control and monitor the use of social 
media on an employee’s device outside of working hours.  This will depend on the 
type of information, harm to the interests of the business and breach of privacy 
principles. 
 
5.3 KEY RECOMMENDATIONS 
The key recommendations for this thesis are as follows. 
 
Recommendation 1 
That social media and technology should be directly addressed in the employment 
contract and periodically reviewed against the contractual duties. This should be 
accompanied by ongoing training and awareness in the workplace for employees on 
the use of social media within and beyond the workplace and identify legal issues and 
risks associated with the use of social media. 
 
Recommendation 2 
That social media workplace policies should be implemented to deal with the control 
and monitoring of inappropriate use of social media outside the workplace and the 
consequences of such misuse. These social media policies should also be accompanied 
by the employment contract dealing with social media and technological change in the 
workplace. Social media policies should be regularly reviewed and updated. Policies 
should be readily available to employees and supported by information and training 
sessions.   
 
Recommendation 3 
That there is a need for law reform by states and territories dealing with privacy and 
workplace surveillance of social media use within and beyond the workplace. It is 
recommended that there is a need for substantial changes to workplace surveillance 
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legislation to certainly greater certainty and consistency, and to better reflect the reality 
of technology in the workplace. For instance, it is recommended that the WA 
legislation be amended to include provisions on data and computer surveillance. 
Moreover, given the limited protection afforded by the Privacy Act and the patchwork 
of privacy laws in states and territories, further law reform is needed in this area. Given 
that WA does not have a privacy law regime, this is one jurisdiction in which law 
reform is recommended.   
 
5.4 FURTHER RESEARCH 
This research has focused specifically on the use of social media in the workplace, 
with special reference to selected legal issues and the misuse of social media outside 
and beyond the workplace. Through examining this specific topic and the issues it 
presented, this thesis has sought to contribute to improved policy and practices in the 
workplace, and also in the field of social media and employment law. However, there 
is further opportunity for research as this thesis did not intend to cover all aspects of 
social media in the workplace. 
 
Privacy and technology is a complex issue and area of law in which further research 
could be conducted with a view to supporting law reform. 
 
Workplace bullying, including cyberbullying, remains a concern in the workplace and 
although there is an extensive body of research on workplace bullying, there is scope 
for further legal research in this area. 
 
Workplace surveillance is also an ongoing contentious issue, and there is scope for 
further in-depth research on surveillance in the workplace, which may include 
international comparative law perspectives.  
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5.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The quote ‘Businesses need to fully transform to properly address the impact and 
demands of social media’ by Eric Qualman23 indicates the multiple concerns social 
media in the workplace imposes on the employer–employee relationship. For the 
employment relationship to function successfully, the workplace needs to adapt to and 
accommodate the use of social media. However, there needs to be clear boundaries 
and responsible use of social media in the workplace. The issues and case law dealt 
with in this thesis demonstrate the need for control and monitoring of social media in 
the workplace and beyond where it impacts on the employment relationship. 
Therefore, by employers implementing appropriate and effective social media policies 
as a tool to positively and constructively monitor and control the use of social media 
in the workplace and beyond, while recognising the benefits of social media, it is 
considered a step in the right direction.  
  
                                                          
23Erik Qualman, Socialnomics: How Social Media Transforms the Way We Live and do Business (John 
Wiley & Sons, 2011) 36 in Francois Quintin Cilliers, ‘The Role and Effect of Social Media in the 
Workplace’ (2013) 40 Northern Kentucky Law Review 567, 567. 
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APPENDIX 1 
MODEL WORKPLACE SOCIAL MEDIA POLICY 
 
DRAFT CLAUSES FOR A WORKPLACE SOCIAL MEDIA POLICY24 
 
A. PURPOSE 
 
The purpose of this Social Media policy is to inform employees on the appropriate use 
of Social Media within and outside the workplace for work purposes, whether 
employees are using their own devices or [Company]-sponsored devices, and to set 
out the responsibilities and obligations of [Company] and its employees. 
 
B. SOCIAL MEDIA POLICY STATEMENT 
 
Social Media is changing the workplace in many aspects. [Company] recognises the 
need for employees to use Social Media and to connect with each other; however, 
because Social Media distorts the line between personal activities and professional 
activities, there is a need to ensure the appropriate use of Social Media in the workplace 
and for work purposes in order to protect the [Company’s] and employee’s reputation 
from any damage through the inappropriate use of these Social Media platforms.  
 
C. SCOPE OF POLICY 
 
This policy applies to all employees (permanent, part-time, casual, temporary) of 
[Company].  
 
 
                                                          
24The following are policies selected for the desktop survey: New South Wales Industry, Social Media 
Policy (12 April 2016) <http://www.industry.nsw.gov.au/policies/items/social-media-policy>; 
Business Victoria, HR Policy and Procedure Manual Template (21 December 2015) 
<http://www.business.vic.gov.au/search-results?q=social+media+policy>; Robert McHale, 
Monitoring, Regulating, and Disciplining Employees Using Social Media (30 August 2012) Pearson 
<http://www.quepublishing.com/articles/article.aspx?p=1945832>; Beachcroft, Social Media Policy 
Template (2014) <https://www.hashdoc.com/documents/3436/template-social-media-policy#!>; 
Spencer Hamer, ‘Social Media’ (2013) 10 HRfocus 1. 
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D. DEFINITIONS 
 
1. Company refers to the ‘employer’ [insert name]. 
 
2. Employee refers to the ‘employee’ under the relevant section of the Fair Work 
Act 2009 (Cth) as either a ‘national system employee’ or having its ordinary 
meaning. 
 
3. External refers to Social Media platforms outside the Company domain in an 
employee’s private space. 
 
4. Internal refers to Social Media platforms within the Company which is only 
accessible by employees through the Company domain. 
 
5. Misconduct refers to an employee breaching this social media policy and any 
terms of the employment contract through engaging in misappropriate use of 
Social Media platforms stated in (4) above, internally and externally where 
indicated as breach. 
 
6. Personal Information refers to ‘personal information’ under the relevant 
section of the Privacy Act 1998 (Cth) as: 
Information or an opinion about an identified individual, or an individual who is reasonably 
identifiable:   
(a) whether the information or opinion is true or not; and  
(b) whether the information or opinion is recorded in a material form or not. 
 
7. Reasonable refers to the appropriate use of Social Media by an employee as 
stated in Clause G of this Policy. 
 
8. Social Media refers to various social networks, which include but is not limited 
to, Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, LinkedIn, Blogs and Discussion Forums, and 
where communication is generated online. 
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9. Social Media Policy refers to this made in the workplace regarding the 
appropriate use of Social Media and permitted monitoring thereof by an 
employer and do not refer to any legal principles unless clearly stated. 
 
10. Workplace refers to a ‘workplace’ under the relevant section of Work Health 
and Safety Act 2011 (Cth) as: 
(1) a workplace is a place where work is carried out for a business or undertaking and 
includes any place where a worker goes, or is likely to be, while at work. 
(2) In this section, place includes: 
(a) A vehicle, vessel, aircraft or other mobile structure; and 
(b) Any waters and any installation on land, on the bed of any waters or floating on any 
waters. 
 
E. USE OF PERSONAL INFORMATION AND PRIVACY 
 
1. The Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) is the legislation dealing with use of personal 
information and [Company] will regulate the collection and handling of 
personal information through this legislation. Furthermore, the employer is 
responsible for the safeguard of personal information of an employee under 
each State or Territory laws where applicable. 
 
2. If an employee provides personal information to [Company], whether pre-or 
during employment, [Company] may not disclose this information to any other 
person under the relevant legislation.  
 
3. Clause 2 of this part will further apply when personal information of an 
employee is provided by a third party.  [Company] will handle this information 
as if it was provided by the employees personally. 
 
F. SOCIAL MEDIA USE BY EMPLOYEE IN THE WORKPLACE 
 
1. All employees of [Company] must obtain written approval by [Company] to 
use Social Media platforms as a representative of [Company]. [Company] 
trusts and requires an employee exercising appropriate responsibility when 
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using Social Media in order to obey the duties imposed on the employee by 
[Company]. 
 
2. Employees who are instructed and authorised to represent [Company] on 
Social Media platforms internally, must conduct themselves professionally and 
act in the best interest of [Company] by disclosing their name and affiliation 
with [Company].  
 
3. Employees are responsible for any material posted on or comments made on 
Social Media. To avoid a breach of the policy, an employee may not post or 
re-post any information or make comments on Social Media that: 
 
• Harms, intimidates or insult [Company] and its partners, clients and other 
employees; 
• Defames and may cause harm to the reputation of [Company] and its 
partners, clients, employees and other persons or organisations; and 
• Discloses personal or confidential information of [Company] and its 
partners, clients or other employees. 
 
4. To ensure that employees comply with this Policy and use of Social Media 
appropriately, [Company] will: 
 
• Provide mandatory training to new and existing staff on the use of Social 
Media within and outside the workplace. 
• Where appropriate, make available an official Social Media account 
specifically approved by [Company] to distinguish between private and 
work-related activities. 
• Not include any personal views or comments on Social Media platforms. 
• Ensure [Company’s] policy do not conflict with any of the Social Media 
Platforms’ terms and conditions. 
 
5. If an employee is uncertain on whether to post information or comments about 
[Company] or interact, as a representative, with other businesses regarding 
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information about [Company], he or she should seek advice from [insert name] 
or the Legal Department. 
 
G. PERSONAL USE OF SOCIAL MEDIA  
 
1. [Company] authorises the reasonable use of Social Media in the workplace on 
an employee’s personal device. The use of Social Media Platforms during 
official working hours for private and personal purposes are subject to the 
following: 
 
• Use of personal Social Media Platforms must occur out of working hours, 
which means during lunch time or before/after scheduled working hours. 
• Use of personal Social Media Platforms must not interfere with an 
employee’s performance. 
• Use of personal Social Media Platforms must be used in compliance with 
[Company’s] other Policies and Code of Conduct. 
• Employees may not use work email address to create a personal Social 
Media account. 
 
2. This Social Media Policy does not apply to the personal use of Social Media 
by employees on their personal devices outside of the workplace and work 
activities unless posts or comments refer to directly or indirectly to [Company] 
and may harm the reputation of [Company] or its employees, or are in breach 
of [Company] policies and the Code of Conduct. 
  
3. An employee acting in their personal and private capacity, using personal 
devices, must not post, upload, forward, tweet, re-tweet: 
 
• False and defamatory material of [Company], clients or other employees; 
• Confidential information of [Company] to other staff or businesses;  
• Private information of other employees, intellectual property of [Company] 
or copyright material; or  
• Any other material that may be directly or indirectly harmful to [Company] 
and its employees. 
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4. If an employee becomes aware of the inappropriate or unlawful use of Social 
Media that     relates directly or indirectly to the [Company] it should be 
reported to [insert name]. 
 
H. MONITORING OF SOCIAL MEDIA  
 
1. Employees should be aware that any use of Social Media websites on 
[Company] sponsored devices during or outside of working hours will be 
monitored by the [Company]. The Company reserves the right to prohibit and 
limit access to Social Media sites on [Company] sponsored devices where there 
might be inappropriate use thereof. 
 
2. Any employee who makes inappropriate use of [Company] sponsored devices 
inside or outside of working hours will be in breach of this Policy and subject 
to a disciplinary hearing. 
 
I. BREACH OF SOCIAL MEDIA POLICY 
 
1. All employees must comply with this Social Media Policy and a breach of any 
terms of the Policy will result in misconduct and breach of their duties in the 
employment contract which is subject to disciplinary action. 
 
2. Disciplinary action for serious breach of the Social Media Policy by an 
employee may include: 
 
• termination of employment contract;  
• non-renewal of a contract; 
• verbal and written warnings; 
• suspension from the workplace; and 
• mandatory education and training. 
  
209 
 
J. ACCEPTANCE OF SOCIAL MEDIA POLICY 
 
I, [employee name] confirm that I understand and will comply with the terms 
contained in the Social Media Policy of [Company]. I acknowledge that I am 
responsible for the appropriate and professional use of Social Media while in the 
employ of [Company]. 
 
NAME: 
TITLE: 
SIGNATURE AND DATE: 
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